Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Targeting Operations

by , | Nov 8, 2023

Intelligence

I reiterate that [the prevention of civilian harm] is not necessarily about more rules on the ground. It is about paying particular attention to civilian harm in existing operational planning and procedures. For instance, when sharing intelligence with allies, and when planning the use of armed force in a targeting process. So that a pilot, for example, who is flying at almost 2,000 kilometres an hour, makes the right choice and does not have to take emergency measures in a split second.

These are the words of the Minister of Defense of the Netherlands, Kajsa Ollongren, during her visit to Colombia University, New York on September 25, 2023.

Last year, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) issued its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) to better monitor, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm in future military operations. Objective 10 of the action plan specifically focuses on civilian harm mitigation and response in the context of multinational operations and operations with non-State actors. That objective emphasizes that inadequate information sharing between allies and partners during multinational operations and operations with non-State actors reduces commanders’ situational awareness and can lead to an increased risk of civilian harm.

Similarly, on April 7, 2022, the Netherlands Ministry of Defense issued a roadmap to work toward providing more transparency about the risk of civilian casualties in future military operations. While the Netherlands Minister of Defense has referred to the importance of intelligence sharing between allies or in the planning of targeting operations, the policy also recalls that the need to provide information to the public must be weighed against the personnel, operational, and national security of the Netherlands and its allies and partners.

Implementation of the DoD CHMR-AP and the Netherlands’ policy on civilian harm has prompted a significant reflection on the Netherlands’ Air Task Force Middle East (ATFME) mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), initiated in 2014. This mission, involving the Dutch F-16’s active engagement in Iraq and the eastern part of Syria, resulted in 2,100 air operations, with weapons deployed on more than 1,800 occasions. By delving into the mission’s complexities, this post seeks to contribute to the broader discourse on intelligence sharing, shared responsibility, and the efficacy of international coalition efforts to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts.

ISIS and the Formation of the International Coalition

In response to the rapid expansion of ISIS and its threat to regional and global security, States formed an international coalition named Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CTJF-OIR) to combat the group. CTJF-OIR involved numerous countries from around the world contributing in various capacities, such as providing military support, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic efforts. Its objective was to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIS through coordinated actions including airstrikes.

The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar played a pivotal role as it served as the command and control center for coalition air operations in the region. It was responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring the airstrikes conducted by coalition aircraft, including those from the Netherlands. The CAOC also facilitated intelligence sharing among coalition partners, ensured effective communication, and supported the targeting process to maximize the efficiency and accuracy of airstrikes against ISIS targets. It operated within the framework of the coalition’s broader strategy to degrade and defeat ISIS while minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage.

The Netherlands played a significant role within the international coalition against ISIS. It contributed military assets, including F-16 fighter jets, to conduct air operations against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. Dutch forces participated in air interdiction missions to disrupt ISIS supply lines, as well as close air support missions to assist ground forces in their fight against the group. Additionally, the Netherlands engaged in training and advisory roles to enhance the capabilities of local forces in the region.

The Targeting Process

The targeting cycle starts with the commander’s objectives and consideration of potential targets to support those objectives. The operational commander then decides whether to engage the approved targets, taking into account coalition resources, operational and legal considerations, target characteristics, and the likelihood of achieving the intended effect. This targeting process requires enhanced coordination and intelligence sharing between different coalition partners.

The Netherlands’ role in the air campaign against ISIS involved deliberate and dynamic targeting. Dynamic targeting, also known as time-sensitive targeting, involves identifying and engaging targets as opportunities arise. This approach is often employed in rapidly evolving situations or when emerging targets need immediate action. Deliberate targeting, on the other hand, refers to the careful planning and execution of strikes against specific targets, often based on extensive intelligence and analysis.

Additionally, when the Netherlands was asked to engage a target, a national assessment was conducted for both deliberate and dynamic targeting scenarios. This ensured that the target qualified as a military objective and the attack was proportionate in accordance with international humanitarian law and according to Dutch rules of engagement (ROE) and targeting directives.

Dynamic Targeting

Dynamic targeting is characterized by speed and spontaneity, as it allows forces to respond swiftly to changing conditions. It demands a rapid response, based on a well-coordinated dance between decision-makers and operational forces as the plan and situation can shift at a moment’s notice. Flexibility becomes a strategic advantage, ensuring that opportunities are seized without hesitation.

Furthermore, real-time intelligence is vital. A network of information sources constantly streams data. This up-to-the-minute intelligence serves as a guiding light, allowing military forces to pinpoint targets accurately. The flow of information paints a comprehensive picture of the battlefield, facilitating informed decision-making. Also, coordination between intelligence gatherers, ground forces, and air units is crucial. Effective communication is the backbone of this coordination. The Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) feeds vital information to airborne assets, shaping the mission’s course as it happens. This fluid coordination ensures that actions on the ground and in the air are in harmony.

Deliberate Targeting

Unlike dynamic targeting, which focuses on rapidly emerging opportunities, deliberate targeting allows for a more extensive planning period due to its proactive nature. Key to effective deliberate targeting is intelligence relating to potential targets, including their significance, location, and potential impact. The information gathered during this process is only valid for a certain period. If the attack does not take place within this period, the intelligence cell must re-verify the information to ensure what is understood regarding the target and possible collateral damage is still current.

Deliberate targeting involves careful planning, including selecting the appropriate weapon and delivery method, as well as coordinating with various assets involved in the operation. Due to the nature of this process, there is generally more time available to evaluate intelligence, review legal considerations, and the overall planning of the operation in comparison to dynamic targeting. This extended timeline allows for a comprehensive assessment of potential risks and benefits, contributing to a more controlled and precise engagement of targets.

In the context of coalition operations, differences in dynamic and deliberate targeting among partners arise from variations in military doctrines, intelligence capabilities, ROE, and legal interpretations. These factors further contribute to the distinct strategies adopted by coalition partners in their dynamic and deliberate targeting endeavors.

Technical Aspects and Human Judgment in Targeting Operations

The disparities between coalition partners are also visible in the technical dimensions of targeting operations. Prior to conducting any offensive action, targeting cells relied on the Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) tool. The tool addresses collateral effects concerns, namely the presence of civilians, civilian objects, or other protected entities within the collateral effects radius. In the event collateral concerns are identified, mitigation strategies should be applied to alleviate such concerns. However, by policy, the use of the CDE tool is only obligatory for certain allies. This tool facilitates an analysis of the target’s structure and the potential consequences of the envisaged attack. The outcomes are represented as a radius, denoting the scope of the strike’s impact.

As useful as the tool may be, it does not disqualify the human eye and personal experience. To give an example, in one instance, a structure of significance was close to a target the Netherlands planned to attack. The CDE tool indicated that this structure might be affected by the attack, necessitating a thorough evaluation of proportionality. However, after carefully examining the analysis, the Netherlands’ Senior National Representative (SNR) overruled the CDE outcome, affirming his confidence in the operation’s feasibility. The SNR provided assurance that the structure would remain undamaged, explaining that environmental obstacles in front of the structure would absorb the blast’s impact, intercept debris, and safeguard the structure. Relying on his experience from previous missions, the Netherlands’ SNR reassured that there was no need for concern.

The legal advisor noted that visual cues indicated the proximity of the structure to the target, and the CDE tool confirmed potential risks. Nevertheless, the Netherlands SNR was resolute in his assessment based on his experience.

Ultimately, the Dutch team executed the operation, validating the SNR’s intuition. The obstacles mitigated the impact, preserving the structure’s integrity. This experience conveyed a fundamental lesson: the CDE tool, while immensely valuable, does not encompass the depth of human insight, experience, and practical wisdom. Furthermore, it does not account for possible secondary blasts. This example underscores that while technology is held in high regard and widely embraced, there are situations where human judgment can surpass its capabilities.

Significance of Intelligence Sharing in Coalition Targeting 

ATFME’s experiences demonstrate the importance of information and intelligence-sharing in targeting and the risk when information is not adequately shared with the relevant coalition partners. To ensure that commanders and their staffs had the most accurate information to make a well-informed decision in the planning and execution of attacks, CTJF-OIR largely relied on intelligence from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and human intelligence (HUMINT) from local partners on the ground. Consequently, CTJF-OIR employed ISR assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and coalition aircraft and established regional partnerships to coordinate military operations and share intelligence with local allies. Because the United States has the most extensive intelligence infrastructure, it provided the most intelligence assets to the coalition.

Information is generally validated and verified through different intelligence sources, meaning that States must often rely on the information and intelligence provided by coalition partners. Therefore, intelligence-sharing in coalition operations is largely based on a certain level of trust between the States involved. While the targets were identified and analyzed by a multinational team of intelligence analysts at the CAOC based on the information provided by several coalition partners, not all States had sufficient intelligence capabilities or resources to verify this information with their national intelligence sources.

For instance, France used to verify the intelligence in the target package with information from its national intelligence services to ensure that the intelligence was accurate, that the target was a lawful military objective, and that the attack would not result in excessive collateral damage. Meanwhile, the Netherlands did not have sufficient intelligence capabilities to collect and share intelligence and thus had to rely on information provided by the coalition.

The Politics of Intelligence Sharing in the Context of Targeting

To enhance intelligence cooperation in military operations, coalitions usually rely on existing and well-established intelligence-sharing arrangements, such as the Five Eyes alliance (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). These intelligence-sharing arrangements are based on mutual trust and cooperation which is influenced by several factors, such as similar strategic priorities and similar national interests and cultures. Moreover, NATO partners frequently provide intelligence support and share intelligence with each other.

CTJF-OIR also shares intelligence through ad hoc information cycles. For example, a coalition intelligence fusion cell (CIFC), with a multinational team of intelligence personnel, analysts and targeters, was responsible for merging and prioritizing intelligence requirements from participating nations. The CIFC included both NATO and Middle Eastern coalition partners and aimed to bring together the intelligence assets and capabilities of all coalition partners.

