GC IV Commentary Series – Two Answers and Two Open Questions on Taxing Humanitarian Relief

Editors’ note: The following series considers ICRC’s 2025 updated Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention. Rosa-Lena Lauterbach, Liisi Adamson, and Sean Watts’s introduction to the series is available here.

In its framework governing occupation, international humanitarian law (IHL) details the regime governing the administration of property. Part of that regime contains IHL’s unique provision on taxing humanitarian aid. This norm, embedded in Article 61 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV), stipulates that the occupying power is obliged to lift “all charges, taxes, or customs duties” on relief consignments destined for occupied territory. The prohibition has only one exception: when collecting such duties would be in the interests of the economy of the occupied territory.

Drawing on this normative content, scholars have encouraged belligerents to adopt similar behaviour outside occupation contexts (p. 27). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s 2025 Commentary equally highlights that, although Article 61’s call to exempt humanitarian relief from charges is addressed to the occupying power specifically, such exemptions should be adopted by all High Contracting Parties in peacetime. As a reflection of agreement among States that taxes and other charges on humanitarian aid need to be removed, the 2025 Commentary cites several UN General Assembly resolutions.

The exact normative content of Article 61 is not completely obvious. Therefore both the scope of occupying powers’ obligations and the behaviour toward which belligerents are otherwise encouraged was indiscernible. The 2025 Commentary provides welcome expansions in this regard.

The 2025 Commentary itself does not provide a roadmap for appraising whether an occupying power’s taxation of aid is compatible with its IHL obligations. Yet, by enunciating the links between Article 61 and other components of the law of occupation, the 2025 Commentary allows us to grasp the full framework governing the collection of such charges.

Article 61 is situated among the provisions that set out the occupying power’s obligations toward the population in occupied territory, norms governing permissible legislative changes, and requirements applicable to collecting money contributions more generally. These norms bring in a panoply of considerations that must be weighed in assessing the lawfulness of taxing humanitarian relief. They lead to the conclusion that the Article 61 exception does not give States a free hand in imposing financial duties on humanitarian aid.

This post disentangles the legal elements that are relevant to such taxation practices. It starts by addressing two questions on which the 2025 Commentary sheds light: what conditions must charges imposed on humanitarian aid meet? And is the occupying power allowed to introduce new taxes, or is its authority confined to already existing ones? I then zoom in on two issues that arise with contemporary conflicts, questioning how the normative content of the law of occupation should be interpreted.

Discernible Conditions for Taxation of Aid

The 2025 Commentary explains that taxing humanitarian relief could occur amid risks of causing inflation, creating a black market, or otherwise disrupting the economy. The 1958 Commentary refers to cases where relief consignments were provided against payment, and pursuant to long-term arrangements between States, underlining that such paid relief consignments could come within the scope of the Article 61(2) exception.

The 2025 Commentary depicts the complementary nature of the different legal instruments applicable in occupation. It underscores the intricate relationship between the 1907 Hague Regulations, GC IV, and Additional Protocol I (AP I), where each newer instrument builds on the previous. The conditions attached to taxation of relief are an example. Namely, apart from already existing tax obligations, the Hague Regulations stipulate several requirements that must be met in cases where charges are collected. According to Hague Regulations Article 51, charges should, to the extent possible, follow existing tax rates. They must be collected under the direction of the commander-in-chief, based on a written order, and confirmed with the issuance of receipts.

The Hague Regulations also prescribe how the revenue collected through contributions may be used. It must serve the administration of the occupied territory or the needs of the occupying army. The former encompasses the costs associated with “restoring and ensuring public order and safety” (p. 172). This justification has been relied on in practice in the Reconstruction Levy introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, used to finance investments in public infrastructure. The latter concerns the occupying power’s security and administration needs and cannot be used to cover the general war effort (p. 174, 180).

The 2025 Commentary brings another consideration that comes from the ties between Article 61 and two other sets of norms: one setting out the Occupying Power’s duty to provide for the needs of the population living in occupied territory (GC IV, arts. 55-56); and another envisaging its obligation to agree to and facilitate the population’s access to humanitarian aid in case it is unable to provide adequate supplies itself (GC IV, arts. 59-60). This contextual reading of the provision makes it clear that a State is only allowed to rely on the Article 61(2) exception to the extent that such duties do not effectively lead to the creation of insurmountable barriers to the delivery of humanitarian aid. Economic interests, in other words, cannot trump access to relief. Setting charges at such high levels that they effectively bar actors from being able to provide relief runs counter to the occupying power’s obligations vis-à-vis the local population.

Changes to Domestic Tax Systems

Through its specific reference to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the updated Commentary reminds of the links between levying fees and the domestic legal framework that underpins such measures. This raises the question of what (legislative) means the occupying power has at its disposal to meet its obligation under Article 61. The relevant IHL norms embody the conservationist principle, according to which the law in force in the country should remain unchanged. Only exceptional circumstances can warrant amendments. For instance, Article 64 allows the occupying power (and even obliges it) to introduce changes when necessary to meet its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

As the exemption of duties of humanitarian relief is one such obligation, the occupying power would indeed be allowed to carry out such legislative changes. It could, additionally, invoke “enhancing civil life in the territory” insofar as a link is made between the availability of essential supplies, a crucial component of this civil life, and the removal of financial barriers on humanitarian relief.

The reverse scenario is more complex. If a State’s domestic law explicitly foresees that humanitarian aid is exempt from all charges, could the occupying power change that legislation and introduce taxes on humanitarian relief? The answer does not only hinge upon the occupying power’s legislative authority. As it concerns the introduction of new taxes, it also requires us to look into the general scope of the occupying power’s authority to levy taxes. Namely, Article 48 of the Hague Regulations explicitly allows the occupying power to collect existing taxes (whilst potentially adapting their rates in case of necessity). However, whether the occupying power is allowed to introduce new taxes is debated in both scholarship and domestic jurisprudence.

Against the silence of Article 48 about the possibility of introducing new taxes, there are two arguments in favour of such a power. One is to place Article 48 in correlation with Article 43. While Article 48 and its collection of only existing taxes is the rule, circumstances stemming from Article 43 (maintaining public order) can justify an exception to that rule and thus merit the introduction of new taxes. Can taxation of humanitarian relief be compatible with the so-constructed normative framework? The justification that doing so is necessary to discourage the black market, for example, would enable the occupying power to meet both legal tests: when it can potentially introduce new taxes; and when it can levy taxes on humanitarian relief.

The second argument relies on Article 49 to support introducing new taxes. This norm allows the occupying power to collect other money contributions when justified by “the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.” New taxes that meet this threshold would not be incompatible with the law of occupation.

While not explicitly adopting a position on this matter, the 2025 Commentary underlines that that “the proceeds of any taxes levied” must be used “for the needs of the army or for administering the occupied territory.” This suggests that the 2025 Commentary takes the second argument and endorses the view that the occupying power is, in principle, allowed to introduce new taxes.

The 2025 Commentary sheds light on important aspects of the prohibition of taxing relief. Its emphasis on this norm being situated in the broader framework governing occupation allows us to address many adjacent questions concerning the introduction and removal of such charges. More contemporary examples of taxes imposed, as well as actors involved in conflict, raise the question of how well-equipped Article 61 of GC IV (as well as the broader framework governing taxation) is to address such realities.

What is Protected from Taxation?

Belligerent parties regularly tax humanitarian relief consignments. In an increasing number of cases, however, humanitarian aid is not impeded through fees on consignments. Instead, charges imposed on organisations themselves jeopardise their ability to operate and provide relief to populations in need. Such duties raise the question of the scope of Article 61. Does it extend to charges on an organisation’s transactions with third-party suppliers, including insurance, vehicle maintenance and security, and other similar elements essential for the delivery of essential services? Equally, does it address staff visa costs or the duties associated with the running of its offices? If Article 61 admits an expansive reading, what type of link would need to be established between the measure imposed, and the ability to deliver relief consignments to all persons in need?

The 2025 Commentary explains that the term “charges” in Article 61 should be understood broadly, listing transport and import costs as well as customs duties as merely illustrative examples. The text of the provision, however, suggests that its scope is limited to those charges that are imposed on the relief itself. This reading is confirmed by the 1958 Commentary, which emphasizes that the exemption from taxation applies to essential relief goods only, namely, “articles of prime necessity, essential for the subsistence and health of the population.”

A more detailed look into the material referenced in the 2025 Commentary leaves the space open to a broader reading. In support of Article 61, the 2025 Commentary refers to instruments that call to lift taxes on organisations. The 2001 Declaration of the Conference of High Contracting Parties to GC IV urged the occupying power to “refrain from levying taxes and imposing undue financial burdens” on impartial humanitarian organisations. UN General Assembly resolutions directly called on Israel to refrain from hindering UNRWA’s operational capacities through financial measures and to “cease levying taxes, extra fees and charges” (para. 37).

Additionally, the norm, interpreted in light of its object and purpose (to remove hurdles to the delivery of humanitarian aid and prevent that resources dedicated to providing relief become reallocated to covering administrative expenses, while not shifting that burden to civilians themselves) could potentially encompass the taxation of humanitarian organisations as well.

Keeping a narrow understanding of Article 61 focused on the taxation of goods still does not give belligerents an unfettered power to impose taxes on organisations. Article 59 of GC IV, supplementing Article 61, lays down the occupying power’s obligation to allow and facilitate relief in cases where the population’s needs remain unmet. The duty is geared toward removing all possible barriers to the delivery of aid, including by any possible simplifications of administrative procedures, including visas and import matters.

The existence of duties and charges imposed on humanitarian relief personnel on its own might not qualify as a violation of this obligation. Yet, cases where the presence of humanitarian organisations is stifled, including through severely high tax obligations which leave them little possibility to operate, can be seen as going against this provision. One could inquire to what extent such barriers would be compatible with a State’s human rights obligations towards the population in occupied territory, in particular with the population’s access to food.

How Does This Framework Apply in Occupation by Proxy?

Imposing charges on humanitarian aid has equally been a practice of non-State actors. Where such actors exercised effective territorial control and were simultaneously operating under the overall control of a third State, the conflict was qualified as international, and the situation was described as an “occupation by proxy” (p. 334).

This change in the applicable legal framework resulting from a State’s overall control brings its own complexities in two domains. First, can the armed group realistically be expected to uphold the IHL of international armed conflict (IAC)? Second, does the armed group inherit the powers a State holds according to IHL of IACs? Some have already alluded to both dimensions in other spheres, including deprivation of liberty.

For instance, “members of the proxy-armed group may also exercise the prerogatives of a detaining power,” including status-based internment of prisoners of war, and keep them captive until active hostilities have come to an end (p. 8, 10). Both questions equally conceive the non-State actor as the agent of occupation and potential tax collector. To what extent is this actor well-placed to assess whether the exemption of taxation is detrimental to the local economy?

Further, as the occupying power is acting through the non-State actor, is the latter vested with the authorisations granted to States in such scenarios? Can it take over the collection of taxes, and even introduce new tax obligations? Is the condition that the revenue obtained be used for meeting the needs of territorial administration or the occupying army or that money contributions be imposed under the commander-in-chief’s authority geared towards the actor exercising effective control on the ground, or the controlling third State? These uncertainties warrant further thought on how the framework governing taxation of humanitarian relief is understood in contexts of proxy occupation.

Concluding Remarks

Contextualising Article 61 of GC IV in relation to other law of occupation norms helps us clarify several aspects concerning taxation of humanitarian relief. First, imposing such charges is only possible in exceptional cases where it is warranted by the economic interests of the occupied territory. New taxes can be introduced pursuant to a written order, under the authority of a commander-in-chief, and their collection ought to be attested through receipts. They should follow existing tax rates as closely as possible and cannot effectively hinder actors’ ability to effectively deliver relief. Revenue obtained through such charges should be channelled toward meeting the needs of the administration of the territory, or the occupying army. While the occupying power ought to maintain domestic legislation to the extent possible, it could both affect legislative changes that allow for tax exemptions in the first place and actually introduce such taxes as long as conditions concerning their justification and revenue use are met.

A search through contemporary patterns of behaviour of belligerents demonstrates that regulating the taxation of humanitarian relief without addressing the broader financial impediments faced by humanitarian organisations would be missing the forest for the trees. Adaptations in interpreting the conditions for permissible taxation of humanitarian relief in scenarios of proxy occupation may be merited. In these and other discussions, Article 61 is an important starting point. Yet, an even more powerful safeguard against such challenges is the broader framework of norms introduced with the aim of safeguarding populations’ access to humanitarian relief.

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Mina Radončić is a PhD candidate at the University of Geneva and a Teaching Assistant at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense. 

Articles of War is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Articles of War does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Authorship does not indicate affiliation with Articles of War, the Lieber Institute, or the United States Military Academy West Point.

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force AFCENT