Did China Just Violate the Biological Warfare Convention?
In early June, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested two nationals of the People’s Republic of China for conspiracy to smuggle a fungus called Fusarium graminearum into the United States, which scientific literature classifies as an agroterrorism weapon. The evidence suggests that Yunqing Jian, 33 and Zunyong Liu, 34 acted fraudulently, intentionally attempting to conceal the importation of the fungus into the United States. A criminal complaint filed in the Eastern District of Michigan alleges that Jian and Liu are members of the Communist Party of China. It further alleges that Jian received funding from the Chinese government for her work on the pathogen in China. Liu is Jian’s boyfriend, and allegedly also works on the same pathogen at a Chinese university.
The two scientists allegedly used their access to the University of Michigan as cover for a scheme. They are believed to have intentionally attempted to smuggle the fungus into the United States to create havoc in the American agricultural sector. The fungus causes a disease called “head blight,” which infects wheat, barley, maize, and rice. Each year, head blight wreaks billions of dollars of damage. The toxins produced by the fungus cause vomiting, liver damage, and reproductive defects in humans and livestock.
China’s Strategy of “Unrestricted Warfare”
As a free society, the United States is highly vulnerable to a biological attack. Conducting a series of biological attacks on the United States aligns with China’s 1999 strategy of “Unrestricted Warfare.” Authored by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare envisions continuous warfare conducted in peacetime and beyond conventional military engagements. The authors argue that modern conflicts are fought across a virtually infinite number of battlefields.
The strategy rejects traditional rules of warfare outlined in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, which aim to protect the civilian population from the devastation of war. Instead, in unrestricted warfare, nothing is forbidden, and everything can be a weapon, including economic disruptions, cyberattacks, disinformation, and even biological agents. The opponent’s weaknesses are targeted, such as free societies, economic dependencies, and social cohesion, rather than directly engaging their military strengths. The strategy integrates military, and non-military means to undermine an adversary’s stability, focusing on the long-term erosion of power rather than immediate destruction.
The United States often uses economic strength as a proxy for national power by comparing gross domestic product and per capita income. China adopts a different approach, focusing on “Comprehensive National Power” or “Gross National Power,” which assesses China’s overall position against that of the United States not just in economic terms, but also military capability, societal cohesion, and social stability. China’s strategy aims to enhance its own power while simultaneously diminishing U.S. influence by encouraging internal chaos and undermining American social and political fabric. China seeks to disrupt the U.S. economy to erode its financial authority and foster public discontent. Through intellectual property theft, which costs an estimated $300 billion annually, China undermines American innovation and job creation. Economic instability can fuel domestic unrest, as job losses and financial crises diminish public trust in institutions.
Political warfare and disinformation weaken U.S. social and political cohesion by amplifying divisions and eroding trust in governance. The spread of disinformation through media influences and shapes public opinion and manipulates cultural narratives. For instance, as U.S. intelligence reports have noted, China uses social media platforms to propagate divisive narratives or influence elections. These activities exacerbate polarization—e.g., over issues like race, immigration, or public health—damaging the social fabric of the United States and making it harder for the U.S. government to respond cohesively to external threats.
Cyberattacks provide a further low-cost, high-impact method for targeting U.S. financial systems, power grids, and communication networks. For example, the 2020 Equifax breach, attributed to PLA officers, exposed the sensitive data of 147 million Americans, illustrating this capability. Cyber disruptions can erode public confidence, disrupt essential services, and incite widespread panic, amplifying domestic instability. Cultural and legal warfare undermine U.S. soft power and international legitimacy. By portraying the U.S. as an unreliable global leader, China can diminish American influence abroad while fostering domestic skepticism about U.S. institutions.
Biowarfare?
The idea that China may also consider using biological warfare as part of an Unrestricted Warfare strategy to destabilize the United States is highly controversial and speculative, with limited conclusive evidence. Biological weapons could serve as a potential tool for widespread disruption without kinetic conflict. The book War for Biological Dominance (2010) emphasizes biotechnology as a strategic domain for national security, including “ethnic genetic attacks.”
The COVID-19 pandemic inflicted enormous damage on the United States, resulting in over one million U.S. deaths and economic losses exceeding $3.5 trillion, and leading to significant social unrest and reduced trust in government, all of which align with China’s goal of disrupting its adversary’s Gross National Power. The ensuing public health crises worsened distrust in medical institutions, as seen in U.S. debates over lockdowns and vaccines.
However, the Fusarium graminearum fungus has been present in the United States for at least 125 years. This fungus naturally occurs in numerous U.S. states that produce wheat and barley, so it does not have an exceptionally novel or exotic origin. However, Xiaoxu Sean Lin, a former lab director of the viral disease branch at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, said the confiscated samples were likely genetically modified strains of Fusarium graminearum, raising a biosafety concern. Were these modified strains designed to enhance infectivity or pesticide resistance?
On June 9, the U.S. government charged another Chinese national present illegally in the United States with smuggling “biological materials” in the form of roundworms and making false statements. The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan called the case an “alarming pattern that threatens our security.” During the COVID-19 pandemic, Americans in all fifty states (myself included) received anonymous and unsolicited seeds in their mailboxes. Most of the seed packets came from China, as well as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The mailings raised concern that the seeds might be intended to sow invasive species or even constitute an attack against American agriculture. Canadian and British citizens also received packets of mystery seeds.