Nevertheless, the level of access to intelligence varied between the different coalition partners because of the various formal intelligence-sharing arrangements and ad hoc information cycles. Because the United States generally has the most prominent intelligence position within the coalition and provides the most intelligence assets, the States involved in the Five Eyes alliance had access to the largest amount of intelligence and information. Despite the existence of intelligence fusion cells, States outside the Five Eyes alliance often received only a restricted targeting package.

Besides these existing intelligence-sharing arrangements, CTJF-OIR also focused on regional intelligence cooperation with Arab States in the region. While these States had a vast intelligence network in Iraq and Syria, including within ISIS, this intelligence cooperation only had a limited degree of success due to strategic differences between the States involved, budgetary pressures, and the resilience of ISIS. It involved a delicate balance between the potential benefits and the risks of exposing their sources and methods and possible complicity in unlawful conduct. To ensure that the information would not be used for unethical or unlawful purposes, States often included caveats with their intelligence products.

Challenges and Considerations in Intelligence Cooperation 

Because of the differences in access to intelligence discussed above, only the States within the Five Eyes alliance could share their extensive intelligence capabilities and classified information with each other. Meanwhile, other coalition partners only received a more restricted targeting package that was deemed relevant for the specific mission. Therefore, States must find a balance between the sharing of intelligence on a “need to know” basis to ensure that their intelligence sources remain protected and the “need to share” to effectively cooperate with other coalition partners. The balance between the “need to know” principle and the “need to share” has been acknowledged in military doctrines of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

An important consideration in intelligence cooperation is the “third-party rule.” This principle maintains that any State that receives intelligence from another State agrees not to share it with a third party unless the other State explicitly gives permission to do so. The rationale is that States retain control over the information and can regulate how it may be used by the receiving State or organization through the use of caveats. This principle has been affirmed in a case before the District Court of The Hague concerning coalition airstrikes in Iraq on January 26, 2015. The Court concluded that the Netherlands cannot share (operational) intelligence from other coalition partners with the public, because revealing the information may create security risks for the military forces of coalition partners and may damage the international relations with other partners. However, because States cannot be absolutely certain that their intelligence products are not shared with a third party, intelligence-sharing agreements often rely on mutual trust.

Increased intelligence cooperation and the interdependency of information and intelligence capabilities also raise questions about how international responsibility is allocated among coalition partners. Although States are generally only responsible for their own conduct, there may be situations of shared or dual responsibility for unlawful acts or omissions. Professor Marko Milanovic has addressed the allocation of State responsibility for intelligence sharing here and here.

However, several ethical and legal dilemmas become apparent in situations when one State shares flawed or outdated intelligence with another coalition partner that uses the intelligence to engage targets that are mistakenly identified as military objectives. In ATFME there have been two incidents worth mentioning. The first occurred on the night between September 20 and 21, 2015, when Dutch F-16 fighter jets targeted a family home in Mosul, which was mistakenly identified as an ISIS headquarters. The other incident involved an attack on the night between June 2 and 3, 2015, by two Dutch F16 fighter jets on an ISIS vehicle-borne improvised explosive device facility in Hawija, which resulted in the death of at least 70 civilians. In both incidents, the attack was conducted based on insufficient intelligence. While the attacks may have been lawful under international humanitarian law, they raise ethical questions about the responsibility of the State providing the intelligence.

Conclusion and Reflections 

Reflection on the ATFME mission against ISIS, prompted by the implementation of CHMR-AP and Netherlands’ civilian harm policy, contributes to the discourse on intelligence-sharing and coalition efficacy in protecting civilians. The Netherlands played a vital role in the international coalition, engaging in deliberate and dynamic targeting. The targeting process revealed disparities among coalition partners in military doctrines, intelligence capabilities, and legal interpretations. Technical tools, like the CDE, highlighted the interplay between technology and human judgment, emphasizing situations where human insight surpasses technological capabilities. This nuanced exploration provides valuable insights into the complexities of modern military operations and ethical considerations in targeting decisions.

ATFME has also illustrated the complexity of intelligence cooperation in coalition operations. On the one hand, States share intelligence with coalition partners because of a certain level of trust and well-established intelligence-sharing arrangements. However, on the other hand, States may be reluctant to share intelligence with partners because of operational security concerns, or legal or ethical concerns when there is an apparent risk that the intelligence is obtained through unlawful means or when the other State may share the intelligence with a third party. Therefore, intelligence cooperation often involves a delicate balance between the “need to know” and the “need to share” intelligence with coalition partners.

The CHMR-AP recognizes that inadequate information sharing in coalition operations reduces the situational awareness of the commander and may increase the risk of civilian harm. Therefore, it recommends improving DoD’s capabilities to share relevant information with coalition partners, including through information-sharing arrangements. Although there will always be circumstances that prohibit the sharing of information, this development shows that the “need to share” intelligence is important to effectively cooperate in a coalition environment.

***

LTC Mehmet Çoban is a Legal Advisor in the Royal Netherlands Air Force and a 2015 graduate of the Royal Military Academy.

Second Lieutenant Jochem de Hoop is a Legal Advisor in the Royal Netherlands Army and a 2023 graduate of the Royal Military Academy.
 
 

 

 

 

Photo credit: Ministerie van Defensie

Print Friendly, PDF & Email