Ukraine Symposium – UN Peacekeepers and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant

Europe’s largest nuclear power plant has been under Russian control since March 2022. The international community has repeatedly called for a resolution to a situation that could result in a nuclear disaster because the plant is regularly damaged by shelling.

In August, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carried out a Support and Assistance Mission to Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ISAMZ) to establish a continuous IAEA presence. Nevertheless, in September, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated, “[t]he safety of Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant is hanging by a thread.”

The UN Secretary-General led calls in August for the plant to be demilitarized and the UN provided logistical and security support for the IAEA mission. However, after the Secretary-General had addressed the Security Council on the mounting crisis, Petro Kotyn, the head of Ukraine’s nuclear agency Energoatom, called for UN peacekeepers to be deployed to set up and secure the demilitarized zone sought by the UN and other international organizations.

Despite the IAEA claiming to have made progress on establishing the nuclear safety and security protection zone, this month Kotyn reiterated his request for UN peacekeepers because he feels there is no solution at the IAEA and “[t]he process is not going forward.”

Professors Mike Schmitt and Tom Dannenbaum discussed the Zaporizhzhia plant earlier in this symposium (see here, here, and here.). Therefore, I will not repeat the coverage of demilitarized zones and violations of IHL at the plant. Instead, I will focus on the merits and demerits of Ukraine’s call for UN peacekeepers to secure the plant.

Mandating a UN Peace Operation

UN peace operations are, in most circumstances, mandated by the UN Security Council. Such operations regularly deploy with mandates to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This is unlikely in the case of Zaporizhzhia given the politics of the current conflict. By contrast, no UN peace operation has been authorized by the UN General Assembly since the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed to the Egyptian and Israeli border in 1956.

When France and the Soviet Union refused to pay for UNEF I, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion, found that both the Security Council and the General Assembly had the competence to mandate peace operations. The former has the primary duty to ensure international peace and security under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter and can authorize coercive use of force. Still, the ICJ concluded there is nothing in the Charter that prevents the General Assembly from recommending the use of a non-coercive peace operation as a method of peaceful settlement.

Traditionally, the General Assembly will not act on a matter of “international peace and security” if the Security Council is seized of the matter. However, in Resolution 377 of 1950 (commonly known as the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution), the General Assembly resolved that if the Security Council was deadlocked with respect to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the Assembly could consider the matter and make appropriate recommendations to member States for collective action, including the use of armed force.

It has been common practice throughout the history of UN peacekeeping to deploy a Chapter VI mission, one that is not authorized to use “all necessary” (forcible) measures, to an inter-State conflict to separate the warring parties. The UN continues to operate Chapter VI missions in inter-State conflicts to this day. For example, UNFICYP is deployed to Cyprus, UNMOGIP to India and Pakistan, and UNDOF maintains a demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria. Such a mission may be deployed by either the Security Council or General Assembly and avoids complicated questions over the General Assembly’s competence to authorize the use of force.

Where peacekeepers are deployed under Chapter VI, they can only use force in self-defense. Whereas missions deployed under Chapter VII can be given mandates to use all necessary measures to protect civilians or ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Also, Chapter VI missions are often smaller forces ill-suited to warfighting with States or non-State actors. For instance, UNFICYP and UNDOF have 746 and 1,069 troops respectively, and UNMOGIP has only a small number of observers. Deployments of 10,000+ peacekeepers are usually reserved for Chapter VII missions that require wide-ranging mandates to protect civilians. Even then, most large missions today reiterate that the host State is primarily responsible for protecting civilians since a peacekeeping force cannot protect everyone, everywhere.

For the General Assembly to authorize a small Chapter VI mission to Zaporizhzhia the situation on the ground would need to change drastically. For example, UNFICYP deployed to Cyprus in 1964 to reduce intercommunal violence and was not prepared for the coup that took place ten years later. The Chapter VI mission worked with communities to establish local level ceasefires but was only able to police a demilitarized zone and corresponding ceasefire following peace talks.

For UN peacekeepers under a Chapter VI mandate to be effective there would need be a peace agreement in place that recognizes Zaporizhzhia as a demilitarized zone. If, hypothetically, fighting were to lessen in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts and battlelines were to be become entrenched whilst the efforts of Ukraine and Russia were directed to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the UN would likely still require a ceasefire to deploy Chapter VI forces. A mere redirection of the most intense fighting would not assuage the doubts of UN member States who must contribute troops to the mission. The risk of casualties would be too high for troop-contributing countries to stomach especially if the force were to be deployed under Chapter VI. We have a long way to go before UN peacekeepers could safely and meaningfully enforce a demilitarized zone or ceasefire.

