Hand-to-Hand Combat, “Double-Tapping,” “Dead-Checking,” and the Issue of “Last Mercy” Under IHL

Last November, a video depicting one of the most brutal encounters of the Russo-Ukrainian war circulated widely across social media. In the small Ukrainian village of Trudove, during a clearing operation, a Ukrainian combatant, nom de guerre “Cobra,” unexpectedly engaged in hand-to-hand combat against a Russian opponent.

After a few minutes of intense physical fighting with a knife, the Russian mortally wounded his adversary. Despite sustaining a clearly fatal wound, the Ukrainian rejected the Russian’s offer of a last grenade, insisting several times on dying on his own (“Let me go in peace … . Let me die”). The Russian nevertheless pulled the pin on the grenade, later stating, “Since childhood, we are taught that in any situation, one must remain human.”

In a separate video, he also claimed that in his mind, he simply wanted to end the fight as quickly as possible and hide from the enemy. Hence, after throwing the grenade, he even ensured his opponent’s death through “double-tapping” or “dead-checking.”

While current international humanitarian law (IHL) discussions largely focus on the threats emanating from advanced and long-range weaponry, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare, this incident underscores that close-quarter combat through traditional means of warfare has not disappeared from modern warfare. Despite advances in military technology, the use of knives, bayonets, and even unarmed combat techniques continue to play a role in battle, in both offensive and defensive operations.

This raises three questions. First, how does IHL govern hand-to-hand combat using traditional means and methods of warfare? Second, is the practice of “double-tapping” justifiable? Third, are so-called “acts of mercy” to accelerate the deaths of mortally wounded combatants (coups de grâce) lawful under IHL?

Melee Combat and IHL

Even in today’s high-tech era, modern military units continue to maintain hand-to-hand combat manuals that involve offensive and defensive techniques taken from various disciplines. These often include the use of traditional close-quarter cutting weapons such as knives and bayonets, which remain almost indispensable objects of combat equipment. Besides, hand-to-hand combat often involves the use of military martial arts during the skirmish. For instance, instruction in techniques from disciplines such as Krav Maga or the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) is mandatory within some armed forces to enhance close-quarter battle effectiveness.

While IHL does not prohibit any of the above, these means and methods of warfare by their design or use can clash with the prohibition on unnecessary suffering. This principle is outlined in a number of treaties, including the St. Petersburg Declaration and Hague Regulations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These were the first legal instruments to prohibit employment of weapons or tactics that unnecessarily aggravate the suffering of incapacitated soldiers or render their death inevitable when merely disabling them would suffice (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Commentary on Additional Protocol (AP) I, para. 1419).

The International Court of Justice considered the prohibition on unnecessary suffering as one of the cardinal principles of IHL, which aims to protect combatants from “useless aggravation of their suffering” and “a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives” (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 78). IHL prohibits conflict parties from employing those weapons and tactics of warfare that by design or use cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to the adversary forces (AP I, art. 35(2); ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (CIHL), rule 70).

Weapons

According to some States, certain types of cutting weapons, such as serrated-edged or barbed-headed bayonets and knives, can cause unnecessary suffering, especially if they are designed to inflame the wounds (see e.g., UK, Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, p. 105). While combatants can use bayonets during a fight, for example, the aim of melee combat is to neutralize an adversary, not to cause undue pain through their design (p. 175). Additionally, during the fight, if a lighter wound is enough to stop the opponent from fighting, there is no justification for causing a more serious injury (para. 23). Therefore, in hand-to-hand combat scenarios, IHL prohibits armed forces from using stabbing weapons that by their nature would torment the adversary and cause “injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to its military effectiveness” (n. 15).

Even if a weapon is lawful, the manner in which it is used in combat must conform to the conduct obligations under Article 41 of AP I, the substance of which the ICRC treats as a norm of customary international law. Under this norm, persons are hors de combat if they: (1) are defenseless due to wounds or incapacitation; (2) clearly surrender; or (3) are in the power of the enemy and unable to continue fighting. Therefore, if an adversary is clearly put out of action due to wounds or expresses the intention to surrender, that person is no long subject to attack, as there is no further risk of hostility (ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (GC I), para. 1348). If combatants use a “finishing off” tactic to ensure the death of their opponent, this may amount to the war crime of intentionally killing a person who is hors de combat, which is criminalized under Article 8(2)(b)(vi) of the Rome Statute.

