Ukraine Symposium – Mine Clearance Operations in the Black Sea


| Dec 20, 2023

Mine clearance

In an Articles of War post earlier this year, Ben Rothchild and Mark Jessup addressed the under-appreciated challenges—operational, navigational, and legal—posed by the relatively extensive mine-laying operations carried out in the Black Sea as a component of the Ukraine-Russia armed conflict. Maritime geographic, or NAVAREA, warnings remain in place, and Russian aircraft have been reported as deploying mines along the (now unilaterally observed) Black Sea grain export route. Naval mine inflicted casualties along the coast and damage to vessels at sea—including a Romanian minesweeper—have begun to mount. Mine sightings are common, and some Black Sea coastal States have commenced local mine clearance operations. Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, NATO members, are looking to a combined mine clearance operation. A post earlier by Dobrin Dobrev on Opinio Juris provides a very useful summary of the current state of play.

In this post, I continue this series of short analyses in relation to the legal aspects of naval mine warfare as part of the Ukraine-Russia armed conflict. To this end, I focus on the “when the war is over” context. In doing so, I briefly raise three possible options for a naval mine clearance operation: a UN Security Council (UNSC) Chapter VII mandated operation; a UN General Assembly (UNGA) authorised operation; and a coastal State (collectively) consented operation. But first, some history.

Types of Multinational Naval Mine Clearance Operations

The most useful form of multinational mine clearance operation is one based in a UNSC Chapter VII mandate. Such operations are not new; the longest to date has been the operation in Kuwaiti and Iraqi Territorial Seas and Internal Waters, and the nearby Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)/High Seas, in the aftermath of both the 1991 and 2003 wars. Indeed, as an aside, whilst the focus of this post is the Black Sea, there is much to be learned from the Arabian Gulf experience. That area has been a long-term venue for naval mining operations, with significant effects for both naval and merchant shipping. The 1980-1988 Iran–Iraq War and its associated “Tanker War” (the context for the International Court of Justice Oil Platforms decision), and more recent mining incidents in the vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz, attest to the longevity, asymmetry, and persistence of the naval mine threat.

The second type of operation is a UNGA mandated operation. The archetypal UNGA mandated naval mine clearance operation occurred in the aftermath of the Suez crisis in 1956. Given that there had been “a lack of unanimity” in the UNSC (due to United Kingdom and French vetoes given their engagement in that conflict) the issue of, amongst other things, reopening the Suez Canal to shipping was referred to the UNGA in November 1956 for consideration. That event triggered the UNGA’s first Emergency Special Session (ESS), in line with the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution.

The key multi-national force (MNF) outcome from this ESS was the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). However, the mandate included a requirement that “steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation.” To this end, the UNGA authorised a mine clearance and salvage operation with vessels under the UN flag. The assembled force comprised at its peak 32 vessels and other floating equipment platforms, mainly provided by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Mine clearance divers from a number of nations also formed part of the force.

An example of the third option, again in relation to the Suez and approaches, is the mine clearance operation that took place in 1975. However, this operation (TF 65)—whilst operating in the same area of operations as the UNSC-established UNEF II—was a separately authorised mission as agreed between Egypt as the host State, and the United States, United Kingdom, and France as the mine clearance force contributing States.

So, what might be gleaned from this experience in relation to any proposed mine clearance operation in the Black Sea, after the Ukraine-Russia war has ended?

Option 1: UNSC Chapter VII?

The ideal mandate for such a multinational Black Sea naval mine clearance force (the MNF) would be a UNSC Chapter VII mandate. This is the preferred option for two clear reasons. First, the level of authority endowed by a UNSC Chapter VII mandate would assist any MNF in implementing controls or other measures that would otherwise potentially constitute unlawful, or at least contestable, limitations on passage and activities.

For example, temporary restrictions on navigation in the Black Sea in order to implement a mine clearance plan would be logical, but contested, if these limitations did not comply with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) EEZ and High Seas regimes. A Chapter VII mandate could cure this. Similarly, a Chapter VII mandate could both authorise and facilitate a temporary alteration of the nature of the MNF’s “due regard” requirements in Black Sea EEZs. Whilst none of the six Black Sea coastal States assert the type of prohibition of military activities in their EEZ that India and Brazil subscribe to, the fact that disposal by activation will often be the consequence of detection nevertheless still raises debates about the nature of the “due regard” obligation.