Ultimately, the U.S. Department of Agriculture identified the seeds as mostly harmless plants, such as rosemary, mint, and hibiscus; however, it remains a mystery why businesses or the Chinese government would conduct massive and unsolicited mailings of plants to random Americans. It may be that the mailings were part of a “brushing scam” to upload fake product reviews online, while others suggest it could have been a dry run to expose U.S. agroterrorism vulnerabilities.
Allegations of biological warfare remain speculative and there is no concrete evidence that Fusarium graminearum or COVID-19 were part of a broader Chinese biological warfare strategy. However, biological warfare aligns with the Unrestricted Warfare playbook. As the threat from China’s asymmetric power increases, it is essential to revisit the rules governing biological warfare and evaluate whether the attempt to smuggle the fungus into the United States would constitute a violation of international law.
The Biological Weapons Convention
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” It also bans the use of biological weapons.
The clandestine importation of a dangerous fungus could potentially violate the BWC if the fungus is a biological agent or toxin intended for hostile purposes or if its importation is inconsistent with peaceful purposes. Article III of the treaty requires each State party “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever,” agents or toxins that “have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” If the fungus is imported with the intent to weaponize it or use it for harmful purposes, this would constitute a violation of the BWC. The Convention focuses on the purpose behind the acquisition or use of biological agents.
As the case against Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu unfolds, whether their secretive smuggling of Fusarium graminearum constitutes a violation of the BWC may be answered as a question of fact. The BWC applies to biological agents or toxins that lack justification for peaceful purposes, such as Fusarium graminearum. If the fungus is inherently dangerous (e.g., highly pathogenic), and the quantity or context of importation suggests non-peaceful intent, it may be deemed a violation. There appears to be no legitimate medical or research justification for the smuggling, which suggests non-compliance. The BWC covers “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production.” A dangerous fungus qualifies as a biological agent if it can harm humans, animals, or plants in a manner consistent with weaponization.
The secretive importation of the dangerous fungus raises suspicions of non-compliance with the BWC, suggesting an attempt to evade oversight or controls. However, the BWC itself does not explicitly address “clandestine importation” as a specific act; the violation would depend on the broader context of intent and use. In addition to the BWC, clandestine importation might violate national biosecurity, biosafety, or import/export control laws, such as the United States’s 1990 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act or similar legislation in other countries. These laws often implement BWC obligations at the domestic level and may criminalize unauthorized handling or transport of dangerous pathogens. If the fungus had been imported for legitimate purposes, such as medical research, agricultural protection, or other peaceful applications, and was handled according to biosafety and biosecurity regulations, it would not violate the BWC.
The BWC lacks a formal verification mechanism, so determining a violation often depends on investigations by State parties, international cooperation, or evidence of intent. The U.S. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act prohibits knowingly developing, producing, stockpiling, transferring, acquiring, retaining, or possessing “any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon.” A person who knowingly assists a foreign State may violate the Act, and conviction can result in imprisonment for life. In this case, the violation hinges on intent because the nature of the fungus already appears to qualify as a dangerous pathogen.
Potential Violation
China expert Gordon Chang warns these events presage a biological attack on the American homeland. The fact that Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu are members of the CCP suggests they acted as agents of the Chinese regime. Director of the FBI Kash Patel warned, “This case is a sobering reminder that the CCP is working around the clock to deploy operatives and researchers to infiltrate American institutions and target our food supply … .” The clandestine introduction of the Fusarium graminearum fungus into the United States further indicates that they knew their actions were illegal. As scientists, they risked their careers and positions to circumvent rules that they certainly knew. If the pair acted on behalf of China, their acts are attributable to Beijing based on the rule reflected in Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility.
The incident suggests that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other affected States such as Canada, should consider filing a complaint under the BWC for a suspected violation. Before or instead of lodging a formal complaint, States parties are encouraged to resolve concerns through consultation and cooperation under Article V. This involves direct dialogue or requesting a consultative meeting to clarify issues or suspicions about compliance. Such meetings can involve technical experts and may be facilitated by the BWC Implementation Support Unit or other agreed mechanisms.
Under Article VI of the Convention, any State party to the BWC that believes another State party is violating the Convention can lodge a formal complaint with the UN Security Council. The complaint should include evidence or details of the alleged breach, such as the development, production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons prohibited under the Convention. Upon receiving the complaint, the UN Security Council may initiate an investigation to assess the validity of the allegations. The Security Council has the authority to request information, conduct inquiries, or involve relevant UN bodies to gather evidence. However, the specifics of the investigation process are not detailed in the BWC and depend on the procedures adopted by the Council. Under Article VI, all States party are obligated to cooperate fully with any investigation initiated by the Security Council. This includes providing access to relevant information or facilities upon request.
If the Security Council determines a violation has occurred, it may take further action, such as issuing resolutions, imposing sanctions, or referring the matter to other international bodies. However, the BWC itself does not specify enforcement mechanisms, and outcomes depend on the political dynamics within the Security Council. Of course, it is likely that these efforts will be stymied by China and Russia at the Security Council, but raising the issues highlights the suspicious activity and alerts other States to the unusual, if not threatening conduct.
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James Kraska is Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Maritime Law at the United States Naval War College. The views presented do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.
The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.
Photo credit: Luz Mendoza via Unsplash