Even a large deployment (the largest currently authorized is 17,420 uniformed personnel for MINUSCA) authorized under Chapter VII by the Security Council would be incapable of precluding the threat of warfare between Ukraine and Russia and ensuring the safety of UN personnel. Moreover, if either party tried to retake Zaporizhzhia, UN peacekeepers would likely need more equipment, resources, or personnel to defend the plant. It is simply not what peacekeepers are trained and deployed to do.

The Cardinal Principle of Consent

In the past, peacekeepers have successfully served as a deterrent to further escalation. However, with a large Chapter VII mission unlikely due to the Russian veto in the Security Council, this begs the question whether the General Assembly could authorize a smaller, Chapter VI force to enforce a demilitarized zone around Zaporizhzhia and deter shelling of the plant. The simple answer is yes, but it is unlikely to do so.

Casting operational concerns to one side for the moment, a major sticking point would be consent. A foundational principle of UN peacekeeping is that the UN requires the host State’s consent. Without consent, the UN would be taking enforcement action. Enforcement mandates are not typically undertaken by UN forces and instead by coalitions of the willing authorized by the Security Council (such as in the Gulf War).

Consent is normally derived from a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the UN and the host State. This was the approach taken with UNEF I, where Egypt consented to the operation’s deployment. The UN withdrew it in 1967 when consent was withdrawn, as is required absent a further mandate to the host State’s satisfaction.

It is important to note that consent was originally understood as the consent of “all the parties concerned.” By this approach, Russia and Ukraine would both need to consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Zaporizhzhia. In 2008 the UN’s Capstone Doctrine spoke of consent as “acceptance of a peacekeeping operation” and “commitment by the parties to a political process.” Today, however, missions are regularly deployed to conflicts where a host of non-State armed groups are operating

It has been suggested that while all parties should consent, consent is not a legal requirement; rather, it is merely desirable. For instance, in Somalia, the government’s consent sufficed to deploy UNOSOM I even though the government lacked effective control of the territory concerned. Similar situations have arisen since, as in MONUSCO, where the mission was tasked with disarming numerous militias active in the Congo without the consent of the armed groups.

The defining difference in the current situation is the existence of an inter-State conflict between Ukraine and Russia, as distinct from intra-State conflicts. While, in theory, the consent of both States is not a legal requirement for the deployment of a peacekeeping force by either the Security Council or General Assembly, the UN would undoubtedly seek the consent of Ukraine and Russia. Increases in peacekeeper casualties make troop contributing countries less willing to contribute forces in the future. Therefore, the UN is perennially concerned with limiting the risks peacekeepers are exposed to. Currently, Zaporizhzhia presents too great a risk without the consent of both parties guaranteeing peacekeeper safety.

It is not entirely outlandish to speculate that Ukraine could gain support for a resolution in the General Assembly calling for a ceasefire alongside the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a demilitarized zone. In this scenario, the General Assembly would have no legal power to compel Russia to accept the presence of peacekeepers. But there may be political ramifications for any Russian objection. If, in the future, we begin more concrete discussions on a ceasefire, Russia would be hard pressed to find valid objections as to why such a ceasefire should not come part and parcel with the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Afterall, UN peacekeepers have a long and distinguished history of ensuring the observance of ceasefires, demilitarized zones, and working with parties to conflicts around the globe.

Concluding Thoughts

Ukraine is correct to raise the request for a UN peacekeeping force. However, that is not to say I believe that the General Assembly should immediately deploy a contingent of UN peacekeepers with the consent of only one State party to the conflict. Instead, it is a possibility that the UN should actively review and reassess as the conflict continues to progress. For instance, if active hostilities were to lessen and negotiations for peaceful settlement to begin sometime in the future, a UN peace operation may become an appropriate mechanism by which to ensure observance of a demilitarized zone at Zaporizhzhia. However, in today’s conflict, UN peacekeepers would be ill-suited to the task without assurances from both sides that peacekeepers would not be subject to attack.

Peacekeepers cannot fight a war but can serve as a buffer. For the UN, a smaller peacekeeping force must not be at risk of being overwhelmed by a party to the conflict. However, if the State parties were willing to acquiesce to the presence of UN peacekeepers, the force would serve as a deterrent and ensure that Zaporizhzhia would be off the table in future conflict.

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Alexander Gilder is Lecturer in International Law and Security at the University of Reading, UK.

Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons