Cross-Border Drone Strikes Against Mexican Drug Cartels
In April 2025, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Colby Jenkins testified that U.S. forces did not have legal authority to conduct cross-border drone strikes against drug cartels in Mexico even though President Trump had designated several cartels and other transnational organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).
While Secretary Jenkins is correct that the terrorist designation does not, in-and-of-itself, provide authority for U.S. forces to take punitive action against the cartels in Mexico, there may be situations where cross-border strikes would be authorized in self-defense if a drug cartel uses force or demonstrates a threat of imminent force against the United States or U.S. nationals.
Punitive Expedition in Mexico
U.S. incursions into Mexico are not novel. In 1916, for example, following attacks on U.S. mining interests in northern Mexico resulting in the murder of 17 U.S. citizens, and cross-border raids by Pancho Villa in Columbus, New Mexico, and Glen Springs, Texas. The raids resulted in the death of 18 U.S. military and civilian personnel. President Woodrow Wilson therefore authorized a punitive expedition into Mexico to capture Pancho Villa.
Under the command of Brigadier General John “Black Jack” Pershing, over 14,000 U.S. troops crossed the border and operated in northern Mexico until their withdrawal in 1917. An additional 140,000 U.S. troops were deployed to patrol the U.S. border with Mexico to deter further raids. Previous incursions included the deployment of U.S. warships to the ports of Tampico and Vera Cruz in early 1914 to protect U.S. oil interests in the area and the occupation of Vera Cruz by U.S. Navy, Marine, and Army personnel in April 1914.
Threat of Mexican Drug Cartels
Today, cross-border raids by Mexican bandits have been replaced by the steady flow of illicit drugs, smuggled into the United States by Mexican drug cartels, that are poisoning the American public. Drug dealers linked to the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels operate with impunity along the U.S.-Mexican border and in major U.S. cities like Los Angeles, Phoenix, Houston, Chicago, Atlanta, and Miami in support of their drug trafficking operations. The cartels flood U.S. communities with fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs, driving addiction and killing thousands of American citizens every year. Violent gang members and local criminal groups employed by the cartels also commit murders, assaults, robberies, and other violent crimes to support their smuggling operations.
This ongoing drug crisis raises serious public safety, public health, and national security concerns that require eradication by an aggressive whole-of-government approach, to include targeted strikes and other punitive action by U.S. and Mexican law enforcement and military forces against the insidious drug cartels.
In 2023, there were over 105,000 drug overdose deaths in the United States. Over 70 percent of those deaths were attributable to opioid use (primarily illicitly manufactured fentanyl from Mexico). In 2022, fentanyl caused 200 deaths per day, and more than a quarter million Americans died from fentanyl overdoses from 2018 to 2021. Compare this three-year fentanyl death toll to U.S. combat deaths during the 20-year Vietnam War, which totaled just over 58,000.
This exorbitant death toll begs the question, does intentionally flooding U.S. cities with fentanyl, methamphetamines, and other illicit drugs that results in over 100,000 deaths a year constitute an armed attack against the United States that justifies the use of necessary and proportionate force in self-defense to neutralize the threat? If you compare the scale and effect of drug trafficking into the United States to that of a conventional armed attack, the extent of injury and death to U.S. persons is clearly grave enough to characterize trafficking by the cartels as an armed attack against the United States that justifies the use of force in self-defense to counter that threat.
The Sinaloa Cartel smuggles fentanyl and other illicit drugs into the United States on a daily basis and is responsible for the deadliest drug threat the United States has ever faced. It has made billions of dollars in profits from the illicit fentanyl trade and is one of the most violent cartels in the world. The Cartel commits heinous crimes to further its drug interests, including bribery, extortion, murder, trafficking weapons, and human smuggling. The cartel partners with Chinese precursor chemical suppliers to obtain the ingredients needed to manufacture illicit synthetic drugs, as well as Chinese organizations that launder drug money and return the “clean” proceeds to the cartel in Mexico. The Sinaloa Cartel is therefore able to dominate the fentanyl and methamphetamine markets in the United States by manipulating the global supply chain and proliferating the establishment of clandestine labs in cartel strongholds throughout Mexico.
The Sinaloa Cartel also manufactures and distributes methamphetamines throughout the United States. Drug deaths attributed to methamphetamines rank second only to deaths caused by fentanyl. The costs associated with manufacturing these synthetic drugs are much cheaper than the costs and risks associated with producing traditional plant-based drugs like heroin or cocaine. The cartel’s ability to manufacture large quantities of methamphetamine with higher potency has allowed it to expand its distribution network from western U.S. markets to markets in the eastern United States.
