Ukraine Symposium – “Public Curiosity” and the North Korean POWs

The Russia-Ukraine international armed conflict, which started with Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 and grew with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, escalated further with the recent involvement of North Korean troops. North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, sent forces to assist Russia’s ongoing war effort against Ukraine. In October 2024, those forces deployed into combat in Russia’s Kursk Oblast following several weeks of training at military installations in Russia.

It is believed that North Korean forces are embedded in Russian units that are mounting a counteroffensive against Ukrainian units holding territory in the Kursk region. Media reports indicate that Ukrainian forces have inflicted significant losses on North Korean personnel. During the fighting, Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers. Ukraine released photographs, video footage, and related information about their capture through television and social media.

This post addresses the treatment of the North Korean prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention (GC III), specifically as it relates to photographs of them on television and social media. We will focus on the concept of making these prisoners of war a “public curiosity” and the implications that flow. We begin with the capture and processing of the prisoners.

Capture and Processing

Capture of the two North Korean soldiers took place on or about 9 January 2025 on Russian territory. Soldiers of Tactical Group No. 84 of the Ukraine Special Operations Forces captured one of the North Korean soldiers, while Ukrainian paratroopers captured the other. Reportedly, they were the first North Koreans to be taken alive by Ukraine. Photographs, videos, and related stories about the North Korean prisoners appeared on television and on social media channels.

The identity of the soldiers could clearly be ascertained from biographical information that Ukraine publicly released. Ukraine transported the two prisoners to Kyiv for interrogation. A video, released through social media channels, showed the soldiers being interrogated. The North Koreans do not speak Ukrainian, English, or Russian. As such, communication with them has been facilitated through Korean language interpreters in collaboration with South Korea’s intelligence services. The soldiers appear to be injured and scared.

Law and Policy

The two captured North Korean soldiers were combatants in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and when they fell into the hands of Ukrainian forces became prisoners of war entitled to the protections of GC III (see art. 4A(1)). Their status as prisoners of war is not in dispute.

As to their treatment, Article 13(2) of the GC III provides, in part, “likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.” As noted in a 2020 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention, traditionally, the exposure of prisoners of war to insult and public curiosity was a military ritual, done for propaganda purposes which included parading the prisoners before crowds (para. 1621).

With advances in technology, prisoners of war have been exposed to public curiosity through the public release of photographic images and video footage (para. 1622). For example, during the Vietnam War, U.S. pilots were displayed on enemy television and forced to make anti-American statements. Similarly, in the first Gulf War, British Royal Air Force navigator John Nichol and his pilot, John Peters, injured and disheveled, were posed on Iraqi television.

Displaying prisoners of war on television for propaganda purposes is certainly not limited to air crews. During the Iraq War in 2003, five captured soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 507th Maintenance Battalion were shown on Iraqi television and on the Al Jazeera network.  Commenting on the incident, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that parading prisoners of war before television cameras was a violation of the Geneva Conventions. In 2005, the U.S. military also strongly condemned publication of a photograph of Saddam Hussein, disheveled and in his underwear, in the aftermath of his capture with a headline that read, “Tyrant’s In His Pants” in a British tabloid paper. Nor is this episode the first to concern public exposures of combatants in the Ukraine conflict. For example, Professors Sean Watts and Eric Jensen previously covered questions relating to “doxing” enemy soldiers here.

As outlined in GC III, Article 13(2), prisoners of war must be protected from insults and public curiosity. The 2020 ICRC Commentary provides helpful insights regarding the intent, interpretation, and application of Article 13(2). As a threshold matter, the word “insult” as ordinarily understood, means a remark or action that treats a person with disrespect or abuse. Accordingly, prisoners of war must be protected from disrespectful words or acts (para. 1623). The word “public” in the context of Article 13 has been interpreted broadly meaning anyone who is not directly involved in the handling of the prisoner of war. This would include other members of the detaining power, though Sean Watts has called for caution concerning support for such expansive interpretations of Article 13 in the ICRC Commentary (p. 168).

