Ukraine Symposium – A Path Forward for Food Security in Armed Conflict

by | Mar 22, 2023

Food security

Climate change, the economic crisis following the Covid-19 pandemic, and armed conflicts throughout the world have aggravated the global food crisis (see e.g., here, p. 6-7 and here). Regarding specifically the latter, in 2018, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 2417, identifying a “vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity.” Thus, there is no surprise – although still concern and regret – that the international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine further threatens both local and global food security. Two main reasons have elevated the threat to exceptional levels.

Exceptional consequences

First, Russia and Ukraine are among the most important grain producers and exporters in the world (see e.g., here, at ¶¶ 2 and 20). On the one hand, 70% of Ukraine’s territory is allocated to agriculture and 17% of its active population works in the agricultural sector (2020 numbers available here, p. 6). On the other hand, many developing and least advanced countries, such as Egypt, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, and Pakistan, are dependent on Ukrainian and Russian food exports (see e.g., here, at ¶ 31).

Second, Russian military operations continue to impair the essential infrastructure necessary for production and distribution of food. This includes agricultural infrastructure, market infrastructure, and energy infrastructure.

As far as agricultural infrastructure is concerned, Russia reportedly targeted grain terminals, grain silos, farms, and storage warehouses and tanks (see e.g., here, p. 22-23 and here, p. 8). In addition, Russia mined or set crops on fire and stole grain from occupied territories, such as in Kherson (for legal analysis, see e.g., Schmitt and Anna Mykytenko and Maksym Vishchyk).

Concerning market infrastructure, Russia attacked grocery stores, grain-transporting railway facilities, and still operates a de facto blockade of certain Ukrainian ports in both the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. Only in mid-July 2022 could grain exports resume through three Ukrainian ports thanks to the Black Sea Initiative, renewed for another period of 120 days in November 2022 (for legal analysis of Russian blockades, see e.g., Fink, Lott, and Kraska, p. 553-55).

Finally, in relation to energy infrastructure, Russian armed forces obliterated the Ukrainian electricity network, most noticeably since mid-October 2022 (see here and here) (for legal analysis, see e.g., Schmitt and Schmitt).These attacks against the energy infrastructure not only deprive many Ukrainians of power indispensable to cooking meals, they also prevent the effective daily functioning of agricultural and market infrastructure. Indeed, their daily functions, for instance, for farms (at ¶ 57) and ports (p. 17), rely on energy sources like electricity.

The dramatic reality in Ukraine leads one to wonder whether international humanitarian law (IHL), and more specifically, the law of international armed conflict, provide sufficient protection to food security in armed conflict. This question is of particular importance because pressure on food security is expected to increase, notably due to climate and demographic changes. As defined during the World Food Summit in 1996, “food security [only] exists when people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” Thus, protection of food security implies protection of food resources, but also efforts to safeguard food and agricultural systems.

A Material or Ecological Approach

IHL offers two significant layers of protection to food security. One protects through general rules, another protects through specific rules. General rules (both customary and conventional in nature) do not have the specific purpose of protecting food security, but nonetheless partially achieve this goal. These rules follow a material or ecological approach toward food resources and objects contributing to food and agricultural systems (grain terminals, storage warehouses, crops, supermarkets, electricity network, etc.). These rules consider agricultural objects, food resources, as well as all food-related market and energy objects as: (i) any other civilian object which is part of the human environment (material approach) or, when relevant, as (ii) any other green object which is part of the natural environment (ecological approach). In other words, IHL general rules do not consider the sustenance value of food-related objects, including food resources, for the survival of humanity.

For instance, IHL basic principles regarding the conduct of hostilities, that are distinction, proportionality, and precautions, apply to all food-related objects and food resources. Indeed, these objects are often, by their nature, civilian objects in accordance with article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I (AP I), when they do not otherwise meet the definition of military objectives (art. 52(2) AP I). Food resources and food-related objects, as any civilian objects, thus enjoy an immunity against attacks except when they become military objectives. Likewise, when these resources or objects constitute collateral damage of an attack against a legitimate military objective, this damage must not be excessive in comparison with the expected definite military advantage (art. 51(5)(b) AP I).

Moreover, certain food resources and food-related objects such as crops and agricultural zones are part of the natural environment. As such, they are protected against widespread, long-term and severe damage (art. 55(1) AP I). This rule applies independently of any military necessity or of the possible proportionate character of the attack (p. 209-210). Although this rule appears to protect food security, the threshold for “widespread, long-term and severe” damage is set so high that damage to food-related green objects will hardly ever meet this threshold in practice.

Furthermore, food resources and food-related objects, like any other movable enemy assets, are protected against pillage (art. 28, Hague Regulations (HR) and art. 33, Geneva Convention IV (GC IV)) and seizure in the absence of any imperative necessity of war (art. 23(g) HR).

Finally, as civilian objects, these resources and objects enjoy a protection against the use of certain weapons, such as mines and incendiary weapons, according to Protocol II (art. 3, ¶7) and III (art. 2, ¶4) to the Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

A Narrow, Anthropocentric Approach

In addition to general rules, a few specific rules, of both a customary and a conventional nature, aim to protect food security. Yet, they operate only to the benefit of a given civilian population, i.e., the enemy population. In other words, these specific rules do care about the special value of food resources, rather than all food-related objects contributing to the food system, but only because these resources contribute to the immediate sustenance of a given population already in need or threatened by hunger. In that sense, they adopt a narrow, anthropocentric approach to protection of food resources. In addition, these specific rules have both a preventive perspective, namely to avoid people facing hunger, and a curative perspective, to help people that already face hunger (p. 1098).

For example, specific rules prohibit hunger as a method of warfare against the civilian population and protect objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (art. 54(1), (2) and (3) AP I). Thus, these rules have the limited goal to protect food resources for the benefit of the specific population whose survival is at stake. In this same idea, Professor Dannenbaum, who closely studied Article 54 AP I, insightfully writes: “Article 54(2) is unambiguously not concerned with the preservation of such objects in and of themselves. […] The special concern for, and protection of, the objects is derived instead from their essential value to specific populations (emphasis added)” (p. 55). Alongside Article 54 AP I, other specific rules deal with humanitarian assistance to civilians already in need, requiring involved States’ agreement to relief offers (art. 23 GC IV and art. 70 AP I) – unless a State’s refusal to agree is arbitrary (¶ 2805; but see Watts, p. 23-46).

The narrow anthropocentric approach of these specific rules clearly appears when they are discussed in the context of sieges and blockades. Despite several controversies relating to their application in this context, scholars do not debate that these rules are meant to specifically protect the part of the enemy population that is besieged or blockaded. They offer no protection to other civilian populations that may have been impacted by the siege or blockade, e.g., those depending on exports from the besieged or blockaded areas (see also Kraska, p. 556-557).

In summary, IHL is divided between, on the one hand, a material or ecological approach and, on the other hand, a narrow, anthropocentric approach to food resources and food-related objects. This double approach already provides considerable protection to food security. Therefore, the first challenge to protect food security in  armed conflict is one of compliance with IHL norms (on the issue of compliance, see e.g., Cathcart). The situation in Ukraine makes this clear: there is first and foremost an issue of compliance with IHL by Russian armed forces. Russia is a party to AP I, GC IV, Hague Convention IV and its Regulations, as well as Protocols II (but not the Ottawa Convention) and III to the CCW and, thus, must answer for the violations of its obligations. Yet, beyond compliance problems, should the IHL community of experts be fully satisfied with the protection provided to food security by this branch of international law?

Toward a General Anthropocentric Approach

As previously discussed, changes on earth and in human society have placed a heavy burden on food security. In 2015, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations noted that, “to satisfy the growing demand driven by population growth and dietary changes, food production will have to increase by 60 percent by 2050.” Despite improvements in our food system, how can humanity withstand the growing pressure on food security if belligerents undermine that system and destroy food resources? IHL could contribute to the collective effort to safeguard food security for all. One path forward is for IHL to endorse a supplementary approach, i.e., a large or general anthropocentric approach to food-related objects, including food resources. This approach calls for IHL to recognize the intrinsic sustenance value of food resources and of (at least some) food-related objects, for the sake of all humanity. To put it differently, IHL should not wait for a specific population to face or be threatened by hunger to give special consideration to food security.

The large or general anthropocentric approach does not require major amendments to IHL. Steps can already be achieved by interpreting and applying the existing framework. Many rules are flexible enough to include such an approach because they allow a context-based analysis or imply some kind of value judgment.

For example, when balancing collateral damage with the expected military advantage in the proportionality assessment, higher “weight” could be assigned to food resources and, at least, to certain food-related objects that contribute greatly to the food system. In the same vein, the examination of military necessity exceptions could be stricter when food security is at stake. Similarly, damage to food resources and food-related objects that are part of the environment should “weigh” in the appraisal of the three cumulative criteria referred to in article 55 AP I, especially the severity criterion.

When including such a general anthropocentric approach to food-related objects in IHL, it is essential to maintain an acceptable balance between the foundational principles of humanity and military necessity. It would be counterproductive to advocate humanity and ignore military necessities. Nonetheless, the balance between humanity and military necessity is itself ever evolving according to our common perception of human values (see Coco, de Hemptinne and Lander, p. 917).

Other options to incorporate a general anthropocentric approach would be to encourage belligerents to create protected zones in relation to food security (following, perhaps, the examples of non-defended localities and demilitarized zones respectively in art. 59 AP I and art. 60 AP I) or a list with identified food-related objects to be protected (for similar ideas in relation to the protection of the environment or the water, see Bothe et al., p. 577 and Geneva Water Hub, p. 6). Another possibility would be to encourage States to develop through their practice an obligation of due regard for food-related objects in armed conflicts (following the example of the due diligence principle in international environmental law – on the latter, see Henckarts and Contantin, p. 480-81).

Additionally, when applicable, international human rights law (in particular, the right to food) could help support and strengthen the suggested approach in IHL. For instance, the assessment of the arbitrary nature of State refusal to consent to relief action could take into account human rights obligations resulting from the right to food (see e.g., Sassòli, p. 580). Moreover, the right to food could be understood to require consideration of long-term effects on food security in the proportionality analysis (see e.g., Hutter, p. 740 and 746). Further, the extraterritorial obligation to respect this right (¶¶ 49-51) could prohibit State belligerents from declaring maritime blockades when the impact on civilian populations other than the blockaded population would infringe their “fundamental right […] to be free from hunger” (art. 11, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (for a similar idea on siege, see e.g., Durisch).

Concluding Thoughts

Although IHL protection for food security is important, the current legal framework does not appear fully adequate under its present interpretation to avoid weaponization of food in future conflicts with worsening effects for humanity. For the sake of the human species, State belligerents must fight hunger as much as they fight their adversary. We must adopt a general anthropocentric approach to IHL that is more responsive to the intrinsic sustenance value of food resources and food-related objects for all people.


Pauline Lesaffre, Ph.D., is a FNRS postdoctoral researcher (chargée de recherches FNRS) in International Humanitarian Law and a lecturer in International Criminal Law at the University of Louvain, Belgium. FNRS refers to the (Belgian) Fund for Scientific Research. This blog post is expressing ideas developed in an article to be published in French in the Quebec Journal of International Law (RQDI). The author thanks Peter Haas, J.D., Philippe Jacques, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Louvain, Professor Sean Watts and the editing team of Articles of War for their helpful feedback on previous drafts of this post.


Photo credit: Unsplash


Symposium Intro: Ukraine-Russia Armed Conflict

by Sean WattsWinston WilliamsRonald Alcala

February 28, 2022

Russia’s “Special Military Operation” and the (Claimed) Right of Self-Defense

by Michael N. Schmitt

February 28, 2022

Legal Status of Ukraine’s Resistance Forces

by Ronald Alcala and Steve Szymanski

February 28, 2022

Cluster Munitions and the Ukraine War

by William H. Boothby

February 28, 2022

Neutrality in the War against Ukraine

by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

March 1, 2022

The Russia-Ukraine War and the European Convention on Human Rights

by Marko Milanovic

March 1, 2022

Deefake Technology in the Age of Information Warfare

by Hitoshi Nasu

March 1, 2022

Ukraine and the Defender’s Obligations

by Eric Jensen

March 2, 2022

Are Molotov Cocktails Lawful Weapons?

by Sean Watts

March 2, 2022

Application of IHL by and to Proxies: The “Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk

by Marco Sassòli

March 3, 2022

Closing the Turkish Straits in Times of War

by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

March 3, 2020

The Abuse of “Peacekeeping”

by Alexander Gilder

March 3, 2022

Prisoners of War in Occupied Territory

by Geoff Corn

March 3, 2022

Combatant Privileges and Protections

by Laurie R. Blank

March 4, 2022

Siege Law

by Sean Watts

March 4, 2022

Russia’s Illegal Invasion of Ukraine & the Role of International Law

by Michael Kelly

March 4, 2022

Russian Troops Out of Uniform and Prisoner of War Status

by Chris Koschnitzky and Michael N. Schmitt

March 4, 2022

On War

by Andrew Clapham

March 5, 2022

Providing Arms and Materiel to Ukraine: Neutrality, Co-belligerency, and the Use of Force

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 7, 2022

Keeping the Ukraine-Russia Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Issues Separate

by Rob Mclaughlin

March 7, 2022

The Other Side of Civilian Protection: The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention

by Jelena Pejic

March 7, 2022

Special Forces, Unprivileged Belligerency, and the War in the Shadows

by Ken Watkin

March 8, 2022

Accountability and Ukraine: Hurdles to Prosecuting War Crimes and Aggression

by Lauren Sanders

March 9, 2022

Remarks on the Law Relating to the Use of Force in the Ukraine Conflict

by Terry D. Gill

March 9, 2022

Consistency and Change in Russian Approaches to International Law

by Jeffrey Kahn

March 9, 2022

The Fog of War, Civilian Resistance, and the Soft Underbelly of Unprivileged Belligerency

by Gary Corn

March 10, 2022

Common Article 1 and the Conflict in Ukraine

by Marten Zwanenburg

March 10, 2022

Levée en Masse in Ukraine: Applications, Implications, and Open Questions

by David Wallace and Shane Reeves

March 11, 2022

The Attack at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant and Additional Protocol I

by Tom Dannenbaum

March 13, 2022

The Russia-Ukraine War and the Space Domain

by Timothy GoinesJeffrey BillerJeremy Grunert

March 14, 2022

Fact-finding in Ukraine: Can Anything Be Learned from Yemen?

by Charles Garraway

March 14, 2022

Status of Foreign Fighters in the Ukrainian Legion

by Petra Ditrichová and Veronika Bílková

March 15, 2022

Law Applicable to Persons Fleeing Armed Conflicts

by Julia Grignon

March 15, 2022

Ukraine’s Legal Counterattack

by Michael Kelly

March 17, 2022

The ICJ’s Provisional Measures Order: Unprecedented

by Ori Pomson

March 17, 2022

Displacement from Conflict: Old Realities, New Protections?

by Ruvi Ziegler

March 17, 2022

A No-Fly Zone Over Ukraine and International Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 18, 2022

Time for a New War Crimes Commission?

by Diane Marie Amann

March 18, 2022

Portending Genocide in Ukraine?

by Adam Oler

March 21, 2022

Are Mercenaries in Ukraine?

by Robert Lawless

March 21, 2022

Abducting Dissent: Kidnapping Public Officials in Occupied Ukraine

by Katharine Fortin

March 22, 2022

Are Thermobaric Weapons Unlawful?

by Matt Montazzoli

March 23, 2022

A Ukraine No-Fly Zone: Further Thoughts on the Law and Policy

by Terry D. Gill

March 23, 2022

The War at Sea: Is There a Naval Blockade in the Sea of Azov?

by Martin Fink

March 24, 2022

Deportation of Ukrainian Civilians to Russia: The Legal Framework

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 24, 2022

Weaponizing Food

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 28, 2022

Command Responsibility and the Ukraine Conflict

by Noëlle Quénivet

March 30, 2022

The Siren Song of Universal Jurisdiction: A Cautionary Note

bySteve Szymanski and Peter C. Combe

April 1, 2022

A War Crimes Primer on the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

by Sean Watts and Hitoshi Nasu

April 4, 2022

Russian Booby-traps and the Ukraine Conflict

by Michael N. Schmitt

April 5, 2022

The Ukraine Conflict, Smart Phones, and the LOAC of Takings

by Gary Corn

April 7, 2022

War Crimes against Children

by Véronique Aubert

April 8, 2022

Weaponizing Civilians: Human Shields in Ukraine

by Michael N. Schmitt

April 11, 2022

Unprecedented Environmental Risks

by Karen Hulme

April 12, 2022

Maritime Exclusion Zones in Armed Conflicts

by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

April 12, 2022

Ukraine’s Levée en Masse and the Obligation to Ensure Respect for LOAC

by Jann K. Kleffner

April 14, 2022

Cultural Property Protection in the Ukraine Conflict

by Dick Jackson

April 14, 2022

Results of a First Enquiry into Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Ukraine

by Marco Sassòli

April 14, 2022

Comprehensive Justice and Accountability in Ukraine

by Chris Jenks

April 15, 2022

Maritime Neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

by David Letts

April 18, 2022

Cyber Neutrality, Cyber Recruitment, and Cyber Assistance to Ukraine

by Nicholas Tsagourias

April 19, 2022

Defiance of Russia’s Demand to Surrender and Combatant Status

by Chris Koschnitzky and Steve Szymanski

April 22, 2022

The Montreux Convention and Turkey’s Impact on Black Sea Operations

by Adam Aliano and Russell Spivak

April 25, 2022

Lawful Use of Nuclear Weapons

by Jay Jackson and Kenneth “Daniel” Jones

April 26, 2022

Litigating Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

by Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

April 27, 2022

Military Networks and Cyber Operations in the War in Ukraine

by Heather Harrison Dinniss

April 29, 2022

Building Momentum: Next Steps towards Justice for Ukraine

by Philippa Webb

May 2, 2022

Counternormativity and the International Order

by Dan E. Stigall

May 3, 2022

Destructive Counter-Mobility Operations and the Law of War

by Sean Watts and Winston Williams

May 5, 2022

Are We at War?

by Michael N. Schmitt

May 9, 2022

The Ukraine Conflict and the Future of Digital Cultural Property

by Ronald Alcala

May 13, 2022

Neutral State Access to Ukraine’s Food Exports

by James Kraska

May 18, 2022

Negotiating an End to the Fighting

by Michael N. Schmitt

May 24, 2022

Is the Law of Neutrality Dead?

by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

May 31, 2022

Effects-based Enforcement of Targeting Law

by Geoff Corn and Sean Watts

June 2, 2022

U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations in Support of Ukraine

by Michael N. Schmitt

June 6, 2022

War Sanctions Steadily Degrade the Russian Maritime Sector

by James Kraska

June 7, 2022

The Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group & Ukrainian Prosecutions of Russian POWs – Part 1

by Chris Jenks

June 22, 2022

The Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group & Ukrainian Prosecutions of Russian POWs – Part 2

by Chris Jenks

June 24, 2022

The Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group & Ukrainian Prosecutions of Russian POWs – Part 3

by Chris Jenks

June 28, 2022

Putting “Overall Control” to the Test of the Third Geneva Convention

by Alessandra Spadaro

July 6, 2022

The Risk of Commercial Actors in Outer Space Drawing States into Armed Conflict

by Tara Brown

July 8, 2022

The Release of Prisoners of War

by Jeroen van den Boogaard

July 8, 2022

The Attack on the Vasily Bekh and Targeting Logistics Ships

by James Kraska

July 11, 2022

Lessons from Syria’s Ceasefires

by Marika Sosnowski

July 12, 2022

Documentation and Investigation Responses to Serious International Crimes

by Brianne McGonigle Leyh

July 13, 2022

Rebel Prosecutions of Foreign Fighters in Ukraine

by René Provost

July 15, 2022

Forced Civilian Labor in Occupied Territory

by Michael N. Schmitt

August 2, 2022

Forced Conscription in the Self-Declared Republics

by Marten Zwanenburg

August 8, 2022

Amnesty International’s Allegations of Ukrainian IHL Violations

by Michael N. Schmitt

August 8, 2022

Oil Tankers as “Environmental Time Bombs,” or Not

by Mark Jessup

August 12, 2022

The Escalating Military Use of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant

by Tom Dannenbaum

August 22, 2022

Protected Zones in International Humanitarian Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

August 24, 2022

Photos of the Dead

by William Casey Biggerstaff

August 19, 2022

Deception and the Law of Armed Conflict

by William Casey Biggerstaff

September 8, 2022

Data-Rich Battlefields and the Future of LOAC

by Shane ReevesRobert Lawless

September 12, 2022

Russian Crimes Against Children

by Oleksii KaminetskyiInna Zavorotko

September 14, 2022

Targeting Leadership

by Mehmet Çoban

September 16, 2022

Illegality of Russia’s Annexations in Ukraine

by Lauri Mälksoo

October 3, 2022

Russia’s Forcible Transfer of Children

by Alison Bisset

October 5, 2022

The Kerch Strait Bridge Attack, Retaliation, and International Law

by Marko MilanovicMichael N. Schmitt

October 12, 2022

Russian Preliminary Objections at the ICJ: The Case Must Go On?

by Ori Pomson

October 13, 2022

The Complicity of Iran in Russia’s Aggression and War Crimes in Ukraine

by Marko Milanovic

October 19, 2022

Attacking Power Infrastructure under International Humanitarian Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

October 20, 2022

Dirty Bombs and International Humanitarian Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

October 26, 2022

Doxing Enemy Soldiers and the Law of War

by Eric Talbot JensenSean Watts

October 31, 2022

Are Civilians Reporting With Cell Phones Directly Participating in Hostilities?

by Michael N. SchmittWilliam Casey Biggerstaff

November 2, 2022

Using Cellphones to Gather and Transmit Military Information, A Postscript

by Michael N. Schmitt

November 4, 2022

State Responsibility for Non-State Actors’ Conduct

by Jennifer Maddocks

November 4, 2022

Reparations for War: What Options for Ukraine?

by Luke Moffett

November 15, 2022

Further Thoughts on Russia’s Campaign against Ukraine’s Power Infrastructure

by Michael N. Schmitt

November 25, 2022

Russia’s Allegations of U.S. Biological Warfare in Ukraine – Part I

by Robert Lawless

December 2, 2022

Russia’s Allegations of U.S. Biological Warfare in Ukraine – Part II

by Robert Lawless

December 9, 2022

The THeMIS Bounty Part I: Seizure of Enemy Property

by Christopher Malis and Hitoshi Nasu

December 12, 2022

Classification of the Conflict(s)

by Michael N. Schmitt

December 14, 2022

The THeMIS Bounty Part II: Stealing Enemy Technology

by Christopher Malis, Hitoshi Nasu

December 16, 2022

The “I Want to Live” Project and Technologically-Enabled Surrender

by David WallaceShane Reeves

January 13, 2023

UN Peacekeepers and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant

by Alexander Gilder

January 20, 2023

What’s in a Name? Getting it Right for the Naval “Drone” Attack on Sevastopol

by Caroline Tuckett

January 23, 2023

Ukraine’s “Suicide Drone Boats” and International Law

by Charles M. Layne

January 25, 2023

The Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Aid

by Alexandra Francis

January 27, 2023

A Wagner Group Fighter in Norway

by Camilla Cooper

February 1, 2023

The Legal and Practical Challenges of Surrendering to Drones

by William Casey Biggerstaff,Caitlin Chiaramonte

February 8, 2023

Field-Modified Weapons under the Law of War

by Ronald Alcala

February 13, 2023

The Wagner Group: Status and Accountability

by Winston WilliamsJennifer Maddocks

February 23, 2023

The Law of Crowdsourced War: Democratized Supply Chains – Part I

by Gary Corn

March 1, 2023

Reprisals in International Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 6, 2023

The Law of Belligerent Occupation

by David A. Wallace 

March 8, 2023

Seizure of Russian State Assets: State Immunity and Countermeasures

by Daniel Franchini

March 8, 2023

The Law of Crowdsourced War: Democratized Supply Chains – Part II

by Gary Corn

March 15, 2023

“Damn the Torpedoes!”: Naval Mines in the Black Sea

by Ben RothchildMark Jessup

March 15, 2023

Landmines and the War In Ukraine

by Dario PronestiJeroen van den Boogaard

March 20, 2023

Russia’s “Re-Education” Camps: Grave Violations Against Children in Armed Conflict

by Alison Bisset

March 20, 2023