Future Conflicts, Civilian Harm, and the CHMR-AP – Part II
Editor’s note: The first post in the two-part series illustrated the emerging “information environment” of modern warfare into which the DoD CHMR-AP will be launched. This second post addresses how CHMR-AP-enabled civilian harm mitigation supports U.S. strategic priorities and complements a wide-range of future military operations.
Across the Spectrum of Conflict
United States military doctrine has long recognized the strategic importance of mitigating civilian harm during armed conflict. Different conflict types, however, implicate different strategic considerations. Likewise, different conflicts require different operational approaches.
The majority of recent U.S. combat experience is associated with the “long wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the more recent campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—conflicts frequently viewed as paradigmatic examples of either counterterrorism (CT) or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. While there is certainly doctrinal division between CT and COIN (a topic beyond the scope of this post) that definitional difference never fully aligned with operational realities. Commentators note that, in the context of both CT and COIN, the local population—the civilians in the vicinity of the fighting—remains a subject of central strategic concern. This is because that same population can be a potential source of strength and support for the adversary. In such conflicts, where the support of the civilian population is frequently regarded as “the center of gravity for military operations,” the importance of mitigating civilian harm is more evident and perhaps better understood. When victory requires the support of the local population, civilian harm can bring strategic ruin.
On that score, the U.S. experience in Afghanistan presents a vivid account of a U.S. military reckoning with the strategic imperative to limit civilian harm. In 2009, after taking command in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal—then commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Afghanistan and the former commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—undertook a strategic assessment which noted that civilian casualties caused by military operations had undermined the larger strategic goals of U.S. and Coalition forces.
In response, General McChrystal issued a tactical directive on July 2, 2009 that “specified his commander’s intent, fire control measures, battle damage assessment criteria, and other CIVCAS direction,” with the goal of minimizing civilian casualties. As General McChrystal noted in that directive, “We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories, but suffering strategic defeats, by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.” Reflecting on the conflict in 2016, General (Ret.) David H. Petraeus and Christopher D. Kolenda penned an article in which they underscored the strategic counterproductivity of civilian harm caused by military operations:
As we found in Afghanistan, an approach that places insufficient emphasis on civilian protection can undermine achievement of our strategic objectives and increase the risk to our forces. In a new report by Open Society Foundations, one of us, co-author Christopher Kolenda, argues that civilian harm in Afghanistan by members of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, and Afghan forces—particularly in the early-to-mid-2000s—played a significant role in the growth and sustainability of the Taliban and undermined the legitimacy of coalition and Afghan government. These problems, at a minimum, intensified the conflict and made joint objectives more difficult to achieve.
Mitigating civilian harm was, therefore, found to be critical in the CT/COIN context in which “one good shot is not going to win the war. But one bad shot could lose it.” Thirteen years after General McChrystal’s tactical directive, the CHMR-AP brings the U.S. military the resources, processes, and capabilities needed to avoid civilian harm (the “bad shot”) and to respond more effectively when it does occur to reduce the inevitably adverse strategic consequences to the overall military effort.
Another set of considerations is, of course, implicated in large scale combat operations. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations defines “large scale combat operations” as “[e]xtensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives.” Such operations are often colloquially referred to as “high end” combat operations and conceptualized as “state versus state conflict with a modern, peer or near-peer adversary, as envisioned during the Cold War period.”
This necessarily means a different strategic approach, focusing less on building the popular support of the civilian population and more on “break[ing] the enemy’s will through simultaneous attrition of its forces and acquisition of territory, denying the threat any advantage in terrain.” Even so, despite the strategic differences, the support and opinions of local populations are far from irrelevant during State-on-State conflicts. As Machiavelli wrote in the 16th century, “For always, no matter how powerful one’s armies, in order to enter a country one needs the goodwill of the inhabitants.” The same can be said today of the popular support needed from voters and taxpayers on the home front. It is especially true in the context of the modern information environment in which rapidly transmitted images and information about civilian harm can serve to sap support and delegitimize a military effort. For no matter the operational context, legitimacy is critical. As JP 3-0 notes:
Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences. These audiences will include our national leadership and domestic population, governments, and civilian populations in the OA [operational area], and nations and organizations around the world.