Similarly, the Jalisco Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación) is also a formidable and brutal criminal organization, and like the Sinaloa Cartel is responsible for large numbers of drug overdose deaths in the United States each year. The cartel operates in all 50 U.S. states, generates billions of dollars in profits from the production and sale of illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine, and is a primary supplier of cocaine to U.S. markets. The cartel is also known for distributing fentanyl laced with heroin, cocaine, or xylazine and smuggles tons of methamphetamine into the United States each year.
Like the Sinaloa Cartel, it obtains precursor chemicals from Chinese suppliers to manufacture fentanyl and methamphetamines, ensuring their delivery by bribing, intimidating, and extorting port officials. The Jalisco Cartel also generates revenues by charging other cartels a fee for using ports under its control—i.e., Manzanillo, Lazaro Cardenas, Veracruz, and Matamoros—to smuggle drugs or precursor chemicals in and out of Mexico.
Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation
In January 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order directing the Secretary of State to designate several Mexican cartels and other transnational organizations as an FTO and/or SDGT. The executive order recognizes that these groups have flooded the United States with deadly drugs, violent criminals, and vicious gangs. The Trump administration recognizes that these groups’ activities, proximity to, and incursions into the United States constitute an unacceptable threat to U.S. national security.
Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States “to ensure the total elimination of these organizations’ presence in the United States and their ability to threaten the territory, safety, and security of the United States through their extraterritorial command-and-control structures, thereby protecting the American people and U.S. territorial integrity.” On February 20, 2025, the Department of State announced the designation of Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cártel del Noreste (formerly Los Zetas), La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Cártel de Golfo (Gulf Cartel), and Cárteles Unidos as FTOs and SDGTs.
Self-Help (Unable or Unwilling)
Normally, a State may only intervene militarily in the territory of another State with the consent of that State (Department of Defense Law of War Manual, § 1.11.4.3). Nonetheless, a State also has an obligation under international law “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” (Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), at 22). If a State is unable or unwilling to stop armed groups from using its territory as a base of operations from which to engage in acts contrary to the rights of another State, the aggrieved State may exercise its right of self-help to target armed groups within the territory of the unwilling State. A growing number of States support such self-help measures when a State is unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory for illicit purposes to the detriment of another State.
Large amounts of territory in northern Mexico are not under the effective control of the Mexican government. A 2018 report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) found that the drug cartels controlled over 20 percent—151,689 square miles—of Mexico. By 2021, that amount of territory under cartel control had grown to 30 to 35 percent according to then Commander of U.S. Northern Command, General Glen VanHerk.
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has rejected U.S. assertions that portions of Mexico are “essentially run by the cartels.” Her position is understandable, given that no head of state wants to admit that they do not have complete control over their territory, but her position is not defendable. There is clear evidence that the increased efforts by the Mexican government to combat organized crime has enjoyed only minimal success.
As a result, the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels operate with impunity in Northern Mexico. They bribe, threaten, and intimidate law enforcement, military, judges, politicians, and other government officials to ensure their illegal manufacturing and trafficking activities are not impeded. It is not uncommon for the cartels to kill local police officers, assassinate judges, and murder prying journalists, members of other cartels, innocent civilians, or their own disloyal members to send a message that they are in complete control. Between 2021 and 2024, for example, cartel members murdered an average of 125 to 150 people every day. This data clearly demonstrates that the Mexican government has been unable or unwilling to stem the steady flow of illicit drugs into the United States. Under these circumstances, the United States is legally justified in using force in self-defense against cartel clandestine production sites and other drug-related infrastructure to reduce the amount of illicit drugs entering the United States.
Conclusion
The Trump administration remains committed to protecting U.S. national security interests by dismantling the Mexican drug cartels, a position President Trump maintained during his first administration. In 2020, for example, he suggested that the United States should consider conducting missile strikes against the Mexican cartels to dissuade further drug trafficking into the United States. His idea was immediately rejected by then Secretary of Defense Mark Esper. Esper believed that such unilateral strikes would violate international law and be considered an act of war. Esper’s advice however was incorrect. While, as a matter of policy, the United States might not want to intervene unilaterally in Mexico because it could seriously damage bilateral relations between the two neighbors, such intervention (under the circumstances discussed above) would clearly be legal under international law.
President Sheinbaum has agreed to increased U.S. military and CIA surveillance flights over Mexican territory to gather intelligence on the cartels but remains firmly opposed to any unilateral U.S. strikes in Mexico, indicating that U.S. military action would not solve anything. Moreover, she has indicated that she will defend Mexican sovereignty against any “violations by land, sea, or air.” Thus, any unilateral U.S. military action against the cartels would clearly result in a significant decline in U.S.-Mexico relations, but such action would not violate international law.
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Raul (Pete) Pedrozo is the Howard S. Levie Professor on the Law of Armed Conflict at the Stockton Center for International Law, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.
Photo credit: U.S. Air Force, Airman 1st Class Victoria Nuzzi