It is important to highlight that being exposed to “public curiosity,” even when such conduct does not involve insults, is humiliating in and of itself and is therefore prohibited (para. 1624). The U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual reiterates the protections found in Article 13(2) and specifically notes that “[d]isplaying POWs in a humiliating fashion on television or on the internet would also be prohibited. For this reason and others, DoD policy has prohibited the taking of photographs of detainees except for authorized purposes.” (§ 9.5.3)

Exposing prisoners of war to public curiosity can be manifested in different ways. Of note, according to the ICRC, “[i]n modern conflicts, the prohibition also covers … the disclosure of photographic and video images, recordings of interrogations or private conversations or personal correspondence or any other private data, irrespective of which public communication channel is used, including the internet” (para. 1624). Not only are such broadcasts humiliating for the prisoner of war, but it is thought that they put the prisoner’s family in jeopardy as well as the prisoner when he or she is repatriated (para. 1624).

Detaining powers that broadcast photographs and videos of prisoners of war may attempt to justify their actions. For example, they may contend that photographs and videos of prisoners will serve as a proof of life and ultimately a safeguard for the wellbeing of the exposed prisoners. Of course, such arguments are often a feeble attempt to disguise the genuine purpose of the photographs and videos which are often propaganda related. Moreover, GC III provides other mechanisms for establishing proof of life. These include the transmission of capture cards, exchange of correspondence, and ICRC visits (para. 1625).

Proof of life is only one purported justification. As further noted by the ICRC,

photographic and other visual evidence has been used to prosecute war crimes, promote accountability and raise public awareness of abuses, contributing to greater respect for the Geneva Conventions. For example, the Nuremberg trials following the Second World War employed a considerable quantity of photos and films as evidence, as have other international tribunals subsequently (para. 1626).

Ultimately, application of Article 13(2) requires detaining powers to strike a reasonable balance between the benefits associated with making information public about prisoners of war to include photographs and videos and the possible humiliation and harm to the prisoners.  However, in striking that balance, any information that enables individual prisoners to be identified must normally be regarded as subjecting them to public curiosity and may not be transmitted, published or broadcast.

Analysis and Implications     

Based upon the publicly available information about the capture of the two North Korean prisoners, it appears that their Ukrainian captors are providing them medical care and otherwise meeting their immediate physical needs. Additionally, they are being interrogated by their captors which is permissible under GC III.

However, the release of photographs, videos, and related biographical information of the two captured North Korean prisoners of war by the Ukrainians appears to be a violation of GC III, Article 13(2). The photographs, videos, and related information were widely disseminated through social media channels and television. That is, public exposure went well beyond those matters directly involved in handling the prisoners. The humiliation evident in the North Korean prisoners’ obvious fear and injury, as well as the biographical information disclosed, compounds the violation of Article 13(2).

So why did the Ukrainians release the information? What was the benefit of publicly releasing the information and how does that balance against the humiliation and harm to the prisoners?  Of course, one can only speculate as to the Ukrainians’ specific motive and related benefit in releasing the information. Was it a form of propaganda showing a defeated and humiliated adversary? Was it intended to conclusively demonstrate that North Korean forces have entered the armed conflict? Ultimately, the application of Article 13(2) requires detaining powers to strike a reasonable balance between the benefits associated with making information public about prisoners of war to include photographs and videos and the possible humiliation and harm to the prisoners.

In this particular case, the humiliation and harm to the two North Korean prisoners of war far outweigh any Ukrainian benefit associated with the disclosure. The most disturbing implication that flows from the incident was specifically identifying the two prisoners. Their identities were clear. The Ukrainians did not use appropriate methods to conceal the specific identity of the prisoners such as blurring, pixelating or otherwise obscuring faces and voices.

Given what is publicly known about North Korea, it is hard to imagine that the two prisoners of war, if repatriated back to North Korea, would not suffer severe consequences for surrendering to and cooperating with their captors. North Korea has a reputation for punishing individuals for acts disloyal to the regime or its leader. Additionally, it is entirely foreseeable that punishments may not be limited to the captured soldiers. Their families may be punished as well.

Conclusion

In the case of the recent captured of two North Korean prisoners of war, the release of photographs, videos, and related information may amount to subjecting prisoners to public curiosity in violation of Article 13(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. The harm inflicted by publicly exposing the identities of these soldiers is troubling. Beyond the immediate humiliation experienced by the prisoners, their safety and that of their families may have been compromised.

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Brigadier General (ret.) David A. Wallace previously served as the Professor and Head of the Department of Law at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and has been designated a Professor Emeritus. He is the United States Naval Academy Class of 1971 Distinguished Military Professor of Law & Leadership.

Brigadier General Shane R. Reeves is a Professor of Law and the 15th Dean of the Academic Board of the United States Military Academy, West Point.

Photo credit: Mil.gov.ua