Likewise, JP 3-0, in articulating the importance of the dyadic, corollary principle of restraint, states, “[a] single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state.”
These are important considerations in a world in which images of civilian harm can be easily transmitted into living rooms and laptops around the globe. Such images can potentially have a significant impact on public opinion as they cast doubt on the morality, appropriateness, and legitimacy of military actions. This, in turn, can impact “U.S. freedom of action globally.” As the NATO Protection of Civilians Handbook notes, “lack of consideration for [civilian harm mitigation] will have a negative impact on the overall mission,” because such “failures will generate negative strategic effects and their consequences will reverberate at all levels of command. [Protection of Civilians] is therefore key for mission success and legitimacy.”
Part of the potential adverse strategic impact will simply be the direct result of the public’s increasing access to the kind of wartime images and details that were previously obscured due to distance and inaccessibility—the historically undivulged horrors of conflict. Unlike in conflicts of the pre-Internet age, almost every living person in the vicinity of the battle will have the ability to capture high quality images and video of the aftermath of a military operation. Ordinary observers will also be able to provide descriptions of the operations’ effects. When civilian harm occurs, its tragic reality will be recorded in detail and almost instantaneously provided to the wider world for observation and consideration. Such gruesome images will further be accompanied by the details of the lives of the victims, some of which will be provided by interviews with neighbors and grieving family members. Photographs of the dead will be accompanied by details that give names and voices to those killed.
It is harder to refer with equanimity to faceless assemblages of “civilian casualties” when the names of the dead are known and the voices of the bereaved are heard. The protective obfuscation of generalized language like “civilian casualties” loses its palliative effect when each loss is not only identified but explored in detail, and we are reminded that human lives are never lost in the plural—only in multiple, anguishing singularities. This information can undermine public support for U.S. and coalition operations, rally other populations, and even bolster narratives that are in opposition to U.S. strategic interests. As Alex von Tunzelmann notes:
Wartime information, however it is delivered, can affect decisions made by power-brokers and influence national—or global—public opinion. It may boost or lower the morale of troops, and of civilians caught up in the fighting. Social media advances on earlier technologies by radically increasing the speed of information delivery and the size of its audience, and by empowering individuals to share their own versions of events—for better or worse.
Information relating to civilian harm is inherently negative, but its harmful effects can be exacerbated when amplified or purposefully distorted by adversaries in a way that is designed to have an adverse strategic impact. As Geoff Corn has posited, the “more effectively [parties to a conflict] delegitimize their adversaries, the more likely they are to achieve strategic success.” On that score, experts note that, in the context of information operations within a State-on-State conflict, both China and Russia would likely highlight and exaggerate civilian casualties to erode support for the coalition war effort.
This likelihood aligns with guidance in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians, which notes that, in addition to breaching overarching legal and moral civilian protection requirements, “harming civilians undermines military efforts and becomes a divisive issue between multinational partners. Even if a military force is not responsible for civilian casualties that occur, there are expectations that the force prevents widespread harm to civilians, regardless of the cause.” Accordingly, experts advise that in any high end conflict with such adversaries, the United States should “[avoid] civilian casualties to stymie Chinese and Russian information operations aimed at degrading coalition cohesion.” This is the new reality of modern warfare.
Accordingly, on the modern battlefield, commanders must contend with the challenges of an intensified, hyperconnected information environment in which (both State and non-State) adversaries can use information to “amplify divisions and sow discord in American society,” as well as erode cohesion within coalitions. Alongside the traditional means of employing military force, enemies will use information to “undermine America’s security alliances, erode trust within military formations, and weaken support from the American public.”
The effects of these sorts of information operations are not trivial. They are real and they are impactful. Such information operations can “slow decision cycles, which would have lethal consequences, but also erode the public support that is necessary for a democracy to sustain a protracted effort and craft a coherent strategy.” Civilian harm in this new operating environment only provides fuel for adversary information operations. So it is imperative that U.S. forces take real and meaningful steps to avoid inflicting such harm. When information can be wielded by your enemies as a weapon, it is wise to avoid providing them ammunition.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, there is a universe of straightforward, important strategic considerations related to civilian harm that exist beyond the considerations addressed above. For instance, if military operations are conducted in such a way as to defeat the adversary but in the process local infrastructure is devastated and causes mass displacement, the ability of that region and population to persevere and ultimately self-govern and subsist, whether of their own accord or under the influence of the victor, will be greatly diminished. This, in turn, can potentially mean that the outcome of the large-scale combat operation is an insurgency, bringing high end conflict immediately back to a low-intensity conflict that will require building the popular support of the civilian population. This can perpetuate a cycle of violence – an infernal dialectic—that undermines overall and long-term strategic objectives. Across the spectrum of conflict, therefore, civilian harm mitigation and response remain important strategic considerations.
Conclusion
As Secretary Austin has stated, “Our efforts to mitigate and respond to civilian harm directly reflect our values and also directly contribute to mission success.” This is true for CT operations against a non-State actor as well as “high-end” conflicts against a near peer adversary. While there are a multitude of strategic considerations that relate to civilian harm, this post has focused on a subset of especially important strategic concerns that relates to the realities of the modern information environment and which remains critical in every operational context.
This is not to say that civilian harm mitigation and response will look the same in a large-scale combat operation as it does in a CT operation. Different environments will often require different approaches—and the actions set forth in the CHMR-AP are intentionally crafted in a way that provides latitude for combatant commanders who will need to adjust for their various, divergent operational contexts. The language of the Action Plan is directive, but not prescriptive due to the understanding that parts of the CHMR-AP will be implemented somewhat differently depending on the operating environment.
For example, the CHMR-AP requires that “[c]ombatant commands develop red teaming policies and procedures appropriate to relevant operational environments with a focus on combating cognitive biases throughout joint targeting processes.” But it does not require a singular approach for every Combatant Command. For instance, the Action Plan does not require the red teaming of every individual strike—something that may be appropriate in the CT context but could be infeasible during a large-scale military operation. The key is that procedures must be “appropriate to relevant operational environments,” and actions are therefore directed at the appropriate command echelon to facilitate tailoring and flexibility where it is important. This is the approach taken throughout the Action Plan to foster the needed flexibility for applicability (and strategic success) in any conflict.
What the CHMR-AP will do is improve DoD’s ability to provide commanders with more information, more capabilities, and better processes to help avoid civilian harm caused by military operations. Of course, the Action Plan will not prevent all civilian harm—a fact plainly acknowledged in the CHMR-AP’s introduction. When, however, civilian casualties do occur, the CHMR-AP will enable commanders to respond more effectively to mitigate the adverse strategic impacts of civilian harm. These enhancements are especially important given the characteristics of warfare (especially against a near peer adversary) in the post-Information Age.
We will not again fight in the operating environments of previous wars, and it is critical that we are prepared to confront “the complex challenges of the modern security environment.” As General Douglas MacArthur reminded future military leaders, “New conditions and new weapons require new and imaginative methods for solution and application. Wars are never won in the past.” The CHMR-AP, therefore, will help the U.S. military look forward so that the United States is positioned to achieve better strategic outcomes in both contemporary conflicts and the wars of the future.
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Dan E. Stigall is detailed from the Department of Justice (National Security Division) to the Department of Defense, where he is a Special Advisor in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. From January – August 2022, he served as Team Lead for the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan Tiger Team and led the development of the action plan.
Photo credit: U.S. Air Force
