Tentative Remarks on Ukraine’s Suspension of the Ottawa Convention
On June 29, 2025, the President of Ukraine signed a decree on the withdrawal of Ukraine from the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, otherwise known as the Ottawa Convention. In doing so, Ukraine followed five States that withdrew from Ottawa in 2025, and also became the first State to refuse obligations under that treaty in the course of an ongoing armed conflict.
In this post, we continue our previous reflections on the subject by discussing Ukraine’s recent move. In the absence of information about any actual use of antipersonnel mines (APL) by Ukraine, time does not yet seem ripe for a comprehensive analysis. Rather, we attempt (very tentatively) to summarize the facts and respond to some immediate international reactions.
Ukraine’s Troubled Journey Around Ottawa
Ukraine signed the Ottawa Convention on February 24, 1999, ratified it on May 18, 2005, and the Convention entered into force for Ukraine on June 1, 2006. Since then, Ukraine declared its support for “the aspirations of the Ottawa-process initiators and like-minded states to overcome humanitarian crisis caused by a large-scale proliferation and indiscriminate use of APLs and wished to see the world free of this type of weapons.”
However, the execution of the Convention’s obligations progressed at a snail’s pace, with APL stockpiles reported as high as 6.405 million in 2006 and 5.916 million in 2013. The situation changed (paradoxically) in the first years of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, with a steady reduction reported between 2015 (5.584 million) and 2020 (3.364 million). At the same time, Ukraine regularly informed the UN Secretary General that the application and implementation of obligations on the occupied territory “is limited and not guaranteed.” Consistent reports indicated that both the Russian Federation and Russian-backed armed groups used factory-produced and improvised APLs without limit.
Ukraine regularly articulated relevant concerns, including in communications to the Ottawa Convention Depositary in 2016 and 2018, in which it urged finding a solution to resolve “challenges originated from the aggression against a State party to the Ottawa Convention, including by a State being a non-State party to this Convention.” No reaction followed. Ukraine received neither support nor even recognition of the problem.
In 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion immediately and catastrophically deteriorated the situation, as Russian forces extensively used at least thirteen types of APLs across all areas of combat operations, contaminating around 23 percent of Ukraine’s territory with mines and other explosive hazards, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, including children. Ukraine’s reports then included a long list of hazard areas, as well as an explanation that the APLs remaining in the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”
With vanishing prospects of peace in the foreseeable future, continued adherence to the APL ban attracted increasing criticism inside Ukraine. Meanwhile, voices abroad expressing sympathy for the policy change came even from the de-miners’ community. In this context, the withdrawal of five States was arguably the last straw.
Events progressed quickly as Ukraine decided to withdraw. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) initiated the process by submitting a proposal to the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), a body under the President of Ukraine coordinating national security and defense issues. The NSDC upheld the proposal, and the President decreed that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) immediately take measures to implement the proposal. On June 11, the CMU submitted a relevant bill to Parliament. The Parliament passed it on July 15, and the President signed it on the same day. The law entered into force on July 17. On July 18, Ukraine notified the UN Secretary General as a depositary of the suspension.
Mapping Early Reactions
Nongovernmental organizations’ reactions were predictably negative. Some qualified the presidential decree as a deceitful political step without legal effect. For instance, the director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) stated that the campaigners are “furious,” because mines “will do nothing to help against Russia,” and named the decisions of all six countries “political games by officials trying to present themselves as defenders of national security.” The ICBL itself warned its LinkedIn followers against “being misled,” because “Ukraine cannot legally withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty.” Human Rights Watch took a similar stance, noting that “because Ukraine is in the midst of a war, its proposed withdrawal is effectively a symbolic move to gain political cover while disregarding the core prohibitions.”
Another group of reactions grieved the expected increase of civilian suffering. For example, Mines Action Canada labelled APLs as a “weapon of choice for those like Russia and ISIS, who want to terrorize civilians.” The Mines Advisory Group was more reserved, acknowledging “the extremely difficult situations faced by Ukraine and, to a different degree, others such as Baltic states” in the face of the Russian aggression. Nevertheless, the group stated that leaving the Ottawa Convention would undermine the legal framework and “play into the hands precisely of those malign actors who have long worked to undermine shared protections and who ignore international law.” The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining expressed virtually the same position.
These statements are far from purely legal in nature. Therefore, before jumping to legal questions, we shall briefly touch upon some political and factual claims that make up the bulk of the criticism.
A Policy of Common Sense
Responding to the “political game” argument, it would be pointless to deny that the actions of the President, of the MFA, and of the NSDC are political. These are exactly the bodies charged with the direction of the State’s international and defense policies. Under Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the core functions of the President of Ukraine are to ensure the State’s national security and to represent the State in international relations.
However, under Article 9 of the same Constitution, international treaties are a part of Ukraine’s domestic legislation. The Constitution does not grant the President a magic cloak to “politically cover” violations of law. His power is to order the government to draft a bill and to submit it to the Parliament. It is the Parliament that turns the political proposal into a law. Support from 299 members of Parliament out of 334 present, with no abstentions or objections from any party, including the opposition, clearly indicates strong backing for the decision to suspend the Ottawa Convention. In subsequent weeks, there were hardly any notable opposing voices in Ukraine. Therefore, the question is not why officials initiated the process of leaving Ottawa, but why there is such a unilateral national consensus on the matter.
The most obvious reason is that an absolute majority of Ukrainians did not read international reports describing why APLs are bad weapons, but instead closely followed news about the stagnated Ukrainian offensive deterred by a myriad of Russian mines. They also see how many Ukrainian veterans lost limbs to antipersonnel mines. Therefore, the mantra that APLs are ineffective simply rings hollow to Ukrainian ears.