A second benefit conferred by this level of authority would be the ability to collect evidence in EEZs without first needing to consider the issue of coastal State consent. This evidence could be useful for a number of purposes (e.g., determining attribution for mine strikes, determining failure to provide adequate notification, or breaches of the law of naval warfare in respect of mine types and deployment locations). It is this very fact that makes a Chapter VII mandate useful. It could prove difficult to argue that the use of mine countermeasure (MCM) equipment and divers—for example, to undertake seabed surveys to locate mines or debris—is a military maritime data collection activity. The reason it may be difficult to claim this characterisation is precisely the intention to publicise (as opposed to securitise) the data, for example, as evidence in a name and shame diplomatic campaign, or even for subsequent legal proceedings.

This does not mean that these operations would therefore be Marine Scientific Research activities, governed by Part XIII of the LOSC and subject to detailed coastal State consent, observation, and data sharing requirements. But it does mean that there would be some uncertainty, which a UNSC Chapter VII mandate could clearly mitigate through direct authorisation of such activities. Of course, it is likely that most of the concerned coastal States would agree to the MNF’s operations without raising such obstacles, but this could not be guaranteed.

This is not to say, however, that these two clear benefits flowing from a UNSC Chapter VII mandate would solve every legal question. One challenging issue, for example, would be the existence (or not) of an independent, UNSC endorsed right for the MNF units to transit through the Turkish Straits, in a manner potentially contrary to the requirements of the Montreux Convention (which governs warship passage through the Straits) if the Turkish government objected to the operations or composition of the MNF. Another challenge could be the freedom of the MNF to operate in Black Sea coastal State Territorial Seas in the event that one or more of those coastal States objected to the operation. However, with the possible exception of Russia, this is unlikely to pose an actual obstacle insofar as the remaining States are likely to welcome assistance in the mitigation of this lingering menace to shipping.

Option 2: The UNGA?

With respect to the UNSC, however, and as was the case during the first Suez crisis, there is the potential that a P5 member—perhaps Russia—may for some reason veto any such mandate. The probable fallback option would then be to build upon the existing UNGA Emergency Special Session (ESS 11) in respect of the Ukraine-Russia armed conflict, in order to create a UNGA authorised naval mine clearance force. However, this option would not carry the force of a UNSC Chapter VII mandate, and would still need to be bound—certainly in the Territorial Sea, and to a much lesser but still contestable degree, in the EEZ—by the parameters of consent provided by the Black Sea coastal States.

For example, in the absence of a Chapter VII authorisation, it is incontestable that MNF operations in any Black Sea coastal State Territorial Sea would still require that coastal State’s consent. Such operations, despite a UNGA resolution, would still amount to a breach of innocent passage unless consented to. Further, there would be no basis for non-compliance (if this arose as an issue) with the Montreux Convention. And there would need to be negotiations with Black Sea coastal States as to the delicate balance to be struck—both practically, and in terms of interpretive coherence—between the MNF’s operational reach and coastal State jurisdiction. This would be particularly the case in respect of military activities involving ordnance disposal, seabed survey, etc. as they might touch upon the requirement for due regard in those coastal States’ EEZs.

Nor would a UNGA resolution provide an automatic exemption from the LOSC Part XIII Marine Scientific Research (MSR) regime. Therefore, to the extent that this regime might potentially be claimed to apply (even though this is not at all a strong argument)—if the operations required of the MNF to achieve its UNGA authorised mission were not otherwise characterised as MSR “exempt” military activities—then operational effectiveness could be held hostage by the need to conform to some coastal State MSR expectations.

Option 3: Coastal State Consent to the MNF?

If a UNSC Chapter VII mandate were not possible, the better option for such a mine clearance MNF would arguably be to secure direct Black Sea coastal State consent to the operation. This would sidestep the uncertainties that are inherent in a UNGA mandate by going directly to the geographically concerned States for authority to operate in their Territorial Seas and—to the extent necessary or acceptable—their EEZs (noting that there is no pocket of pure High Seas as the entirety of the Black Sea beyond the six coastal State Territorial Seas is comprised of their adjoining EEZs).

