The New Syria and Its Obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention

On December 8, 2024, after weeks of hostilities, rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) captured the capital city of Damascus and took control over the Syrian State. This historic development attracted worldwide attention and crystalized after the sudden exile of Bashar al-Assad to Moscow, marking the fall of the infamous Assad dynasty that ruled Syria for over than half a century.

This turn of events ushered in a new chapter for Syria after an atrocious 13-year period of civil war that left Syrians facing devastation, displacement, and despair. Finally, after years of turmoil including the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its own nationals, Syrians are presented with a new national path of stability, or at least the promise of one.

This hope, however, is not without concerns. This post addresses two such concerns: the ability of the new State apparatus to exercise effective control over the entire territory of Syria; and the fate of chemical weapons in Syria and the factories that produced them.

We focus on the important duty of the new Syrian government to dispose of chemical weapons in its territory. We believe this is a critical step toward embracing a new period of hope and peace for the people of Syria. On a broader level, a crisis involving chemical weapons can generate a threat to international peace and security, and lead to more escalation in the already boiling Middle East.

The opportunity to rebuild carries with it the solemn responsibility to honor Syrian obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the CWC). In particular, the new Syrian government is bound to ensure the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities, and related materials, and the systematic dismantling of infrastructure in adherence with the timelines and verification protocols established by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The Rise to Power of HTS

HTS representatives form the majority of office holders in the transitional government of Syria. In the past, HTS was linked to al-Qaeda, and was designated a terrorist organization by multiple entities. The group, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), broke from al-Qaeda in 2017 to pursue an independent Syrian agenda. Since 2018, it has governed 3.4 million people in Idlib with Turkish support, maintaining relative stability despite a humanitarian crisis.

Today, after taking over Syria, diplomatic engagements by HTS led to the removal of a bounty on al-Sharaa, and the European Union signaled possible suspension of sanctions against Syria. As such, there is a new perspective and treatment toward the group and what it represents.

HTS brought about this change in attitude by a series of decisions reshaping the political landscape in January 2025. In particular, the new government appointed Al-Sharaa as transitional President of Syria and retained Mohammed al-Bashir as Transitional Prime Minister, who has been in the role since December 10, 2024. In addition, the new government annulled the 2012 Syrian Constitution and some Syrian laws. The Syrian Parliament, security branches, and the army will be dissolved and restructured. Further, rebel factions and bodies will be integrated into State institutions and a seven-member committee will draft a transitional constitutional charter.

These measures indicate that the new government is attempting to assert effective control after dismantling old institutions by integrating factions into the State apparatus and laying foundations for a unified system. To mark these historic events, and the new regime’s desire for stability and unity, the new government declared that December 8 will become a National Day.

In the context of chemical weapons, the new regime displayed a preliminary desire to reach out to the international community. In particular, Al-Sharaa, the appointed Syrian President, stated that he was monitoring closely potential chemical weapons depots and coordinating with international organizations to secure them.

Recognition of the Alternative Government

The rise to power of the new Syrian regime raises questions about the recognition of the government as the representative of the Syrian people. In this regard, recognition refers to the acknowledgment of a government that claims to represent a State.

In most situations, recognition happens automatically, as domestic legal frameworks typically provide a process for selecting a government, for example through elections. However, disputes arise when the legitimacy of a government taking over control is contested. This often occurs in scenarios such as a military coup or a civil war such as the one that took place in Syria. In such instances, recognizing the new government turns from what is usually a domestic matter into one of international significance.

When facing a need to recognize governments, it is common to refer to the standard of de facto control of all or most of the State territory while evaluating if and when the rise to power was tainted by the commission of international crimes. Not surprisingly, these criteria were applied inconsistently over the years, often depending on political considerations of interested States and organizations.

If possible, it is preferable that the issue should be resolved by the UN. The new Syrian government seems to be recognized, at least as an interim or caretaker government, by most States and also by the UN Secretary-General. This recognition was further reinforced at the Paris Conference on Syria on February 13, 2025, where representatives from numerous States and international organizations expressed their support for the transitional government and its efforts to lead Syria toward a stable and inclusive future. As such, we can move beyond the question of recognition into the main focus of this post: the role of the new government in meeting Syria’s international obligations in the context of the CWC and the OPCW.

The Obligations of the New Syrian Government

It is widely accepted that changes in government do not affect a State’s treaty obligations under international law. This applies to cases of election or revolutions alike. This principle derives from the need for stability and the sanctity of treaties as recognized in the customary rule of pacta sunt servanda anchored in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that reaffirms the inviolability of treaties.

The understanding that new governments remain obligated to previous undertakings goes back centuries. For example, in the London Protocol of 1831, major European powers recognized that internal changes of legal order have no bearing on a State’s commitment to honor treaties signed before the change. Despite attempts to challenge this principle (for example by the Soviet Union after the October Revolution), State practice has consistently reaffirmed that internal changes are irrelevant to the duty to uphold international obligations.

Recent examples of State practice can be seen in Afghanistan, which remained bound by its international obligations despite the Taliban takeover in 2021, and Myanmar, which remained subject to its international obligations even after a military coup in 2021. The new Syrian government is similarly bound by the previous regime’s international commitments regardless whether they were adopted prior to the rise to power of the new government.

Obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention

The CWC bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons by States party, with the ultimate goal of establishing a world free from such weapons. States party, in turn, are obliged to take the steps necessary to enforce the treaty in respect of persons within their jurisdiction.

Article IV of the CWC establishes the obligations of States party to destroy their chemical weapons in accordance with detailed provisions outlined in the Annex on Implementation and Verification. Similarly, Article V sets forth requirements for States party to destroy or convert their chemical weapons production facilities under strict verification measures.

In particular, weapons and facilities must be completely destroyed within 10 years of the Convention’s entry into force (29 April 2007). However, in extraordinary circumstances, the conference of the States party may approve an extension of up to five additional years, setting a final deadline of 29 April 2012. Indeed, during 2011, recognizing that some States had not met this extended deadline, OPCW Member States established reporting and transparency measures to ensure that the remaining chemical weapons were destroyed as soon as possible.

Syria acceded to the CWC in 2013, at a time when the treaty had near-universal membership, with 189 States party. Its accession followed the August 2013 chemical attack in Ghouta, which spurred diplomatic efforts to dismantle its chemical weapons program. According to article IV of the CWC, a State that joins the treaty after the end of the original ten-year period for destruction shall pursue to destroy its chemical weapons as soon as possible, based on an order of destruction determined by the Executive Council.

Indeed, under the supervision of a joint OPCW-UN mission, Syria declared that it removed and destroyed all chemical weapons in its territory. However, questions remain regarding the accuracy of Syria’s declaration on meeting this demand, as the OPCW’s declaration assessment team has worked to resolve gaps and inconsistencies it found. OPCW’s suspicion derives, inter alia, from the fact that its fact-finding mission and the investigation and identification team (IIT) confirmed that Syrian government forces used chemical weapons in several instances even after this declaration was made.

On 22 April 2021, the Conference of the States party to the CWC suspended Syria’s rights and privileges under the Convention, citing its use of chemical weapons and failure to comply with its disarmament obligations. The decision, based on Article XII(2), followed findings by the OPCW IIT, which confirmed Syria’s use of chemical weapons.

The decision also criticized Syria for failing to declare and destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile and production facilities and for not responding to the OPCW Executive Council’s request on 9 July 2020, to address these violations. As a result, Syria lost its voting rights, eligibility for election, and ability to hold office in OPCW.

To regain these privileges, Syria must comply with Council decision EC-94/DEC.2, which mandates it to declare all chemical weapons, stockpiles, and production facilities and resolve outstanding discrepancies in its initial declaration. The OPCW Director-General noted that it will monitor and report on Syria’s progress, and only upon full compliance will its rights be reinstated.

On 12 December 2024, after the rise to power of the new Syrian government, the OPCW urged Syria to fulfil its obligations under the CWC. In his opening remarks, the Director-General reminded the Council that, to date, Syria had not declared its full chemical weapons programme and that chemical weapons had been used in Syria on multiple occasions.

The Director-General further emphasized that the OPCW stands ready to support Syria in meeting its obligations, and in particular to help hold to account any identified perpetrators of chemical weapons use and bolster the reputation of Syria as a reliable and trusted member of the international community. In conclusion, the Director-General stated that “after 11 years at the OPCW, this Member State now needs to come into full compliance and, at last, fulfil all its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, relinquishing what is left of its chemical weapons programme.”

Finally, on 8 February 2025, a meeting took place in Damascus between the Director-General of the OPCW and the President of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa, to mark the beginning of a renewed collaboration between Syria and the OPCW. This encounter signals that there is hope indeed that the new Syria will strive to meet its international obligations under the CWC.

A Look Ahead

Syria remains legally bound to submit accurate and complete declarations in relation to its obligations under the CWC, regardless of any change in government. The international community should incentivize the new Syrian regime to avoid violations of treaties and especially ones that safeguard humanitarian considerations. This issue is particularly relevant in the context of the CWC.

In situations of non-compliance, Article XII(1) allows the OPCW Conference of the States Parties to recommend collective measures against a State party that has engaged in prohibited activities that cause serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention, as already done in the case of Syria. In cases of particular gravity, Article XII(4) states that the OPCW may bring the issue before the UN Security Council.

Recall the rise and demise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that attempted to establish that when a State is unwilling or unable to prevent mass atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, the international community has a collective responsibility to intervene. This doctrine crashed in the face of reality in the case of the civil war in Syria in the sense that the international community failed to invoke it even after the previous government perpetrated atrocities.

Even in the face of horrific photos emerging from the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its own people, no meaningful international action was taken under the R2P framework. And still, while R2P did not materialize as an international norm, the principle underlying it, that the international community has a role in preventing mass atrocities, remains relevant.

Therefore, if the new Syria government violates the provisions of the CWC, there will be room to consider if the UN Security Council should exercise its mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take measures in response to threats to international peace and security, including imposing sanctions (art. 41) or, if necessary, the use of force (art. 42). This move, of course, depends on the lack of a veto by one of the Security Council’s permanent members, most notably Russia which backed the previous Assad regime notwithstanding the atrocities it committed.

In this regard, action can be taken under Article XII of the CWC, which provides for referral to the United Nations in cases of serious breaches of the Convention. This rule invites the Security Council to take necessary measures in response to ongoing non-compliance, in a desire to ensure accountability and the enforcement of international norms against the use of chemical weapons.

In sum, with a new government in place that demonstrates a desire to integrate as a positive member of the international community, this transitional period presents an opportunity to ensure that the new Syria will better uphold its international obligations. As part of this change, it is crucial to insist on compliance with the CWC.

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Photo credit: Voice of America