Complete Defeat and the End of the Non-Recognized State of Nagorno-Karabakh

September 2024 marks the first anniversary of a decisive turn in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Following Azerbaijan’s “anti-terrorist operation,” the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh were dissolved, triggering a mass exodus of the local population and a significant humanitarian crisis.

The swift military defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan has set a concerning precedent in international law by applying the concept of debellatio—a doctrine traditionally reserved for international conflicts between States—to a non-international armed conflict involving a non-recognized State. This post expands on Captain Peter Konchak’s discussion of the debellatio effect against Hamas, examining the legal implications in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh as a non-recognized State.

Historical Background

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a long-standing and complex territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, centered around Nagorno-Karabakh. The roots of the conflict date back to the early 20th century when the Soviet Union incorporated the region into Soviet Azerbaijan. Despite its Armenian majority, Nagorno-Karabakh remained an autonomous region within Azerbaijan during the Soviet era.

As the Soviet Union began to collapse in the late 1980s, long-standing ethnic tensions in the region escalated into open conflict, fueled by growing secessionist and nationalist aspirations across the USSR. In 1988, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh declared their intention to secede from Azerbaijan and unite with Armenia, a move Azerbaijan sought to suppress. This eventually escalated into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1991 to 1994, resulting in significant casualties on both sides and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

By the end of the war in 1994, Armenian forces had gained control over Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding districts, establishing a self-declared Republic of Nagorno-Krabakh (Artsakh). However, no country, including Armenia, recognized it. The belligerents agreed to a ceasefire in 1994 known as the Bishkek Protocol. Still, the conflict remained unresolved, with occasional flare-ups of violence over subsequent years, including a major escalation in April 2016.

The conflict reignited in September 2020, leading to significant Azerbaijani advances. The hostilities ended with a Russia-brokered ceasefire on November 9, 2020, which resulted in Armenia’s withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to the region. In December 2022, Azerbaijani State-backed activists began blocking the Lachin corridor, causing a humanitarian crisis in the region. Azerbaijan did not comply with International Court of Justice (ICJ) orders to lift the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. Tensions remained high, and in September 2023, Azerbaijan launched what it termed an “anti-terrorist operation” in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the swift defeat of the local Armenian forces and the dissolution of the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh government.

This raises a crucial question: what happened in and to Nagorno-Karabakh from an international law perspective, and why does this matter? This post examines specifically the application of debellatio to the context of Nagorno-Karabakh, a quasi-State entity that demonstrated a significant level of self-governance and control over its territory.

A Way to End Armed Conflicts

Traditionally, the doctrine of debellatio has been applied exclusively to the total subjugation of a sovereign State (p. 52-53). In its classical form, debellatio occurs when a State’s armed forces are utterly defeated, and its government collapses to the point where it can no longer exercise any meaningful control or resistance. It requires the absence of a government-in-exile advocating for the defeated State’s cause and the lack of any co-belligerents fighting on its behalf. For instance, in the case of Kuwait in 1990, debellatio did not occur because Kuwait’s government went into exile and coalition forces intervened to reverse the Iraqi occupation. In contrast, the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 serves as a prime historical example of debellatio, in which Allied forces occupied the entire territory, dissolved the government, and imposed new governance structures.

Debellatio has been pivotal in understanding the legal implications of a total victory in international armed conflicts (IAC), where the victorious State gains extensive power over the defeated State, including the power to reshape the political landscape according to its terms. It has less frequently been applied to non-State actors, such as armed groups and non-State entities possessing significant Statehood attributes. Accordingly, this post explores the debellatio of Nagorno-Karabakh, a quasi-State entity with nearly three decades of largely autonomous governance.

The application of debellatio in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) aligns with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) interpretation of how such conflicts end. According to the ICRC, the complete military defeat or demobilization of a non-State actor, or any other form of dissolution, signifies the conclusion of the NIAC (para. 489). Although the ICRC and legal commentators have considered the possibility of applying debellatio to NIACs, this remains a relatively underdeveloped area of international law.

Debellatio, in practice, has been a way to conclude armed conflicts. Armed conflicts, whether IAC or NIAC, end when the factual circumstances that initially gave rise to the legal state of war no longer exist. While the ideal resolution of such conflicts is through a peace treaty negotiated between the belligerent parties, there are instances where an armed conflict ends unilaterally, including through the doctrine of debellatio. Complete and irreversible victory allows the victor to reshape the political landscape according to its own terms, often with long-lasting implications for the region and international relations.