Further, even if a UNGA mandate was achieved, it would still require detailed consultations about implementation with the Black Sea coastal States. This was effectively the approach taken in the 1975 Suez mine clearance operation to enable Task Force 65 to undertake its mission. That is, even though a UNGA mandate might provide an additional degree of perceived legitimacy, it would still not circumvent the requirement to negotiate and agree the parameters of the operation with the Black Sea coastal States. And such State-by-State negotiation would in any case still be a necessary preliminary because of issues such as the scope of operational freedom in each Territorial Sea, and more contentiously, whether and why mine clearance operations in each EEZ might be subject to any (contestable) limitations. A direct negotiation with Turkey in particular would also be required so as to ensure preliminary MNF access to the Black Sea area of operations through the Turkish Straits.

It is the Black Sea geopolitical context that is therefore the source of perhaps the most significant challenge to this option. This is because the 1975 Suez operation required the MNF to negotiate with only one coastal State, Egypt. By contrast, a Black Sea mine clearance MNF operation would ideally require all six coastal States to consent. These negotiations, and the multifarious State-specific parameters and limitations that could result from such a set of negotiations, could quickly become wickedly complex. Individual and differential State-by-State arrangements rather than a single multilateral arrangement would make operational planning, and mission coordination and execution, quite challenging. But regardless of this complexity, and even if only some but not all of the Black Sea coastal States agreed to a mine clearance MNF, there is no doubt that benefits to shipping (including navigational safety and reduced insurance costs) would still quickly accrue from an escalating set of publicly notified cleared/swept routes.


As an incident of the Ukraine–Russia armed conflict, the full consequences of Black Sea naval mine warfare are still to fully manifest. Indeed, it may not be until the war is over that the full costs of this campaign will begin to show. And despite the fact that casualties to people and ships have already accrued, the longer naval mine laying continues, the more challenging and costly the post-conflict mine clearance problem will become. This is especially the case in the Black Sea, where it appears that many of the free-floating (or moored but now loose) mine types used to date do not disarm as required, and most of the mine fields have not been notified.

So, while there is little doubt that the reconstruction of Ukraine will be an expensive and long-term task, it is important to recognise that “reconstruction” is also required in the Black Sea. But the first step in maritime reconstruction is mine clearance. And when the escalating naval mine threat is combined with the fact that the Black Sea is an essential sea line of communication—especially for grain—it becomes very apparent that the international community equally needs to start thinking about how the Black Sea commons will again be rendered safe for maritime activity.


Rob McLaughlin is a Professor of Military and Security Law at UNSW Canberra and a Professor of International Law at Australian National Centre for Ocean Research and Security.



Photo credit: Andrew J. Eder, U.S. Navy


Symposium Intro: Ukraine-Russia Armed Conflict

by Sean WattsWinston WilliamsRonald Alcala

February 28, 2022

Russia’s “Special Military Operation” and the (Claimed) Right of Self-Defense

by Michael N. Schmitt

February 28, 2022

Legal Status of Ukraine’s Resistance Forces

by Ronald Alcala and Steve Szymanski

February 28, 2022

Cluster Munitions and the Ukraine War

by William H. Boothby

February 28, 2022

Neutrality in the War against Ukraine

by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

March 1, 2022

The Russia-Ukraine War and the European Convention on Human Rights

by Marko Milanovic

March 1, 2022

Deefake Technology in the Age of Information Warfare

by Hitoshi Nasu

March 1, 2022

Ukraine and the Defender’s Obligations

by Eric Jensen

March 2, 2022

Are Molotov Cocktails Lawful Weapons?

by Sean Watts

March 2, 2022

Application of IHL by and to Proxies: The “Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk

by Marco Sassòli

March 3, 2022

Closing the Turkish Straits in Times of War

by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

March 3, 2020

The Abuse of “Peacekeeping”

by Alexander Gilder

March 3, 2022

Prisoners of War in Occupied Territory

by Geoff Corn

March 3, 2022

Combatant Privileges and Protections

by Laurie R. Blank

March 4, 2022

Siege Law

by Sean Watts

March 4, 2022

Russia’s Illegal Invasion of Ukraine & the Role of International Law

by Michael Kelly

March 4, 2022

Russian Troops Out of Uniform and Prisoner of War Status

by Chris Koschnitzky and Michael N. Schmitt

March 4, 2022

On War

by Andrew Clapham

March 5, 2022

Providing Arms and Materiel to Ukraine: Neutrality, Co-belligerency, and the Use of Force

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 7, 2022

Keeping the Ukraine-Russia Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Issues Separate

by Rob Mclaughlin

March 7, 2022

The Other Side of Civilian Protection: The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention

by Jelena Pejic

March 7, 2022

Special Forces, Unprivileged Belligerency, and the War in the Shadows

by Ken Watkin

March 8, 2022

Accountability and Ukraine: Hurdles to Prosecuting War Crimes and Aggression

by Lauren Sanders

March 9, 2022

Remarks on the Law Relating to the Use of Force in the Ukraine Conflict

by Terry D. Gill

March 9, 2022

Consistency and Change in Russian Approaches to International Law

by Jeffrey Kahn

March 9, 2022

The Fog of War, Civilian Resistance, and the Soft Underbelly of Unprivileged Belligerency

by Gary Corn

March 10, 2022

Common Article 1 and the Conflict in Ukraine

by Marten Zwanenburg

March 10, 2022

Levée en Masse in Ukraine: Applications, Implications, and Open Questions

by David Wallace and Shane Reeves

March 11, 2022

The Attack at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant and Additional Protocol I

by Tom Dannenbaum

March 13, 2022

The Russia-Ukraine War and the Space Domain

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March 14, 2022

Fact-finding in Ukraine: Can Anything Be Learned from Yemen?

by Charles Garraway

March 14, 2022

Status of Foreign Fighters in the Ukrainian Legion

by Petra Ditrichová and Veronika Bílková

March 15, 2022

Law Applicable to Persons Fleeing Armed Conflicts

by Julia Grignon

March 15, 2022

Ukraine’s Legal Counterattack

by Michael Kelly

March 17, 2022

The ICJ’s Provisional Measures Order: Unprecedented

by Ori Pomson

March 17, 2022

Displacement from Conflict: Old Realities, New Protections?

by Ruvi Ziegler

March 17, 2022

A No-Fly Zone Over Ukraine and International Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 18, 2022

Time for a New War Crimes Commission?

by Diane Marie Amann

March 18, 2022

Portending Genocide in Ukraine?

by Adam Oler

March 21, 2022

Are Mercenaries in Ukraine?

by Robert Lawless

March 21, 2022

Abducting Dissent: Kidnapping Public Officials in Occupied Ukraine

by Katharine Fortin

March 22, 2022

Are Thermobaric Weapons Unlawful?

by Matt Montazzoli

March 23, 2022

A Ukraine No-Fly Zone: Further Thoughts on the Law and Policy

by Terry D. Gill

March 23, 2022

The War at Sea: Is There a Naval Blockade in the Sea of Azov?

by Martin Fink

March 24, 2022

Deportation of Ukrainian Civilians to Russia: The Legal Framework

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 24, 2022

Weaponizing Food

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 28, 2022

Command Responsibility and the Ukraine Conflict

by Noëlle Quénivet

March 30, 2022

The Siren Song of Universal Jurisdiction: A Cautionary Note

bySteve Szymanski and Peter C. Combe

April 1, 2022

A War Crimes Primer on the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

by Sean Watts and Hitoshi Nasu

April 4, 2022

Russian Booby-traps and the Ukraine Conflict

by Michael N. Schmitt

April 5, 2022

The Ukraine Conflict, Smart Phones, and the LOAC of Takings

by Gary Corn

April 7, 2022

War Crimes against Children

by Véronique Aubert

April 8, 2022

Weaponizing Civilians: Human Shields in Ukraine

by Michael N. Schmitt

April 11, 2022

Unprecedented Environmental Risks

by Karen Hulme

April 12, 2022

Maritime Exclusion Zones in Armed Conflicts

by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

April 12, 2022

Ukraine’s Levée en Masse and the Obligation to Ensure Respect for LOAC

by Jann K. Kleffner

April 14, 2022

Cultural Property Protection in the Ukraine Conflict

by Dick Jackson

April 14, 2022

Results of a First Enquiry into Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Ukraine

by Marco Sassòli

April 14, 2022

Comprehensive Justice and Accountability in Ukraine

by Chris Jenks

April 15, 2022

Maritime Neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

by David Letts

April 18, 2022

Cyber Neutrality, Cyber Recruitment, and Cyber Assistance to Ukraine

by Nicholas Tsagourias

April 19, 2022

Defiance of Russia’s Demand to Surrender and Combatant Status

by Chris Koschnitzky and Steve Szymanski

April 22, 2022

The Montreux Convention and Turkey’s Impact on Black Sea Operations

by Adam Aliano and Russell Spivak

April 25, 2022

Lawful Use of Nuclear Weapons

by Jay Jackson and Kenneth “Daniel” Jones

April 26, 2022

Litigating Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

by Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

April 27, 2022

Military Networks and Cyber Operations in the War in Ukraine

by Heather Harrison Dinniss

April 29, 2022

Building Momentum: Next Steps towards Justice for Ukraine

by Philippa Webb

May 2, 2022

Counternormativity and the International Order

by Dan E. Stigall

May 3, 2022

Destructive Counter-Mobility Operations and the Law of War

by Sean Watts and Winston Williams

May 5, 2022

Are We at War?

by Michael N. Schmitt

May 9, 2022

The Ukraine Conflict and the Future of Digital Cultural Property

by Ronald Alcala

May 13, 2022

Neutral State Access to Ukraine’s Food Exports

by James Kraska

May 18, 2022

Negotiating an End to the Fighting

by Michael N. Schmitt

May 24, 2022

Is the Law of Neutrality Dead?

by Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

May 31, 2022

Effects-based Enforcement of Targeting Law

by Geoff Corn and Sean Watts

June 2, 2022

U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations in Support of Ukraine

by Michael N. Schmitt

June 6, 2022

War Sanctions Steadily Degrade the Russian Maritime Sector

by James Kraska

June 7, 2022

The Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group & Ukrainian Prosecutions of Russian POWs – Part 1

by Chris Jenks

June 22, 2022

The Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group & Ukrainian Prosecutions of Russian POWs – Part 2

by Chris Jenks

June 24, 2022

The Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group & Ukrainian Prosecutions of Russian POWs – Part 3

by Chris Jenks

June 28, 2022

Putting “Overall Control” to the Test of the Third Geneva Convention

by Alessandra Spadaro

July 6, 2022

The Risk of Commercial Actors in Outer Space Drawing States into Armed Conflict

by Tara Brown

July 8, 2022

The Release of Prisoners of War

by Jeroen van den Boogaard

July 8, 2022

The Attack on the Vasily Bekh and Targeting Logistics Ships

by James Kraska

July 11, 2022

Lessons from Syria’s Ceasefires

by Marika Sosnowski

July 12, 2022

Documentation and Investigation Responses to Serious International Crimes

by Brianne McGonigle Leyh

July 13, 2022

Rebel Prosecutions of Foreign Fighters in Ukraine

by René Provost

July 15, 2022

Forced Civilian Labor in Occupied Territory

by Michael N. Schmitt

August 2, 2022

Forced Conscription in the Self-Declared Republics

by Marten Zwanenburg

August 8, 2022

Amnesty International’s Allegations of Ukrainian IHL Violations

by Michael N. Schmitt

August 8, 2022

Oil Tankers as “Environmental Time Bombs,” or Not

by Mark Jessup

August 12, 2022

The Escalating Military Use of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant

by Tom Dannenbaum

August 22, 2022

Protected Zones in International Humanitarian Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

August 24, 2022

Photos of the Dead

by William Casey Biggerstaff

August 19, 2022

Deception and the Law of Armed Conflict

by William Casey Biggerstaff

September 8, 2022

Data-Rich Battlefields and the Future of LOAC

by Shane ReevesRobert Lawless

September 12, 2022

Russian Crimes Against Children

by Oleksii KaminetskyiInna Zavorotko

September 14, 2022

Targeting Leadership

by Mehmet Çoban

September 16, 2022

Illegality of Russia’s Annexations in Ukraine

by Lauri Mälksoo

October 3, 2022

Russia’s Forcible Transfer of Children

by Alison Bisset

October 5, 2022

The Kerch Strait Bridge Attack, Retaliation, and International Law

by Marko MilanovicMichael N. Schmitt

October 12, 2022

Russian Preliminary Objections at the ICJ: The Case Must Go On?

by Ori Pomson

October 13, 2022

The Complicity of Iran in Russia’s Aggression and War Crimes in Ukraine

by Marko Milanovic

October 19, 2022

Attacking Power Infrastructure under International Humanitarian Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

October 20, 2022

Dirty Bombs and International Humanitarian Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

October 26, 2022

Doxing Enemy Soldiers and the Law of War

by Eric Talbot JensenSean Watts

October 31, 2022

Are Civilians Reporting With Cell Phones Directly Participating in Hostilities?

by Michael N. SchmittWilliam Casey Biggerstaff

November 2, 2022

Using Cellphones to Gather and Transmit Military Information, A Postscript

by Michael N. Schmitt

November 4, 2022

State Responsibility for Non-State Actors’ Conduct

by Jennifer Maddocks

November 4, 2022

Reparations for War: What Options for Ukraine?

by Luke Moffett

November 15, 2022

Further Thoughts on Russia’s Campaign against Ukraine’s Power Infrastructure

by Michael N. Schmitt

November 25, 2022

Russia’s Allegations of U.S. Biological Warfare in Ukraine – Part I

by Robert Lawless

December 2, 2022

Russia’s Allegations of U.S. Biological Warfare in Ukraine – Part II

by Robert Lawless

December 9, 2022

The THeMIS Bounty Part I: Seizure of Enemy Property

by Christopher Malis and Hitoshi Nasu

December 12, 2022

Classification of the Conflict(s)

by Michael N. Schmitt

December 14, 2022

The THeMIS Bounty Part II: Stealing Enemy Technology

by Christopher Malis, Hitoshi Nasu

December 16, 2022

The “I Want to Live” Project and Technologically-Enabled Surrender

by David WallaceShane Reeves

January 13, 2023

UN Peacekeepers and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant

by Alexander Gilder

January 20, 2023

What’s in a Name? Getting it Right for the Naval “Drone” Attack on Sevastopol

by Caroline Tuckett

January 23, 2023

Ukraine’s “Suicide Drone Boats” and International Law

by Charles M. Layne

January 25, 2023

The Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Aid

by Alexandra Francis

January 27, 2023

A Wagner Group Fighter in Norway

by Camilla Cooper

February 1, 2023

The Legal and Practical Challenges of Surrendering to Drones

by William Casey Biggerstaff,Caitlin Chiaramonte

February 8, 2023

Field-Modified Weapons under the Law of War

by Ronald Alcala

February 13, 2023

The Wagner Group: Status and Accountability

by Winston WilliamsJennifer Maddocks

February 23, 2023

The Law of Crowdsourced War: Democratized Supply Chains – Part I

by Gary Corn

March 1, 2023

Reprisals in International Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

March 6, 2023

The Law of Belligerent Occupation

by David A. Wallace 

March 8, 2023

Seizure of Russian State Assets: State Immunity and Countermeasures

by Daniel Franchini

March 8, 2023

The Law of Crowdsourced War: Democratized Supply Chains – Part II

by Gary Corn

March 15, 2023

“Damn the Torpedoes!”: Naval Mines in the Black Sea

by Ben RothchildMark Jessup

March 15, 2023

Landmines and the War In Ukraine

by Dario PronestiJeroen van den Boogaard

March 20, 2023

Russia’s “Re-Education” Camps: Grave Violations Against Children in Armed Conflict

by Alison Bisset

March 20, 2023

A Path Forward for Food Security in Armed Conflict


March 22, 2023

The Legality of Depleted Uranium Shells and Their Transfer to Ukraine

by Stuart Casey-Maslen

March 24, 2023

Accountability for Cyber War Crimes

by Lindsay Freeman

April 14, 2023

Destruction of the Kakhovka Dam: Disproportionate and Prohibited

by Anaïs Maroonian

June 29, 2023

Transfers of POWs to Third States

by Marten Zwanenburg, Arjen Vermeer

July 19, 2023

Territorial Acquisition and Armed Conflict

by Michael N. Schmitt

August 29, 2023