Beyond Compliance Symposium – The Harm Mitigation Holarchy: Human Security, Protection of Civilians, and Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response

Editors’ note: This post forms part of the Beyond Compliance Symposium: How to Prevent Harm and Need in Conflict, featured across Articles of War and Armed Groups and International Law. You can find the introductory post here. The symposium invites reflection on the conceptualization of negative everyday lived experiences of armed conflict, and legal and extra-legal strategies that can effectively address harm and need.

War has always resulted in civilian harm to some degree. In contemporary conflicts, however, the majority of those harmed are civilians. Over the course of the last century, as the locus of conflict shifted “from remote battlefields to densely populated cities,” civilians have been increasingly exposed to greater risk. As Greenberg and Boorstin note, “Civilians have—both intentionally and by accident—been moved to center stage in the theater of war, which was once fought primarily on battlefields.” Today, it is estimated that civilians represent “90 per cent of war-time casualties.”

It is no wonder, therefore, that recent years have seen increased attention to the issue of armed conflict and its impact on the civilian population. The surge of energy in this space has resulted in new ideas, new efforts, and a new kind of discourse. On that score, a plurality of competing conceptual frameworks have emerged that relates to the mitigation of civilian harm caused by armed conflict. The three major frameworks relating to civilian harm are: Human Security, Protection of Civilians (PoC), and Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR), the last of which is sometimes referred to as simply Civilian Harm Mitigation (CHM).

Each of these frameworks, however, has suffered from a degree of definitional ambiguity and confusion that has complicated its effective implementation. Without clear definitions, it is difficult to organize, resource, or plan appropriately. Influential studies have shown the definitional ambiguity surrounding such conceptual frameworks has resulted in them being “a central obstacle” to their operational effectiveness. Such nebulosity means that opportunities for optimal policymaking and operationalization are diminished. As commentators have noted in other contexts, “[d]efinitional ambiguity makes coherent discussions … challenging, limiting theoretical insights, and frustrating efforts at policy development.” Further, with regard to operational implementation, a lack of clarity leads to confusion regarding how responsibilities and resources are to be appropriately allocated among the pluriverse of governmental agencies and entities responsible for carrying out activities. In that regard, numerous reports have highlighted that one of the most significant challenges for the U.S. military in recent conflicts has been “the inability to apply and focus the full resources and capabilities of the [United States] in a concerted and coherent way.”

Given that context, and with the aim of disambiguation, this post posits that the major conceptual frameworks for civilian harm mitigation are best understood as a holarchy: a hierarchy of interrelated concepts that are, at once, individual and complete, but which can also form part of a larger whole. The harm mitigation holarchy (like any holarchy) consists of more focused conceptual frameworks that nest within the context of broader conceptual frameworks, with each successive level producing “greater depth and less span.”

This post elucidates the concepts of Human Security, PoC, and CHMR, situating each as an element (or “holon”) of the greater harm mitigation holarchy. The post then briefly outlines various State approaches to civilian harm mitigation, with an emphasis on the United States’ approach.

Human Security

The broadest conceptual framework in the harm mitigation holarchy—the highest holonic level—is that of Human Security. While there is no singular accepted definition of Human Security, as a general matter, the concept relates to the multiple factors of insecurity facing populations. It is rooted, as a concept, in the “Four Freedoms” speech that former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave to Congress in 1941, in which “Roosevelt made the case for the U.S. intervention in World War II to stop the advancement of Hitler in Europe.” In that speech, the former President expounded on four specific freedoms that now form the basis of Human Security: freedom from fear; freedom from want; freedom of speech; and freedom of religion.

Despite its origins in the 1940s, Human Security only “came to prominence in 1994 when it was championed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its annual report on human development.” Since that time, the concept of Human Security has matured into the “recognition that it may be more beneficial to prevent the emergence of violent conflict and the humanitarian disasters that came about, rather than to merely respond.” It emphasizes “the value of a holistic approach to security,” that fosters “the foundations for enduring stability.”

In 2012, the UN General Assembly defined Human Security as “an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.” The NATO Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles, adopted in Madrid in 2022, mirrored and augmented this definition, defining Human Security as “a multi-sectoral approach” that can involve actions to “address the broader conditions fueling crisis and pervasive instability, and to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction.” One scholar further described Human Security as “an integrative concept, constructed to merge governance and protection of political communities with the broader ambitions of personal welfare and invulnerability.”