Nagorno-Karabakh’s Quasi-Statehood

For nearly three decades, Nagorno-Karabakh existed as more than just a rebellious region or an armed insurgency. Following the end of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1994 and the subsequent Bishkek ceasefire, the region developed many of the attributes typically associated with sovereign States. These included a functioning government with a president, a legislative body in the form of a National Assembly, a legal and judicial system, a defense force, and well-functioning economic structures. In many ways, Nagorno-Karabakh was a quasi-State entity that, while not recognized internationally, demonstrated significant self-governance and territorial control. Moreover, the region maintained a distinct identity culturally, ethnically, politically, and administratively, despite being heavily reliant on Armenia. This semi-autonomous existence set Nagorno-Karabakh apart from non-State actors in other NIACs.

Nagorno-Karabakh’s status began to unravel in the aftermath of the 2020 war, when Azerbaijan reclaimed significant territories that had been under Armenian control. The situation reached a critical point in September 2023, when Azerbaijan launched a decisive military operation, dismantling the remaining structures of Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto authorities. This swift military victory led to the collapse of the region’s quasi-State institutions and triggered a mass exodus of the ethnic Armenian population to Armenia. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry acknowledged approximately 200 combat deaths among its military personnel within just 24 hours of the operation, highlighting the intensity of the fighting.

This raises the question: Can the doctrine of debellatio apply to a NIAC where the defeated entity is not just an armed group, but a non-recognized or quasi-State? The argument hinges on the idea that Nagorno-Karabakh’s defeat was not merely the suppression of an insurgency, but the total destruction of a political entity with State-like characteristics.

Another crucial question concerns the phenomenon of de facto or unrecognized States. This discussion is essential for understanding how these entities differ from typical armed groups and why this post argues that debellatio in NIACs can be further sub-classified when it involves de facto States.

The terms de facto or unrecognized States are commonly used to describe “secessionist entities that control territory, provide governance, enjoy a certain degree of popular support, persist over time, and seek widespread recognition of their proclaimed sovereignty and yet fail to receive it.” Nagorno-Karabakh is a prime example of such an entity. Millions of people live in these regions, often suffering from a lack of international cooperation, economic isolation, and limited access to humanitarian aid, among other challenges. Nevertheless, the organizational structure and social cohesion within these entities set them apart from typical armed groups as understood under international humanitarian law (IHL). Therefore, the discussion of the debellatio-type effect on these entities, using Nagorno-Karabakh as an example, represents a distinct and important area of consideration.

While international law and relations remain State-centric, the global societal structure is far from homogeneous, encompassing a variety of entities and communities that exist beyond the framework of traditional nation-States (p. 59). As such, while the debellatio of a recognized State is a shocking event that draws significant international attention, the effects of debellatio on de facto States should not be overlooked.

A NIAC in Nagorno-Karabakh? 

Understanding whether IHL or domestic criminal law applies presents a challenge. Azerbaijan labeled its operation in Nagorno-Karabakh an “anti-terrorism” campaign, portraying it as a law enforcement action rather than an armed conflict, which is consistent with Azerbaijan’s stance of treating the crisis as a domestic issue.

However, this terminology raises the question whether the “anti-terrorist” operation should be viewed as part of the IAC between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or as a NIAC between Azerbaijan and the “Defense Army” of Nagorno-Karabakh. This critical distinction determines the conflict’s legal classification and the applicable legal framework.

The history of the IAC between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in the early 1990s, provides important context. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions emphasizes the factual realities of armed conflict, regardless of any formal declaration of war, even when a State does not officially recognize it. The IAC classification also includes partial or total occupation of a State’s territory. Despite significant lulls in fighting since the 1994 Bishkek ceasefire, the issue of Armenia’s purported occupation of Azerbaijani territory is crucial for assessing the duration of the IAC between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This suggests that IHL continued to apply to Nagorno-Karabakh even after the cessation of hostilities, given the region’s occupied status under international law.

According to Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, a territory is considered occupied “when it is placed under the authority of a hostile army, and this occupation extends only to areas where such authority can be effectively established and exercised.” The international community has largely viewed the disputed territory as occupied Azerbaijani land. Given the premise of Armenia’s effective control, which is a sine qua non requirement for occupation (para. 136), and Nagorno-Karabakh’s dependence on Armenia, including for financial, political, and military support (para. 186), I argue that Armenia was the occupying power in Nagorno-Karabakh until the aftermath of the 2020 war.