As for the protection of civilians, Ukrainians have first-hand experience living in the most mined country in the world, and they understand the civilian toll of mining more than anyone. However, they also understand the price of the alternative explained in the MFA statement: “in the light of the overriding priority to defend our states from brutal Russian aggression to protect our land from occupation, and our people from horrific Russian atrocities, Ukraine has made a difficult but necessary political decision.” This decision is a result of a choice between stopping the enemy at a certain cost or letting the enemy advance in the knowledge that any territory where the enemy will appear will be crammed with APLs without any control or recording, and there will be no convention to prevent this. If this choice is political, this is a policy of elementary common sense.
Suspension, Not Withdrawal
For now, the critics’ legal argument is based on an assumption that Ukraine will use the same mechanism as the five other withdrawing nations—Article 20 of the Ottawa Convention—which precludes withdrawal in the course of an ongoing armed conflict. This position is understandable, taking into account the wording of the Presidential decree (which used the term “withdrawal”). However, the decree was an effort to find a solution, not the solution itself. Professor Duncan Hollis ably analyzed various alternatives available to Ukraine, including Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a mechanism ultimately chosen by the MFA and enshrined in the law.
Article 62, expressing the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, establishes three options: termination; withdrawal; or suspension. Ukraine has chosen the latter. An explanatory note to the bill submitted to Parliament (available in Ukrainian only) confirms the consciousness of that choice. It underscores that Ukraine will be only temporarily released from its obligations in the following terms:
Considering that Ukraine shares the principles and purposes laid down in the foundation of the Convention of 1997 and intends to comply with them after the termination of the military threat for its national interest, the use of the mechanism of withdrawal from the 1997 Convention does not appear to be advisable. To the contrary, the suspension of the 1997 Convention would enable unlimited use of necessary types of weapons until the moment of removal of the threat of attack or danger for the state independence of Ukraine.
This explanation is in line with Ukraine’s previous promise to complete the process of destruction of APLs “after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine.”
There is nothing impossible about restoring conventional commitments after suspension. Article 72 of the VCLT “releases the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of the suspension” but “does not otherwise affect the legal relations between the parties established by the treaty.” Further, Article 72 obligates the parties to “refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the operation of the treaty.” Considering that Russia is not a party, Ukraine likely considers the Ottawa Convention to be suspended in relations between itself and the other parties. Thus, it appears that Ukraine wishes to leave the door back to the Ottawa Convention open.
The Fundamental Change of “Never Under Any” Circumstances
Ukraine’s choice of Article 62 as a vehicle for suspension cannot but engender the question whether the circumstances invoked by Ukraine are sufficiently fundamental to justify suspension. One can refer to the case of the Load Line Convention terminated by the United States in 1941 citing an armed conflict as a fundamental change. However, this approach hardly applies to the Ottawa Convention, which was meant precisely for armed conflicts. There must be something much more fundamental to trigger the right to suspend under Article 62.
What are the circumstances actually invoked by Ukraine? Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ June 29 statement cites Russian aggression, stressing the extensive use “of anti-personnel mines as a method of warfare,” which created an asymmetric advantage for the aggressor. An explanatory note to the bill cites two additional changes. First is the failed Budapest Memorandum on security assurances, and second is the allegedly articulated intention of Russian leaders to “completely exterminate Ukrainians as a nation and the Ukrainian State as such.” Ukraine is likely to present these arguments in the international arena.
Without doubt, the failure of the security architecture and genocide allegedly faced by the nation sound like a much more serious change of circumstances than an outbreak of another armed conflict. Further analysis of the validity of these arguments as grounds for invocation of the rebus sic stantibus to suspend the Ottawa Convention is well outside of the scope of this post. However, as noted by Professor Hollis, the question is “who will seek to hold Ukraine responsible,” and what is the legal forum before which the critics and Ukraine could present their arguments? Currently, no such legal forum appears to exist except a meeting of States parties foreseen by Article 11 of the Ottawa Convention. This forum lacks the power to adjudge violations, and in any event the opinions by the meetings would hardly be authoritative for Ukraine after over ten years of overseeing a fundamental problem of an armed aggression against a member State by a non-member.
On the other hand, if Ukraine and other States parties manage to retain good working relations, the meeting may be used for its original purpose: discussion of international cooperation and assistance. Such a discussion would be much more beneficial for the Ottawa Convention and each of the parties (including Ukraine) than quarrels and mutual accusations.
Conclusions and Way Forward
Ukraine’s case presents an unprecedented crisis in the history of the Mine Ban Treaty. Over ten years of aggression and over three years of full-scale invasion by a non-member against a member is a situation that the authors of the Ottawa Convention did not foresee, and the conventional bodies failed to address. Despite this, Ukraine did its best to follow its aspiration of overcoming humanitarian crises caused by the proliferation and use of APLs by doing something that no other member States ever did: reducing its stockpiles even in the course of an armed conflict. A difficult but necessary decision was made after years of hesitation, when it became crystal clear that further compliance contradicts common sense and the sense of national self-preservation.
Nevertheless, Ukraine does not turn its back on Ottawa. It remains a member and wishes to resume compliance when the situation so allows. It is not up to us to judge whether the arguments invoked by Ukraine indeed point at a fundamental change, but we are certain that these arguments deserve attention and discussion. Finally, we hope that this discussion will remain productive and provide a new impetus for the global de-mining effort.
This post was written in the authors’ personal capacities and does not necessarily reflect the positions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
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Inna Zavorotko, PhD is a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. She currently serves in the Legal Department of the Ministry of Defense.
CPT Oleksii Plotnikov is an officer at the Legal Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.
Photo credit: 24th Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian military