The concept of Human Security, therefore, is extremely broad in scope and, consequently, intensely multidisciplinary in practice. It has clear humanitarian characteristics, giving it pronounced non-military elements. These stand out in stark relief when observing what have been described as Human Security’s “fundamental elements”: economic security, health security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. A significant portion of these challenges is obviously best addressed by development agencies and other non-military elements of State power. Human Security, therefore, is a shared realm.

Human Security, nonetheless, also has a military application that is heavily preventive in nature, as it envisions a range of activities designed to address underlying root causes of human insecurity. This could potentially include military operations which have “the alleviation of human suffering” as their main objective. But its military application is also protective, as it envisions undertaking operations designed to protect civilians who are experiencing (or who are in danger of experiencing) violence associated with armed conflict. As Kees Homan notes, “[I]n human security operations, the protection of civilians, not defeating an enemy, is an end in itself. The main objectives of humanitarian operations are to save lives, to alleviate human suffering, and to offer the prospect of resuming a dignified existence.” Human Security, moreover, is also mitigative, as it requires “embedding considerations for the comprehensive safety and security of the populations into all stages and levels of [military] operations, missions and activities.” This mitigative aspect also means that Human Security has introspective elements, requiring militaries to look inward to assess and adjust internal processes. Yet Human Security is also extrospective insofar as it envisions taking a range of actions to address external factors “to save lives, to alleviate human suffering, and to offer the prospect of resuming a dignified existence.”

Given its breadth, Human Security has become a sort of umbrella for a range of more specific efforts. As an example, for NATO, Human Security encompasses five areas of work or cross-cutting topics: Protection of Civilians; Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence; Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings; Children and Armed Conflict; and Cultural Property Protection. For the purposes of the harm mitigation holarchy, the next holonic level is the first of these areas of work: Protection of Civilians.

Protection of Civilians (PoC)

While Human Security finds its origins in development, military considerations are at the heart of PoC, with a focus on armed conflict. Alexander Gilder notes, “PoC was borne out of ‘the desire by the Security Council to make the civilian population one of the beneficiaries of the external military presence.’” As described more fully below, this means that the concept of PoC differs from Human Security in its sharper focus on military efforts to protect civilians.

PoC’s definition depends on the institution involved and its mandate. As with Human Security, “[t]here are a multitude of descriptions of what PoC means, with different actors having diverging perspectives.” (As Kjeksrud et al. have explained, “diverging organizational interests and operational goals … have prevailed over conceptual clarity.”)

Several institutions and commentators have drawn on a definition of PoC put forth by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a UN forum that brings together the “heads of [multiple] organizations and consortia to formulate policy, set strategic priorities and mobilize resources in response to humanitarian crises.” The IASC defines PoC as “… all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e., International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee law (IRL)).”

The UN, in turn, has defined PoC in various mandates as “all necessary action, up to and including the use of force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians.” Further, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support has advanced an operational concept for PoC in UN peacekeeping operations which consists of a three-tier framework: (a) protection through a political process; (b) providing protection from physical violence; and (c) establishing a protective environment. None of these definitions, however, constitutes a formal UN definition of PoC. In fact, commentators have noted that the various competing definitions are sometimes in tension with one another, and perpetuate the obliquity of this complex concept.

The NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians defines PoC as:

[I]nclud[ing] all efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment.

The NATO PoC Framework is comprised of four elements: (1) understanding the human environment; (2) mitigating harm; (3) facilitating access to basic needs; and (4) contributing to a safe and secure environment. A report by the Stimson Center notes that PoC is now “a fundamental concept central to all types of crises. It is critical to achieving all three of NATO’s core tasks—collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.” As elucidated in the general definition put forth by NATO, the concept of PoC is envisioned as relating to “military operations” and the use of military force to protect civilians, including through support to humanitarian action “by contributing to the provision of a safe and secure environment.”

Accordingly, the concept of PoC is primarily military in nature. It is a framework for envisioning and considering “how military force is used to protect.” This true even though PoC may at times involve “functional co-operation between humanitarians and military forces.” PoC is also primarily a protective concept (with humanitarian dimensions), as it involves actions aimed at protecting civilians from conflict-related harm intended by exogenous, malign actors, “facilitating access to basic needs, and contributing to a safe and secure environment.” These are sometimes called “deliberate PoC actions” in which “[m]ilitary forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability activities expressly intended to mitigate harm to civilians, including operations intended to create an environment conducive to PoC.” PoC is also mitigative as it entails consideration of civilian harm mitigation during the conduct of military operations, integrating civilian harm mitigation into doctrine, training, and planning of operations, etc. The protective dimension of PoC gives it extrospective elements, while its mitigative dimensions involve mainly introspective elements. PoC is, nonetheless, narrower in scope than Human Security because it focuses on military activity rather than broader development or humanitarian actions. Within the harm mitigation holarchy, PoC occupies the middle ground between Human Security and its relative antipode: Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response.

Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR)

The most specific holonic level in the harm mitigation holarchy is that of CHMR. As noted above, some people refer to this as CHM, though recent policies have added additional emphasis on responding to civilian harm (hence, the “R” in CHMR). A report by the Center for Naval Analysis defined CHMR as follows:

[I]t is an adaptive, data-driven, and holistic approach to military operations in which risks to civilians are considered along with risks to mission and risks to force. Effective approaches are then developed and taken, achieving operational and strategic objectives while minimizing civilian harm to the extent feasible.

Consistent with a holarchic structure, CHMR has the least span, but the greatest depth of each holarchic level. This is evident in the granular definition of CHMR given in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 3000.17, which defines the acronym as “[a]ctivities taken to reduce the risk and severity of civilian harm, and to respond to civilian harm,” which may include: (1) “[f]orce development efforts that provide DoD operational and institutional ability to mitigate and respond to civilian harm”; (2) “[e]fforts when planning and conducting military operations to understand the presence of civilians and civilian objects in the operational environment, analyze the risks of civilian harm, and address these identified risks”; (3) “[r]eviews, assessments, and investigations to understand whether, why, and how civilian harm resulted from military operations”; (4) “[a]cknowledgements of civilian harm that results from military operations and other responses to affected civilians and civilian communities”; and (5) “[e]fforts to analyze and learn from military operations to improve DoD operational and institutional ability to mitigate and respond to civilian harm during future military operations.”

CHMR is, therefore, primarily a military concept. Lacking broader humanitarian dimensions and disassociated from development, CHMR “emerged in the cauldron of military operations.” Moreover, it is notably more introspective than either Human Security or PoC, focusing on what a military force can adjust internally to better mitigate civilian harm and, when it occurs, to respond appropriately. It largely lacks the preventive foci of Human Security and PoC, instead bringing a sharper focus to what militaries can do to mitigate civilian harm vis-à-vis their own doctrines, processes, and activities. CHMR, therefore, addresses primarily internal factors, such as the integration of CHMR into military planning to shape operations in a way that mitigates civilian harm to the extent possible. It involves the introspective work of improving the readiness of military forces to mitigate and respond to civilian harm by integrating concepts into doctrine, tactical training, and professional education. Further, CHMR places emphasis on increasing battlefield awareness, enhancing understanding of the effects of operations, and reducing instances of target misidentification.

CHMR also entails responding to civilian harm but specifically views such activity as a means of palliating the direct impacts experienced by civilians who have been harmed by military operations, making the ultimate aim of response-related CHMR activities mitigative in application. Further, because responses in the CHMR context are focused on addressing the direct impacts of military operations—reactively mitigating the harm caused rather than proactively addressing external factors—its responses largely lack the extrospective qualities seen in Human Security and PoC. All these attributes combine to make CHMR a primarily military, mitigative, and introspective concept.

Various International Approaches

The military policies of different countries place emphasis on different levels within the harm mitigation holarchy. For instance, the United Kingdom places significant weight on Human Security in its military doctrine. The United Kingdom’s policy on “Human Security in Defence” is more nuanced in the realm of defense and military activity. It enables context and gender-sensitive planning, facilitating a deeper understanding of communities’ vulnerabilities and the operating environment, delivering more conflict-sensitive outcomes, and minimizing harm to civilians. Such activities benefit communities while supporting UK armed forces’ ability to plan, fight, and win.

Joint Service Publication 985: Human Security in Defence sets forth the United Kingdom’s policy on Human Security. It explains why and how UK forces must incorporate Human Security considerations into their full range of activity, from strategic planning to activities at the operational and tactical level. It emphasizes that consideration of UK operations (as well as those of their partners) may impact civilians and the reverberating effects of certain actions upon strategic objectives. It also emphasizes consideration of how adversaries and conflict parties may exploit Human Security to advance their own objectives (e.g., Russian use of torture and sexual violence to terrorize populations into submission in Ukraine), and how States can use Human Security as a vehicle for constructive engagements to shape the international context and reinforce the rules-based international order. Doing so treats the law of armed conflict as a minimum compliance standard, with Human Security adding greater consideration of the context and the wider ramifications of any adverse civilian impacts.