The IAC between Azerbaijan and Armenia included the 44-day war in 2020, culminating in the tripartite ceasefire agreement on November 9, 2020. A Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed under this agreement, which coincided with the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces. As a result, Azerbaijan regained control over the Aghdam, Kelbajar, and Lachin regions.

Some argue this did not conclude the IAC between Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to this view, Armenia continued to exercise overall control over Nagorno-Karabakh until September 2023, meaning that the occupation and, consequently, the IAC, persisted. I disagree.

First, while the 1907 Hague Regulations referred to armistices as temporary suspensions of hostilities, modern ceasefire agreements have evolved through State practice. Today, ceasefires are often part of a broader attempt to settle conflicts permanently. Though they may not resolve all issues, such as territorial sovereignty, ceasefires impose an obligation on all parties to refrain from renewing hostilities. As a result, they preclude the use of force under the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter within the context of that specific conflict.

Second, Armenia’s withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh had significant strategic and political consequences. Its battlefield defeat, coupled with the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including Nagorno-Karabakh, despite opposition from the region’s authorities, marked a decisive end to Armenia’s control over the region. The Armenian Prime Minister’s refusal to intervene militarily during the September 2023 assault—highlighting Armenia’s inability and unwillingness to maintain any control—further demonstrated this reality. Although the ICJ has recently stipulated that an occupying power may still have obligations under the law of occupation even after withdrawal if it continues to exercise authority over the territory (paras. 92-93), it is clear from the situation on the ground that Armenia ended its occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020.

Therefore, even assuming the IAC between Azerbaijan and Armenia survived the November 9, 2020, ceasefire agreement, it no longer concerned Nagorno-Karabakh. Although a significant portion of Nagorno-Karabakh remained outside Azerbaijan’s control, Armenia eventually lost control over these territories, regardless of whether this was due to military defeat or strategic decisions. Consequently, I argue that Azerbaijan’s September 2023 assault falls within the context of the NIAC in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Implications of Debellatio to Nagorno-Karabakh

The November 2020 tripartite ceasefire agreement effectively prevented Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, or any other actor, from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground, leaving Azerbaijan’s victory hanging in the balance. Amid Russia’s disinterested “peacekeeping” and the timid international response to the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan seized the moment and launched an assault to secure a swift debellatio-type victory over the remnants of resistance in the blockaded region. As a result, Azerbaijan secured complete freedom of action, not burdened by obligations such as post-conflict reconciliation or internal self-determination for Armenians within Azerbaijan.

In contrast, conflicts that end with a peace settlement typically involve negotiations where both sides agree on terms that impose limitations on future actions. Had the NIAC between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh’s military forces concluded through a well-negotiated settlement, with compromises from both sides, the potential for renewed hostilities would have been significantly reduced.

Instead, Azerbaijan opted for a shortcut to achieve its ultimate goal of subjugating the territory to its control. This precedent could have far-reaching consequences, particularly in how the international community regards future conflicts involving quasi-State entities. It may pave the way for a shift where military power, rather than international law and diplomacy, becomes the primary tool for resolving conflicts involving non-State entities, with profound implications for vulnerable populations. For regions with similar quasi-State entities, such as Palestine, Taiwan, or Western Sahara, the precedent set by Nagorno-Karabakh could have dangerous consequences. States facing similar challenges might be more inclined to pursue total military victories knowing that the international community might accept debellatio fait accompli.

Conclusion

The debellatio-type defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh allowed Azerbaijan to sidestep the complex arrangements and obligations that would have come with a peaceful settlement. By securing a total military victory, Azerbaijan reshaped the region’s political landscape without the constraints of post-conflict negotiations or addressing the rights and future of the Armenian population within its borders.

The direct consequence of Nagorno-Karabakh’s defeat was the forced displacement of over 100,000 Armenians, effectively erasing a centuries-old community from the region. This speaks volumes about the humanitarian cost of such an approach.

As the international community reflects on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its aftermath, it is crucial to consider the broader implications of applying debellatio to NIACs. Embracing such a precedent risks legitimizing the use of force over diplomacy and threatens global stability. The lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh must inform future discussions on conflict resolution, ensuring that the principles of justice, accountability, and human rights remain at the forefront of international law.

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Davit Khachatryan is an international law expert and researcher with a focus on operational law, international criminal law, alternative dispute resolution, and the intersection of various legal disciplines.

Photo credit: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation