Requiem for IHL: A Geopolitical Perspective

International humanitarian law (IHL) is facing a fundamental crisis. As Dr. Erica Harper recently noted, many actors around the world now openly violate the laws of war and face no consequences, accelerating the alarming erosion of global norms. While some have periodically called for a renewed commitment to IHL, such pleas seem to fall on deaf ears time and again. Many belligerents simply do not seem to care. Yet Dr. Harper’s analysis ends with the conclusion that IHL’s end is not inevitable and can be prevented through urgent action.

This post uses an inter-disciplinary lens to present a much starker assessment of the future of IHL. By using both a geopolitical and legal analysis, it shows how the concept of IHL is itself under siege, thanks to the emerging world order. IHL, by its very nature, must be an internationally agreed-upon framework of laws, with global consensus on how wars are allowed to be fought, and enforcement mechanisms to uphold this consensus. This post argues that the idea of an “international” framework of laws—be it jus ad bellum, jus in bello, or jus post bellum—will no longer be viable as the world order changes. It can continue to exist on paper but will increasingly lose relevance in practice.

Just as domestic laws are a reflection of societal structure, international laws reflect the structure of the wider world order. As such, geopolitical factors shape the contours of legal development (and legal crises) just as much as jurisprudence. And when the geopolitical world order no longer allows for a universal legal framework, there is little we can do to stem the tide.

The argument that IHL is outdated or losing relevance is nothing new. But as we shall see, important indicators cannot be dismissed this time. The stakes are not just IHL’s credibility but its very existence.

Multipolarity Is Anathema to IHL

The rise of China as the predominant trading partner of most nations in the world, the resurgence of Russian aggression as a talking point in the West, and India’s status as both a space and nuclear triad power allow each of these States to now view themselves as key global players. Traditional nuclear powers like the United Kingdom and France and newer nuclear members like North Korea and Israel are also part of the mix, not to mention a whole range of middle powers like Turkey, Japan, Saudia Arabia, and Brazil, among others, all of which have begun asserting their strategic interests.

We call this a multipolar world, with many power centers exerting influence. The consequences of such a world are dire, perhaps even fatal to the very concept of IHL. For any international legal framework to last, one needs a unified world order, such as the liberal world order that emerged following the two world wars. Without this framework, legal consensus is impossible because actors would only pursue their own interests. And without consensus, the very concept of an international legal framework becomes untenable. Multipolarity is thus a conceptual, not merely a structural, threat to IHL.

It is already easy to notice these trends playing out, such as through Russia arbitrarily redefining the rules of self-defense to justify invading Ukraine, or China’s seeming disregard for a rules-based international order. With any recalibration of the world, this trend will likely increase. As Professor Hitoshi Nasu rightly observed, legal development under the liberal world order was nothing short of “schizophrenic” thanks to the long list of tribunals and institutions created in its wake, none of which seem to have any relevance today. As we are already seeing, emerging powers will not treat these laws with the veneration that some in the IHL community demand.

The Custodians of IHL Are Already Paralyzed

Some would argue that the UN and International Criminal Court (ICC) are easy targets, and that their inefficiencies should not lead to dismissing the very idea of IHL. But how else can we judge the future of IHL, other than through the primary mechanisms meant to uphold and implement it?

In 2025 alone, two potential nuclear conflicts broke out, one between India and Pakistan, and the other between Israel and Iran. Any student of international law would know that the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir was taken to the UN in 1948, as was the Israel-Palestine question in 1947. Despite the passing of nearly eighty years, at the UN there is not even a glimmer of resolution in sight for either situation. And in 2025, we still live in fear over what might happen. Why would future generations, tasked with forming a new geopolitical order, take IHL seriously if this is the state of its chief custodian?

The ICC has fared no better. For the first twenty years of its existence, the Court was almost exclusively involved in African conflicts, dealing with leaders who possessed no geopolitical power to resist its jurisdiction. This prompted many to accuse the ICC of double standards and bullying the weak. When it recently tried to intervene against leaders who actually possess geopolitical power, namely Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, it found itself unable to take any real action. To the contrary, its investigation into the situation in Palestine, earned the ICC a rap on the knuckles from the United States for its overzealous intervention.

What kind of future can anybody reasonably envision for IHL under such a legal framework? The primary requirement for the rule of law is implementation. Those governed by the law must believe in its implementation. Yet, implementation itself has been the “Achilles heel” of IHL.

Civilizational Conflicts Undermine IHL

The law is not always competent to sanitize wars driven by passion and identity. The most brutal war crimes of recent times have invariably been identitarian in nature, with belligerents targeting members of opposing ethnicities, tribes, or religions. If the source of war becomes increasingly civilizational, it will become even harder to implement adherence to IHL. Yet this is precisely what is happening.

After the end of the Cold War, some felt we were entering a new era of peace shaped by liberal democratic values. Meanwhile, others offered more pessimistic visions of a world where civilizational clashes—conflicts the roots of which go back to age-old cultural and historical tensions—would become the norm. The pessimistic prediction, unfortunately, aligns with today’s reality. Historical disputes, not modern “nation-State” identities, have become the primary driver of global conflict.

Be it India-Pakistan, Rwanda-Congo, Iran-Israel, Armenia-Azerbaijan, or any of the many conflicts currently raging in the Sahel region, these are all conflicts with civilizational seeds in some form. In each of these conflicts, it is not the post-Westphalian nation-State identity that belligerents refer to, but far older wounds.

India and Pakistan’s rivalry goes back to a millennium-old question of Hindus and Muslims struggling to coexist in South Asia. Iran and Israel’s enmity goes back to the ancient idea of a Jewish homeland in West Asia denied by the Persians. Rwanda-Congo tensions are directly related to the cyclical violence between the Hutus and Tutsis, which predates European colonialism. Even the Russia-Ukraine war is civilizational in a way, with Moscow seeing Ukraine as a cultural and historical part of Russia, while Ukraine sees itself as a sovereign nation-State with legal autonomy. In each of these cases, the belligerents see the conflict as being far older than the modern political or legal systems designed to regulate them.

This means that belligerents on either side will see most conflicts as existential, making them even more resistant to legal constraints. Belligerents will fight wars with high emotional stakes and complex historical dimensions, driving parties to consider factors beyond the typical legal parameters, especially if these parameters are mere children in the chronological scale of these age-old blood feuds.

Conclusion: What is the Way Forward?

There is a reason why many have noted all of these trends to be an unprecedented challenge to the legal order. The demise of IHL is not a hypothetical or alarmist prediction, but an observation grounded in the political reality of our time. There can be no “international humanitarian law” if it is not “international.”

As tempting as it can be to hope for change through diplomatic reform, multilateral cooperation, or reenergised institutions, such optimism is increasingly futile when the very idea of a universally agreed-upon IHL seems incompatible with a fractured world order.

The rise of multipolarity is not a matter of speculation, but of fact. Similarly, that international institutions responsible for spearheading the future of IHL—particularly the UN and the ICC—remain paralyzed by political inertia, double standards, and legitimacy crises, is not speculation, but fact. Nor is it a fantasy that older, more civilizational wars are starting to rear their head. If such dilemmas were merely blooming on a distant horizon, there might have been a chance to steer things around. But the crisis is not looming; it is here.

Given this trajectory, the way forward must begin with a shift in how we conceptualize IHL: not as an instrument of international compliance, but as an internal moral duty. When international consensus fractures, States must bear the burden of restraint domestically. Each State must cultivate the political and ethical will to impose meaningful limits on its own conduct. One could claim it is absurd to make nations adopt laws that shackle their own powers, but there is no other choice when a world policeman ceases to exist. In the absence of credible external enforcement, moral self-regulation becomes the only viable mechanism to preserve any framework of laws.

This analysis is not meant to celebrate the death of IHL or to revel in any legal vacuum that will inevitably follow. Instead, it is a grim and reluctant acknowledgement of where things appear to be heading. Nobody ought to take any satisfaction from the prospect of wars becoming even more brutal and unregulated than they already are. IHL, for all its absurdities and hypocrisies, symbolizes an aspiration towards humanity and accountability in warfare, principles originally codified in good faith. Its impending death is not just a legal crisis; it is a moral one, and it will have deeply human consequences.

***

Nilanthan Niruthan is the Executive Director of the Centre for Law and Security Studies. He teaches law and geopolitics at the National Defence College and writes a column for StratNews Global, South Asia’s leading defence media platform.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense. 

Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.

Photo credit: U.S. Army, Sgt. 1st Class Ryele Bertoch