Ukraine Symposium – Russia’s “Re-Education” Camps: Grave Violations Against Children in Armed Conflict
On March 17, 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Russian president Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation. The warrants allege that Putin and Lvova-Belova are responsible for war crimes against Ukrainian children, specifically, the deportation and unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. The allegations made in the warrants have been the focus of various investigations since reports of the abduction and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children first came to light. Last month, for example, the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab published a report detailing the scale and organization of Russia’s program of transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children. The report carefully documents the large numbers of children affected, the tactics employed to transfer them to Russian territory, the sprawling network of facilities to which children are sent, and the governmental organization and coordination of the program. The findings further strengthen arguments made in a previous post that Russia’s forcible transfer and forced adoption initiatives amount to violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law standards.
The Yale Report also raised a series of new concerns related to the transportation of Ukrainian children to Russian recreation and re-education camps. It outlines the pressure imposed upon parents to “consent” to children’s attendance at the camps, failure to maintain communication channels between children and their families, and suspension of children’s return from camps. The “education” provided in the camps is reportedly designed to advance patriotic messaging on Russia’s politics, military prowess, culture, and history and there are suggestions that some children have undertaken military training. This post will demonstrate that the Yale Report findings suggest further violations of IHL and IHRL and grave violations against children during armed conflict.
Abduction
The Yale Report asserts that Russia’s actions in its transfer and treatment of children from Ukraine may amount to abduction. This would constitute a violation of Article 35 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which obliges States Parties, including Russia, to take all measures to prevent the abduction of children for any purpose or in any form.
Abduction is internationally regarded, as noted by the Yale Report, as a grave violation against children during armed conflict (UN Security Council Resolutions 1261 (1999) and 1539 (2004)). Its commission triggers the UN Security Council’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) (Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005)), which seeks to systematically gather information on grave violations in order to inform future Security Council action and ensure compliance and accountability for violations against children. Abduction is a trigger for listing parties to a conflict in the annexes of the UN Secretary General’s annual report on children and armed conflict (Security Council Resolution 2225 (2015)).
In 2022, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict developed guidance (SRSG Guidance) on abduction as a grave violation, including how to identify it. Thus, abduction is defined as:
the removal, seizure, capture, apprehension, taking or enforced disappearance of a child, either temporarily or permanently, including for the purpose of any form of exploitation of the child. The abduction must be perpetrated by a party to the conflict in the context of and be associated with an armed conflict.
The Yale Report’s findings suggest that, at least in some instances, Russia’s actions in removing children from Ukraine amount to abduction, in line with the 2022 guidance. The removals, some temporary and some seemingly more permanent, are committed in the context of and associated with an armed conflict. Children, under 18, are the targets and it is reported that Russian armed forces and occupation authorities are involved in recruiting and removing children. The SRSG Guidance explains that exploitation can include indoctrination, which aligns with reports of a pro-Russian, political realignment curriculum within the camps. Retaliation or intimidation against children, their relatives or others, for political purposes can also amount to exploitation. Indeed, removing children as a means of intimidating the civilian population ought to be considered as a motivating factor in this example.
The act of removing a child for exploitative purposes is sufficient to be considered abduction, and it can be conducted through a number of means, including coercion, fraud, force, or abuse of power. The SRSG Guidance makes clear that children’s assent or consent is irrelevant; they may be de facto or de jure incapable of giving consent and they may do so as a result of threats or coercion. The Yale Report demonstrates that the issue of consent arises in relation to parents in the Ukraine-Russia example, with a number of parents reporting being pressured into giving consent, which in turn raises the possibility of coercion. Abduction is a continuing violation, which lasts until the child is released. Thus, Russia appears to have conducted temporary abductions in relation to children who have been returned from camps. Children who have not been returned from Russia’s camps can be considered continuing cases of abduction.
The Threat of Trafficking
It is acknowledged (Security Council Resolution 2225 (2015)) that abduction is not only a grave violation in and of itself but is closely connected to other violations of IHL and human rights abuses. If children manage to escape from camps in Russia and attempt to make the journey back to Ukraine, they will likely be unaccompanied and consequently vulnerable to trafficking, sexual exploitation, and forced labour, in a region where the threat of trafficking is currently considered high and imminent.
Russia bears further international legal obligations in this regard. Trafficking of all persons is prohibited by international law. Article 5 of the Palermo Protocol (2000), to which Russia is a State party, requires States to criminalize trafficking in domestic law. When it comes to children, the CRC obliges States parties to take all appropriate measures to protect children from trafficking (Article 33) and sexual and economic exploitation (Article 32). The Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography also requires States parties to prohibit trafficking in children for any purpose (Article 3), as does ILO C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (Articles 1 and 3(a)).
Russia’s reported actions in removing children from their homes, detaining them in camps, sometimes with no definite date for return, and denying them the possibility to communicate with family members, raises the risk that children will attempt to leave the camps and undertake dangerous journeys alone, opening them to further exploitation.
Recruitment and Use
There is also a close connection between abduction and the recruitment and use of children in armed forces and armed groups. While the Yale Report does not document any instances of children being used in active hostilities, its investigations uncovered military training camps for Ukrainian children in Chechnya and Russia-occupied Crimea. Indeed, a previous post detailed the manner in which Russia has used Ukrainian children in intelligence gathering. It is particularly concerning to note the involvement of the Yunarmia, an all-Russian military-patriotic movement, in the organization of Russia’s military camps as the possibility that the Yunarmia may use children to serve in occupying forces in Ukraine has already been raised.
Recruitment and use of children is also a grave violation against children in conflict and, as in the case of abduction, triggers the MRM. The direct participation in hostilities of children under 15 is prohibited under IHL (Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I of 1977) and under international human rights law (CRC, Art 38). For States parties to the OPAC, which includes Russia, all feasible measures must be taken to ensure that children under 18 do not take a direct part in hostilities (Article 1) and compulsory recruitment is prohibited (Article 2). States that permit voluntary recruitment under 18 must ensure that recruitment is voluntary and carried out with the informed consent of the child’s parents or guardians (Article 3). The ILO lists forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict as one of the worst forms of child labour (Article 3(a)) and requires Member States to take immediate action to prohibit and eliminate it (Article 1). Conscripting or enlisting children under 15 into national armed forces or using them to actively participate in hostilities is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii)) and has been successfully prosecuted by the Court (Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen).
Any suggestion that Russia is involved in the recruitment and use of children in hostilities will be taken extremely seriously by both the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, which has already issued arrest warrants for the deportation of children and unlawful transfer of children from Ukraine to the Russia Federation under Article 8(2)(a)(vii) and Article 8(2)(a)(viii) of the Rome Statute. The latter has also recently highlighted the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes against children as a key priority.
Conclusion
The conduct exposed by the Yale Report paints a picture of a well-planned and carefully orchestrated series of initiatives designed to exploit and indoctrinate Ukraine’s children and instil fear in the Ukrainian population. They are horrifying in their severity and scale and their direction against the most vulnerable. It can only be hoped that the evidence gathered will contribute to delivering accountability and redress to those responsible in the longer term.
***
Dr Alison Bisset is Associate Professor in International Human Rights Law at the University of Reading, UK.
Photo credit: Mirek Pruchnicki
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