The Netherlands also has several efforts that aim to advance Human Security, such as those set forth in the 2024 Dutch National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security. As the action plan notes:

We strive for peaceful and inclusive societies. This requires a holistic perspective on conflict prevention that bears everyone in mind and focuses on promoting equality, human security and the protection of human rights. We therefore support local, peaceful approaches to conflict prevention and rely on strategies that address a range of root causes of conflict. We also support the work and monitor the operational space of civil society organisations, including women’s organisations, human rights defenders and peace builders, so that they can continue their efforts to prevent armed conflict and violent extremism, combat violence against women and girls, and/or enhance the resilience of local communities.

This Dutch approach casts Human Security as the broadest conceptual framework in the harm mitigation holarchy, serving as an umbrella for a range of more specific efforts.

Recently, however, the Netherlands Ministry of Defense, took a more focused approach to mitigating civilian harm, with an emphasis on mitigating civilian harm that occurs “as a result of the deployment of weapons by Dutch military personnel,” meaning the use of force. Since 2020, in the aftermath of heated political debate about a specific case of high civilian casualties in the town of Hawija (Iraq, 2015), the Dutch Ministry of Defense has prioritized efforts to mitigate civilian harm from military operations and respond appropriately when it occurs.

Notably, on April 7, 2022, Dutch former Minister of Defense Kajsa Ollongren introduced a step-by-step approach, outlining actions the Netherlands Ministry of Defense would “take in the short and (medium) long term regarding civilian casualties during military deployment.” These included steps to enhance transparency and accountability to the Dutch Parliament on civilian harm (including a mechanism for reporting allegations of civilian harm caused by Dutch military operations), improve how the Netherlands investigates allegations of civilian casualties, and identify opportunities to improve mitigating civilian casualties in the future. The Netherlands Ministry of Defense is also actively seeking cooperation with civil society and international partners on improving CHMR. Recent Dutch activity in this space, therefore, has leaned toward a more pronounced CHMR focus.

Similarly, many other countries around the world have brought increased focus to the mitigation of civilian harm caused by armed conflict. This is evident in recent activity by: the Kenyan Ministry of Defense; work by the Dutch non-governmental organization PAX and the Iraqi Al-Amal Association to assist Iraqi authorities with the development of an Iraqi PoC policy; and plans announced by Nigeria to create a Nigerian policy on civilian harm mitigation. Further, on September 24, 2024, senior representatives from Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, convened virtually for a meeting of the International Contact Group on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response, at which senior leaders from these countries “discussed the importance of mitigating civilian harm caused by military operations as well as responding effectively when civilian harm does occur,” and “expressed their commitment to promote civilian harm mitigation best practices within their respective armed forces.”

The United States’ Approach

U.S. military doctrine has referenced all three primary holons in the harm mitigation holarchy. Joint Publication 3-0 (Joint Campaigns and Operations) refers to Human Security and states that commanders must “consider human security during military operations, such as stabilization activities, special operations, and [foreign humanitarian assistance].” Human Security considerations echo within the June 2020 DoD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan, a key objective of which is to ensure that “[p]artner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis.” Other U.S. military publications have addressed Protection of Civilians as well as “Civilian Casualty Mitigation.” Over the past two years, however, U.S. policy has brought significant emphasis to CHMR.

Notably, on August 25, 2022, the DoD released the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP), which lays out a systematic approach to improving the DoD’s ability to mitigate and respond to civilian harm caused by military operations. Thereafter, on December 12, 2023, the Secretary of Defense approved the DoD Instruction on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response, “which establishes the Department’s enduring policies, responsibilities, and procedures for mitigating and responding to civilian harm.” In August 2024, the Joint Staff published the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response, an important instruction that provides further guidance on CHMR efforts across the joint force.

The DoD is updating and augmenting other key policies as well. As the CHMR-AP directs, these include recent policy updates that define the civilian environment as part of the operational environment. Those updates define the civilian environment as, “The factors within the operational environment that relate to civilians and their communities, including the civilian population and the personnel, organizations, resources, infrastructure, essential services, and systems on which civilian life depends.”

Such policy updates strive to improve battlefield awareness so that U.S. military operations are more likely to have their intended effects on the adversary, and less likely to harm civilians or civilian objects. Similar policy updates also incorporate the goals “of protection and restoration of the civilian environment as much as practicable across all steps of the joint planning process.”

In addition, DoD has also created important new institutions, such: as a senior-level CHMR Steering Committee comprised of senior leaders to bring focus on implementation of the CHMR-AP and addressing other issues related to civilian harm mitigation and response; a “Civilian Protection Center of Excellence to serve as DoD’s hub of analysis, learning, and training related to CHMR and to facilitate the institutionalization of good practices across the force”; and a Directorate for CHMR Policy within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to provide policy support and oversight of the overall DoD CHMR effort.

A significant aspect of DoD’s institutional efforts has been the creation of new positions focused on mitigating civilian harm, assessing civilian harm, and responding to civilian harm. These include: (1) “Civilian Harm Mitigation Response Officers (CHMROs) embedded in appropriate combatant and operational commands;” (2) a different kind of CHMRO—called “Ally & Partner CHMROs”—to integrate CHMR into security cooperation programming and relationships with allies and partners; (3) “Civilian Harm Assessment Cells[,] to better investigate and assess whether civilian harm may have been caused by military operations;” (4) “Civilian Harm Assessment and Investigation Officers[,] who will improve and standardize efforts in the sphere of assessing and investigating civilian harm;” and (5) “Civilian Environment Teams that will illuminate the non-adversarial aspects of the battlefield for commanders.”

Each of these new positions brings important focus to specific aspects of DoD’s overall CHMR mission and, in the aggregate, form the core of DoD’s burgeoning CHMR enterprise. Accordingly, while DoD continues to recognize Human Security, and while other aspects of DoD policy incorporate broader PoC equities, recent activity in this space aligns more closely with a CHMR focus.

Conclusion

Recent years have seen increased attention to the issue of civilian harm caused by military operations. This has resulted in the advent of new ideas, new policies, new conceptual frameworks, and new vocabularies, all of which seek to direct governmental activity in a way that mitigates civilian harm caused by armed conflict. New institutions and new international fora have emerged during this period of heightened activity and awareness. But a cacophony of voices seeking to advance a common cause can sometimes create confusion. Differing definitions, varying descriptions, and sometimes even outright conflation of the three major frameworks relating to harm mitigation (Human Security, PoC, and CHMR) have resulted in a counterproductive ambiguity that can challenge their effective implementation and advancement.

This post, therefore, suggests that Human Security, PoC, and CHMR are best understood as three distinct but interrelated concepts, each with its own unique identity, but existing within a holarchy of nesting concepts. This permits Human Security, PoC, and CHMR to be understood distinctly, while still recognizing the important strands that connect them and the natural synergies that exist among them. It permits their helpful individuation while maintaining their reticular nature. And it allows that, despite their distinctiveness, developments at one holonic level may still have effects on the others. As Jan Krikke notes, “The action of one holon reverberates through the entire system.”

Obviously, the categories and definitions put forth in this post are not absolute. Conceptual classifications are often crude taxonomies that seldom achieve absolute purity (especially when the various categories are interrelated and overlapping). And real-world operations will not always adhere to academic distinctions. There will be instances when activity in one category takes on the attributes of another, vaults completely across the dividing line, or uncomfortably rests within the categorical interstices. Nonetheless, the classifications put forth allow us to better understand, organize, resource, plan, and ultimately undertake action to mitigate civilian harm.

Human Security, PoC, and CHMR each have a role in maintaining international security, promoting peace and stability, and mitigating the harm civilians experience because of armed conflict. To borrow from Welmoet Wels, none of these concepts is best served through the blurring of their demarcations, rendering their respective meanings less and less clearly defined. A clear understanding of each is necessary to best advance the goals and realize the desired outcomes of each. Moreover, in addition to more coherent policy development, such conceptual clarity will also enhance more effective operational implementation by elucidating how responsibilities and resources should be allocated among various actors when pursuing objectives related to mitigating civilian harm. To that end, policymakers and implementers should conceptualize Human Security, PoC, and CHMR as distinct parts of a collective and as holons in the harm mitigation holarchy.

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Dan E. Stigall is the Director for Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) Policy in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism, Special Operations & Low-Intensity Conflict, OSD (Policy). Any opinion expressed is solely that of the author.

 

 

 

 

Photo credit: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office