Military Martial Arts

The same logic can be applied to the abuse of military martial arts. These disciplines focus on rapid incapacitation, striking, grappling, choking, and weapon disarming techniques (p. 1) that can potentially cause severe injuries leading to painful death. For instance, in January 2002, during a combat operation in Afghanistan, a U.S. Special Forces soldier likely used MCMAP techniques to neutralize an Al-Qaeda fighter with “bare hands” after intense physical fighting.

Generally, the manner of use of these techniques, whether in offensive or defensive operations, “should be proportional to the measure of danger” (para. 1621). Therefore, combat techniques that inflict unnecessary suffering from the first engagement, such as intentionally executing spinal locks that cause lifetime paralysis when other means of incapacitation are available, can amount to a prohibited method of warfare due to the superfluous nature of the harm.

Analogously to the rules that prohibit attacks against persons finding themselves hors de combat, IHL prohibits the use of physical techniques that have no military necessity and are directed towards a defenseless opponent. To illustrate, scenarios of melee combat when a combatant quickly incapacitates and renders unconscious the opponent, yet then proceeds to apply a neck crank or eye gouging to ensure the unconscious opponent’s inability to resist, would clearly violate the customary rule of humane treatment and military necessity. Moreover, such conduct could amount to the war crime of attacking persons hors de combat in a manner that causes superfluous injury without any justification.

 “Double-Tapping”

As the Trudove encounter and other historical examples illustrate, armed forces have conducted the practice known as “double-tapping” (p. 753–54). This refers to delivering a final, fatal shot or stab to an already incapacitated or deceased adversary, typically to confirm death and eliminate the potential threat of feigned surrender (p. 328). When such a practice is employed, combatants’ inability to defend themselves, as underlined by Article 41 of AP I, is usually evident. Wounds often involve “paralysis or the loss of body parts, … sucking chest wound or a head shot” or other injuries that practically and clearly render soldiers incapable of resistance (p. 4).

Hence, under such circumstances, the conflict parties bear two direct obligations under IHL: “to search for and collect the wounded and sick without delay;” and to “do everything [they] reasonably can to care for [the wounded] person” (ICRC, GC I Commentary, paras. 1383–86). The practice of “double-tapping” is a form of preventive clearing operation that eliminates survival chances for the combatants finding themselves hors de combat. Employing such a tactic without clear military necessity practically amounts to “a de facto no-quarter approach” (p. 328). It violates IHL and is a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xii) of the Rome Statute.

Therefore, combatants must refrain from engaging in “double-tapping” unless there is an imminent threat from the enemy. During last stand fights, it is quite common for grievously maimed combatants to continue to resist their adversaries. In such scenarios, a combatant who engages in acts hostile to the enemy, which “by their nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces” loses his or her protected status and becomes targetable (para. 1942).

Some of the most common examples are: (1) showing armed resistance (e.g. trying to open a grenade, shoot or touch a weapon); (2) feigning death or injury with the intent to resume the attack against an enemy; and (3) attempting to escape (paras. 1621–23). Combatants who continue to actively participate in combat, even if they are gravely injured, do not fall under the legal protection granted to the wounded or sick under IHL and are targetable (ICRC, GC I Commentary, para. 1348).

Even if enemy combatants are presumed dead, “double-tapping” deceased adversaries in order to ensure their death contradicts a customary rule of the battlefield enshrined in Article 15(1) of GC I and Article 34(1) of AP I. These rules oblige belligerent parties to respect cadavers from being despoiled and suffering the effects of post-mortem mutilation. Additionally, the practice of “dead-checking” through grenades or bullets can hinder the identification of fallen soldiers (p. 766). This could lead to a violation of Article 16(1) of GC I, which obliges belligerent parties to record and identify fallen soldiers. In summary, IHL clearly prohibits the practice of “double-tapping,” permitting the practice only during exceptional, combat-related circumstances (ICRC, GC I Commentary, para. 1404).

Coup de Grâce or an “Act of Mercy” Against Mortally Wounded Combatants

On the battlefield, a coup de grâce is a historical practice whereby a belligerent inflicts the final, fatal blow to a gravely wounded enemy. Combatants justify such acts as morally driven decisions, or as an act of “compassion” or “respect” towards opponents to relieve them from immense suffering and hasten an inevitable death (p. 73). Sometimes, a combatant performs an “act of mercy” when the mortally wounded enemy asks to bypass prolonged suffering and be “finished off.” Some describe the practice as “battlefield euthanasia,” which is a well-documented practice that dates back to the biblical times of the death of King Saul (p. 228).

Neither of these scenarios is uncommon on the battlefields of the 21st century. But such practice is the subject of both philosophical and legal controversy. Generally, proponents of mercy killing argue that ending extreme and untreatable suffering of the enemy that leads to a certain death is “motivated by … good rather than evil” (p. 116) or driven by “the conscience of humanity” (p. 231). Others, including combatants, see “compassion” in attempting to save the life of a wounded adversary (p. 69), and raise concerns regarding the wishes of the wounded soldier, the extent of the suffering, and the inevitability of death (p. 11).

Regardless, combatants—whether alive, wounded, or otherwise finding themselves hors de combat—“have a right to life and an inherent human value that … should be … protected from arbitrary deprivation” (p. 895). The practice of “mercy killing” results in arbitrary deprivation of life, regardless of the motives of the enemy, as combatants decide the fate of the wounded based on their perceptions.

In one case of mercy killing, a combatant admitted to the mercy killing of a severely injured Taliban fighter, stating that it was “the humane thing to do” (p. 128). In another case, a former UK Special Air Service sergeant murdered several mortally wounded Iraqi soldiers at their request to end their suffering, as the sergeant hadwitnessed them sustain severe wounds, including disembowelment and limb loss.

There is limited international case law regarding this practice; national courts typically handle cases involving mercy killings. Within the U.S. military justice system, mercy killings are usually charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as premeditated murder or voluntary manslaughter, two charges that, according to some, carry penalties and stigma highly disproportionate to the moral injury of the act (p. 117–71). Nevertheless, practice shows that in the majority of “mercy killing” cases, the punishments awarded to the defendants demonstrate a degree of leniency and mainly include dismissal or short confinement terms (p. 123–29).

Nevertheless, every combatant who engages in hostilities bears a duty to assist and do no harm to enemy soldiers finding themselves hors de combat. Killing a severely wounded opponent on the grounds of “kindness, compassion, easing suffering, and favor” (p. 170) clearly contradicts the binding IHL-centered principle of humanity, which seeks to “protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being” (p. 2). According to Article 12(1) of GC I, enemy combatants must be treated humanely without adverse distinction.

Based on the principle of humanity, the above rule, which reflects customary international law, prohibits combatants from discriminating between friend and foe when providing medical care, and prioritizes the treatment of the most critically wounded (ICRC, CIHL, rule 110). No matter the condition of the enemy, combatants must do everything reasonably possible to provide aid to the wounded (ICRC, GC I Commentary, para. 1383). As a prosecutor in one case correctly argued, “This is one of the basic rules of combat … treating a wounded combatant humanely does not mean accelerating his death” (p. 128). Therefore, according to the humanitarian spirit of IHL, the “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” dilemma in regard to mercy killing is irrelevant (p. 232). This practice clearly amounts to murder, with or without malicious intent (ICRC, GC I Commentary, para. 1404).

Conclusion

As contemporary examples illustrate, close-quarter combat will continue to shape the present and, most likely, the future of armed conflict. Hence, traditional weapons and tactics of war—from knives to martial arts techniques—will not disappear from the battlefield. While IHL does not prohibit such means and methods of warfare, it does demand that combatants avoid weapons or techniques that, by design or use, cause unnecessary suffering.

The practice of “double-tapping” or “dead-checking” is mostly incompatible with the rules of IHL. It is only permissible in the exceptional circumstances where a wounded enemy poses an immediate threat through feigned surrender or attempts to engage in hostile actions. Otherwise, “double-tapping” constitutes a prohibited attack on defenseless, hors de combat persons and may amount to a war crime.

As for “mercy killings,” IHL clearly indicates that wounded soldiers, even if they suffer from grave injuries, are protected from attack. Any debate surrounding this question belongs to philosophical and ethical discussions. Regardless of the motive behind an attack against a defenseless and mortally wounded enemy, the law imposes a duty to refrain from “mercy killings” and, to the maximum extent possible, preserve the life of the enemy.

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Nikoloz Mosidze is an LL.M. candidate in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights at the Geneva Academy.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense. 

Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.

Photo credit: U.S. Army