Sudan: The Case for Recognising All Conflict-Related Sexual Violence as Torture
Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is often framed as an unfortunate byproduct of war rather than as an intentional and strategic act of violence. However, a closer examination of CRSV in modern conflicts reveals it is not incidental. As a deliberate weapon perpetrators wield, it is a tool of terror, control, and destruction to destabilize communities and dismantle social cohesion. Despite the clear intent to inflict severe physical and psychological suffering, CRSV is frequently treated as a lesser crime, incorrectly attached to the idea of sexuality, rather than what it fundamentally constitutes under international law: torture.
While there has been increasing legal and academic recognition of CRSV as a form of torture, the systematic and widespread sexual violence occurring in Sudan emphasizes the urgent need for more explicit legal recognition by States. The scale and brutality of CRSV in Sudan provide a compelling basis to formally classify all CRSV as torture. Doing so would not only strengthen accountability mechanisms but also ensure that survivors receive the legal recognition and redress they deserve.
Sexual Violence in Conflict: A Strategic Weapon
Sexual violence in conflict is neither incidental nor random. It is a deliberate and systematically deployed tool of warfare serving to punish, intimidate, and, in some cases, facilitate ethnic cleansing. Its use targets “not only the direct victims, but also has consequences for families, communities, and ethnic or religious groups, aiming to break their spirit and will.” Historical and contemporary conflicts—from Bosnia and Rwanda to Israel and Sudan—demonstrate that members of armed groups have strategically used mass rape to inflict lasting trauma on individuals and to dismantle the social fabric of communities. Despite significant advancements in international humanitarian law, CRSV remains inadequately addressed, with States often framing it as an unfortunate consequence of war rather than recognizing CRSV as a core instrument of violence.
The ongoing conflict in Sudan exemplifies this failure. Reports indicate systematic sexual violence perpetrated by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other armed groups, with women and girls abducted, raped, and forced into sexual slavery. These atrocities are not isolated incidents but rather form part of a broader pattern of warfare, where members of armed groups deliberately use sexual violence to instil fear, exert control, and destroy communities.
Survivor testimonies from the ongoing conflict reveal that these acts of violence frequently take place in front of victims’ families, within their homes, transforming places of refuge into sites of horror. The intent is clear: to destroy family bonds and the concept of home, leaving civilians feeling powerless against the brutal militias.
Moreover, the perpetrators do not confine their crimes to adults. UNICEF has this month documented cases in which infants under the age of five and young girls and young boys under the age of sixteen were victims of rape in Sudan, further underscoring the extreme brutality of these acts. The sheer scale and nature of these crimes show a pattern of their use as a method of control and instilling terror.
The brutality of CRSV is no less severe than acts of torture more traditionally recognized under international law. Yet, the persistent failure to explicitly categorize CRSV as torture enables its continued use as a devastating weapon of war against civilian populations, many of whom are already enduring extreme hardship.
The harrowing accounts emerging from Sudan compel a critical re-examination of how international law classifies CRSV. Without formal recognition as torture, there is a risk that CRSV becomes diminished in legal frameworks that treat it as somehow secondary to other forms of violence. To prevent this, international law must evolve to ensure that CRSV is neither overlooked nor minimized, but instead fully recognized as the grave and intentional infliction of torture it is.
Legal Precedents: CRSV as Torture in International Law
The recognition of CRSV as torture in international law is not unprecedented. The jurisprudence of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) recognize rape and other forms of CRSV as torture when used systematically in armed conflict.
In the Čelebići judgment, the ICTY made clear that rape can amount to torture when it satisfies the core elements set out under international law, specifically, when severe physical or mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted for purposes such as punishment, intimidation, coercion, or discrimination (paras. 475-93). Importantly, the Tribunal underscored that torture is not limited to acts of interrogation or punishment in custodial settings, a point it reinforced in the Kunurac case (para. 496).
In the Furundžija case, the ICTY confirmed that rape and other forms of sexual violence amount to torture when committed for prohibited purposes such as intimidation, coercion, or discrimination (paras. 163-86.) The Tribunal did more than simply acknowledge the act of rape, it examined the broader context in which offenders employ sexual violence, recognizing the deep and lasting psychological and physical harm inflicted on victims. In Furundžija, the ICTY made clear that rape is not simply a violation of bodily integrity. It is a form of violence that deliberately inflicts enduring trauma, thus meeting the threshold of torture under international law.
The ICTR, in the Akayesu case, also recognized that rape and sexual violence can constitute acts of genocide when carried out with the intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part. Beyond its significance for genocide law, Akayesu confirmed that sexual violence can also meet the definition of torture under international law (paras. 597, 687).
Despite these rulings, the primary lens through which commentators analyze CRSV remains war crimes or crimes against humanity, rather than torture. This legal gap limits accountability, as torture carries unique non-derogable obligations under international law, specifically under Article 2(2) of the Convention Against Torture, Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and customary international law. International laws regarding torture also carry stronger obligations for States to prosecute and prevent such crimes under the Convention Against Torture and the ICCPR.
A Necessary Evolution in International Humanitarian Law
The situation evolving in Sudan emphasizes the pressing need to revisit both how the international legal community understands CRSV and its prosecution under international law. The systematic use of sexual violence as a weapon of war—aimed at terrorizing, controlling, and dismantling civilian populations—aligns with the established definition of torture under the Convention Against Torture. The jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, including the ICTY and ICTR, has long affirmed that rape and sexual violence can constitute torture when used as a method of punishment, intimidation, and coercion in armed conflict. Yet, despite these precedents, States continue to approach CRSV as a lesser or secondary crime, often disconnected from the framework of torture that more fully captures its intent and gravity.
Recognizing CRSV as torture is not only a matter of legal precision; it is essential to respecting the experiences of survivors, ensuring their access to justice, and affirming that sexual violence in conflict is among the most serious violations of international law. The devastating accounts emerging from Sudan leave no room for ambiguity about the severity and purpose of these acts.
As the war in Sudan continues to ravage its civilian population, now is the time for the international legal community to affirm unequivocally that all CRSV constitutes torture, and to act accordingly to prevent, prosecute, and remedy these crimes in Sudan and beyond.
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Natalie Nunn is a Senior Legal Consultant with Lexbridge Lawyers, a Visiting Fellow with the Geneva Academy, and a Principal Researcher for the University of Queensland’s ‘Law and the Future of War’ centre.
The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.
Photo credit: Steve Evans
